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By Kevin Freese, OE&TA; and Marc Williams, OE&TA
Russia’s Arctic Army
Introduction
In the hit superhero film The Dark Knight Rises (2012), the antagonist, Bane (Tom Hardy), addresses protagonist Batman (Christian Bale) espousing his 
advantage fighting in darkness “… you think darkness 
is your ally? You merely adopted the dark. I was born in 
it, molded by it …” In some ways, this quotation is 
analogous to Russian and US military approaches to 
the Arctic. Certain US units train periodically for Arctic 
operations but cold weather is a normal condition for 
the Russian military. Russian equipment is designed to 
operate in snow, ice, and swamp and at -50°C.  Multiple 
formations are permanently stationed in the Arctic and 
other units train in the Arctic year-round. High-latitude 
rotations are routine, rather than exceptional. 
Russia is the only US competitor with Arctic military 
forces. Russian Arctic military activity is one aspect 
of  a long-term, global strategy,1 but the Arctic is 
disproportionately emphasized compared to other 
regions2 and Russia is always preparing for Arctic 
conflict.3  Although the Arctic operational environment 
is one of  the more 
stable regions of  
the world and 
conflict over the 
Arctic is unlikely, 
conflict in the Arctic 
remains a matter 
of  concern. 
This article 
examines the 
Arctic operational 
environment, 
particularly as it 
relates to Russia, discusses 
Russia’s strategic approach to the Arctic, highlights the 
Russian Army’s Arctic-positioned forces, and provides 
a description of  several key operating platforms 
the Russian Army uses in the Arctic. The US Army 
training community would be well-advised to take 
Russian Arctic capabilities seriously when designing and 
developing scenarios and scripts, in order to ensure the 
Army is ready to face an adversary who is experienced, 
trained, equipped, well-positioned, and with more at 
stake in the region than anyone else.
Frontier station ‘Nagurskoye’  
Source: Vladimir Baranov (Владимир Баранов), “Frontier station ‘Nagurskoye’ (Погранзастава ‘Нагурское’),” RIA 
Novosti image #642086, April 14, 2010, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RIAN_archive_642086_Frontier_
station_%22Nagurskoye%22.jpg. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
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The Arctic Operational Environment                              
The Arctic is one of  the most extreme and dynamic 
environments in which an army could operate. It 
is dominated by seas covered in drifting ice.4 Land 
topography is varied, ranging from glacier-covered 
mountains to shallow lakes and boggy peatlands.5   
Winters are long, dark, and cold; summers are short 
with continuous daylight.6 Ionospheric storm impacts 
are pronounced7 and geostationary satellites cannot 
provide coverage.8 The Arctic population is small, 
dispersed, and isolated compared the rest of  the world.9 
Much Arctic infrastructure, particularly in Russia, is 
built on permafrost in areas at risk for thawing in the 
near future.10 Russian transportation networks are 
isolated from other European networks,11 although 
development projects are underway to connect them.12  
Climate change is increasing the importance of  the 
historically small Arctic economy.  Russia’s Northern 
Sea Route (NSR) serves as a seasonal waterway between 
Asia and Europe and connects Russia’s east and west;  
decreasing annual sea ice is extending its shipping 
season.  Decreases in annual sea ice and advances 
in extraction technology also make Arctic natural 
resources more accessible.  The Arctic has abundant, 
untapped mineral wealth, including precious metals, rare 
earths, and uranium, among others,  as well as massive 
undiscovered fossil fuel resources.  
Russia’s Strategic Approach to the Arctic   
Russia arguably has as many or more national interests 
based in the Arctic that any other country: The most 
Arctic territory, the longest Arctic coastline,19 and 
the largest Arctic population of  any country.20 Russia 
economy depends upon hydrocarbon resources, much 
of  which are in Russian Arctic territory. The NSR is a 
key shipping route for Russia, connecting its eastern 
and western extremes and allowing Russia to tap into 
global commerce. Much of  Russia’s strategic deterrent 
capability is based in the Arctic, particularly the Barents 
Sea and Kola Peninsula region.21  
Acknowledgement:  Funding for this map was provided by the National Science Foundation through the Arctic Research Mapping Application (armap.org) and Contract 
#0520837 to CH2M HILL for the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC). 
Map author: Allison Gaylord, Nuna Technologies.  May 27, 2009.
*The Aleutian chain boundary is demarcated by the 'Contiguous zone' limit of 24-nautical miles.
Arctic Boundary as defined by the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA)
All United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, 
Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.*
Credit: US Arctic Research Commission
US definition of the Arctic
Source: Allison Gaylord, “Arctic Boundary as Defined by the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA),” US Arctic Research 
Commission, May 27, 2009, retrieved from: https://www.arctic.gov/maps.html. Public Domain.
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The Arctic is prominent in Russian national 
policy, but is nested within global strategy. 
The 2016 Foreign Policy Concept states that 
Russian policy is “aimed at preserving peace, 
stability and constructive international 
cooperation in the Arctic,” emphasizing 
international law can handle disputes. Russia 
maintains that states with Arctic territory 
have special rights and responsibilities for 
development and ties use of  the NSR to 
that development.22 The National Security 
Strategy of  2015 mentions the Arctic in the 
context of  global exploitation of  maritime 
fossil fuel resources, developing public-
private relations in the security sector, and 
international development.23 The National 
Maritime Doctrine identifies Russian Arctic 
policy drivers as ensuring Russian fleet 
access to the Atlantic and Pacific, natural 
resources in the economic exclusive zone 
and continental shelf, growing the NSR, 
and the Northern Fleets mission to defend 
Russia.24
Russia’s actions towards the Arctic are 
consistent with these interests and strategy. 
Russia already has a polar ice breaker fleet 
that outnumbers the rest of  the world’s 
combined fleets25 and is modernizing 
ports along the Arctic coast.26 Russia 
has claimed authority to regulate ships 
transiting international waters in the NSR27 
despite international pushback.28 Russia 
is improving space domain capability 
by expanding satellite coverage, with an 
additional twelve Earth-imaging satellites 
dedicated to Arctic surveillance planned to be in orbit 
during the next decade.29  Moreover, Russian media 
continues to advance the narrative of  Russian Arctic 
legacy and supremacy.30  Simultaneously, Russia has 
been conducting scientific studies of  the Arctic basin 
to legitimize claims before international bodies that the 
undersea Lomonosov ridge is connected to Russia’s 
continental shelf.31 If  ultimately accepted by the 
international community, this would enable Russia to 
extend economic exclusivity to central Arctic natural 
resources.
The Russian military has three priorities in the Arctic: 
Maintaining strategic balance with west through nuclear 
forces, employing conventional power in the Barents 
region, and securing the NSR, particularly in the eastern 
littorals.32  Russia’s Arctic joint military capability is 
nested in the Arctic Operational Strategic Command, 
established at the Northern Fleet headquarters in 
Severomorsk in 2014.33  The Russian Aerospace Forces 
Expanded definition of the Arctic
Source: US Department of State, “Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation Non-Binding Illustrative 
Map,” US Arctic Research Commission, April 12, 2019, retrieved from: https://www.arctic.gov/maps.html. Public Domain
Arctic Shipping Routes 
Source: CIA, “Arctic Shipping Routes” CIA World Factbook, 2019, retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/resources/the-world-factbook/attachments/maps/XQ-map.gif. Image in public domain.
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have an air defense division in Severomorsk34 and were 
building an Arctic Air Squadron with fighter-bombers 
as of  July 2019.35 Naval forces include Russia’s only 
aircraft carrier and nuclear cruiser, seven ballistic missile 
submarines, and dozens of  submarine, naval aviation, 
and surface assets.36 Ground forces include two Army 
Arctic brigades and a Naval Infantry brigade in addition 
to support formations.37 Arctic military infrastructure 
includes 14 airfields, 5 coast guard stations, 9 military 
bases. Arctic forces deploy worldwide and non-Arctic 
forces deploy to the Arctic periodically.38   
In addition to having military forces and a plethora of  
equipment and infrastructure positioned in the Arctic, 
Russia has been improving forces for Arctic operations 
through modernization and technological investment. 
Military improvements range from investment in bases 
to support long-range aircraft operations and coastal 
patrols,39 upgraded air defense,40  improving vehicle 
capabilities,41 advancing drone and robotics technology 
for Arctic operations,42 upgrading air and missile 
defense, and training forces extensively to operate in the 
region.43  
Russian Arctic Ground Forces 
Russian dedicated Arctic ground forces include the 
80th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade in Alakurtti, the 
200th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade in Murmansk, 
and the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade in Sputnik. These 
forces rotate on an 18-month basis to Franz Josef  
Land, using the Arctic Trefoil. The 80th resembles a 
standard Infantry brigade but with oversnow vehicles 
and training with dog sleds and reindeer sleds.44  The 
200th is equipped as a standard MRB with all-terrain 
vehicles for supply and logistics. They deployed to, 
Luhansk, Ukraine in 2014.45 The 61st is based in 
Sputnik but has deployed to fight in the Donbass region 
and Syria.46 In 2016, Russia announced it would be 
activating another Arctic Brigade in Chukotka, but gave 
no timeline.47 Russia continues to innovate and refine 
vehicles for overcoming the Arctic environment.
Specialized Facilities
The Arctic Trefoil48 (also known as the Arctic 
Shamrock) is a military facility built specifically to 
endure Arctic extremes. The 14,000 square meter 
facility is built on stilts. It houses 150 personnel on 18 
month rotations and includes a medical clinic, library, 
chapel, gym, and cinema. Its purpose is to strengthen 
the Russian military presence along the NSR. There is 
also the Northern Clover base operating on Kotelny 
Island in the East-Siberian Sea.49 More were being 
constructed along the NSR as of  2019.
Arctic-Specific Equipment
The Arctic environment stresses equipment through 
temperature extremes, high winds, and rough terrain. 
The Russians have adapted legacy platforms and 
developed new ones to deal with these climatic 
stressors. This includes air defense systems, logistics 
and resupply vehicles, combat vehicles, and aircraft. 
Many of  the systems included here can be found in the 
Worldwide Equipment Guide  (https://odin.tradoc.
army.mil/WEG). 
200th MRB Unit Patch and 61st Naval Infantry Brigade Patch 
Source: VoidWanderer, “200 OMSBr VSRF,” Wikimedia Commons, June 27, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:200_OMSBr_VSRF.png;  VoidWanderer, “61st Kirkenes Marine Brigade Patch,” Wikimedia 
Commons, November 24, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:61st_kirkenes_marine_brigade_
patch.png. Both Public Domain.
Arctic Trefoil on Franz Josef Land 
Source: “Video: Russia Establishes Arctic Shamrock Base on Franz Josef Land,” Navy Recognition, August 29, 
2018, http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/august-2018-navy-naval-
defense-news/6468-video-russia-establishes-arctic-shamrock-base-on-franz-josef-land.html. 
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Tor-M2DT Air Defense System
The TOR-M2DT is a short-range (5-12 km) air 
defense missile system using the TOR-M2 missile 
launcher (NATO designation SA-15 “Gauntlet”). 
The system is adapted for the Arctic region by 
being mounted on the chassis of  the DT-30PM 
articulated tracked vehicle. The TOR-M2DT was 
developed by the Russia`s JSC Izhevsk Electro-
mechanical Plant Kupol (a subsidiary of  the 
Almaz-Antey Concern).50  The Tor-M2DT has 
been deployed in the Russian Arctic from Franz 
Josef  Land to Chukotka.51  The TOR-M2DT 
was revealed during the rehearsal for the Russian 
Victory Day Parade in April 2017.
BTR-82 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC)
The BTR-82 armored personnel carrier is the latest 
addition to the BTR-80 family. It is an improved version 
of  the BTR-80A/S, which entered service in 1994. It was 
developed largely as a complement (and a stop-gap) for a 
BTR-90, whose development has been long, troubled, and 
expensive. The BTR-82 is similar to the BTR-80A/S but 
has some minor improvements. In 2010, it successfully 
passed trials. Production commenced that same year. The 
original BTR-82 entered service with the Russian Army in 
2011. However the original BTR-82 was not produced in 
large numbers because production soon switched to the 
up-gunned BTR-82A, which the Russian military uses in 
large numbers. Its operating temperature range is -50°C 
to +50°C (-58°F-+122°F). The 80th Independent MRB 
received the BTR-82A models in 2016.52
Ruslan TTM-4902 PS-10 All Terrain Carrier
The Ruslan TTM-4902PS-10 carrier is a two-sectioned, 
tracked, amphibious all-terrain vehicle. It has a 
300-horsepower engine and is capable of  transporting
up to 22 people as well as providing bed space for five.
Manufactured by the CJCS Transport Company, the
Ruslan was designed to transport cargo, repair teams, and
equipment (up to 4000 kg) in off-road conditions. The
first section is a power module (load-carrying capacity 500
kg). It is able to carry six people and has two full beds.
The second section is a passenger module (16 people,
six beds). The vehicle was tested in harsh conditions in
the Murmansk region north of  the Arctic Circle before
entering into service. These vehicles are currently in
use by Russian units in the Arctic. The Ruslan TTM-
4902PS-10 has a temperature range of  -50°C to +50°C
(-58°F-+122°F).53
YouTube Screenshots of Tor-M2DT in winter camouflage paint 
Source: Defense Daily, “TOR M2DT Arctic Short Range Air Defense Missile System,” YouTube, February 27, 2018, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMDsjkzAvQM.
BTR-82A 
Source: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “BTR-82A Russian 8x8 Amphibious Armored 
Personnel Carrier (APC),” Worldwide Equipment Guide, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/
BTR-82A.
TTM-4902 PS-10 debarking from the Saint George Landing 
Ship  
Source: Zarvan, “New TTM-4902PS-10 all-terrain vehicle tested during amphibious operation by 
Russian navy troops,” Pakistan Defence, August 25, 2015, https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/new-ttm-
4902ps-10-all-terrain-vehicle-tested-during-amphibious-operation-by-russian-navy-troops.393827/.
Red Diamond 8 Oct-Dec 2019
DT-10PM and DT-30PM “Vityaz” Articulated Tracked Vehicles
The function of  the DT series of  
articulated tracked vehicle is to carry 
munitions, military equipment, and 
personnel through difficult terrain and 
weather conditions (-45°C to +40°C 
degrees). It has excellent off-road 
capabilities in any season, including 
swamps, virgin snow, unimproved dirt 
roads, and water obstacles throughout 
Russia’s Siberia and Far East districts. 
These are two-unit transport vehicles 
with all four tracks driving. Because of  
low ground pressure, the vehicle is theoretically immune to certain types of  at mines. ATVs are indispensable 
as recovery vehicles, since they have a high pull ratio and can approach a stuck or damaged vehicle from any 
direction in bad road conditions. The DT-30PM transporters are effective for search and rescue teams operating 
in extreme conditions (bad roads, floods, snow-drifts, land- and snow-slides, or large-scale destruction) when it 
is necessary to evacuate people, animals, and various cargoes or to transport rescue teams, medical personnel, 
equipment, and food to affected areas. The DT-30PM has a fully-enclosed forward-control cab, which provides 
seating for a driver and four passengers. The engine compartment is located behind the cab. The rear unit can 
accommodate a variety of  bodies. In some variants, the rear unit can vary considerably from the front. It is fully 
amphibious. On water, it is propelled by its tracks. Owing to their unique design, the Vityaz-family ATVs are 
capable of  operating in conditions impossible for other all-terrain vehicles,54 for example:
• Amphibious return to a mother ship
• Off-road movement with one unit disabled or detached, or without both tracks on one of  the units
• Negotiating ditches and clefts up to 4.0 meters wide
• Unloading of  a ship offshore if  it cannot come close to waterfront (i.e. in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, or
in flooded regions, etc.); negotiating waterways in severe ice conditions
• Operating in mountains up to an altitude of  4,000 meters
TM-140 “Chetra” All-Terrain Vehicle
The TM-140 “Chetra” is manufactured by Chetra PM. It is a commercial Arctic vehicle created for oil workers 
and geologists working in difficult terrain and climatic conditions, adapted for military use. It functions well in 
snow and swamp environments. It can come equipped with a passenger module, a workshop module, or special 
purpose modules (pile driving, drilling rig, or crane).55
DT-10PM and DT-30PM 
Source: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “ Vityaz DT-10PM Russian All Terrain Carrier, Worldwide Equipment Guide, 
https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/Vityaz_DT-10PM_Russian_All_Terrain_Carrier;  US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 
“Vityaz DT-30PM Russian All Terrain Carrier,” Worldwide Equipment Guide, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/Vityaz_DT-
30PM_Russian_All_Terrain_Carrier;
TM-140A amphibious, all-terrain, tracked, Arctic 
cargo/personnel carrier  
Source: DefenseWebTV, “TM-140A Amphibious All Terrain Tracked Cargo Personnel 
Carrier Arctic Vehicle Russia Russian Army,” YouTube, January 8, 2016, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=W2WfxSwnhVQ.
Specifications
Weight 11.2 tons Engine Yaroslavl 250hp turbo-diesel
Length 2,710 mm Engine pre-heater Yes
Width 2,650 m
Armor
Engine compartment only. 
Optional add-on armor for 
protection against small 
arms.
Height 2,190 mm
Road Speed 45 km/h
Swim speed 5 km/h Ground pressure 0.26 kg / sq. cm
Fuel Capacity 830 liters Clearance 450 mm
Carry capacity 4 tons Arctic equipment Dual-circuit heating system
Range
800 km unloaded
550 km loaded
Power 24 volt
Passenger module 2.7 × 2.65 × 2.19 m
Temperature range –50°C to +50°C
Weapons
Can be fitted with a remote 
weapon station armed with 
one machine gunIncline 30 degrees
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Mi-8AMTSh-VA Arctic helicopter
The Mi-8AMTSh-VA is a variant of  the Mi-8 
HIP multi-role transport helicopter and was 
first fielded in 2015 to the Russian Air and 
Space Force (RuASF). The Russian Navy 
received its first version in 2016. Produced 
by the Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant (U-UAP) in 
southeastern Siberia, it has been modified 
for Arctic conditions. With an additional 
power unit, the helicopter can start up in 
temperatures down to -60°C and remain in 
the open air without a hangar for up to five 
hours in a ready for take-off  state.56 Designed 
as a transport helicopter, the Mi-8 proved a 
multi-purpose machine. The cable external 
suspension, equipped with the weight-
measuring device, makes it possible to carry 
large size cargoes weighing up to three tons. 
If  required, it can serve as either a combat, 
rescue, or artillery observation helicopter. 
The Mi-8AMTSh-VA is deployed to Kotelny 
Island, Tiksi, Nagurskaya, Anadyr, and Mys Schmidt.57  It is used for resupply, reconnaissance, and search and 
rescue operations in the Northern Sea Route. Russia is expected to purchase 100 more models for use in the 
Army and Federal Security Service in Vorkuta.58
Mi-8 helicopter 
Source: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, GTA 20-17-003 Worldwide Equipment Identification Cards Russia Edition, 
August 1, 2019, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1007539
Specifications
Arctic equipment
*Hydraulic, fuel and oil systems use Teflon 
hoses
*Thermal insulation
*MSK immersion suits over cold waters
*Snow skis/slump pads
*Alcohol anti-icing for the cockpit windows
*Oven and hot water boiler for use by the 
aircrew and passengers
*Increased battery capacity
Engine 2x Klimov VK-2500-03 turboshafts
   OEI Mode 2,700shp for 2.5 minutes
   Take-off mode 2,400shp for 30 minutes
   Cruising rate 1,500shp for 60 minutes
Auxiliary power unit
Modified TA-14 provides preheating for 
engine, main gearbox, cabin, cockpit, engine 
bays and transmission
Overhaul time 2,000 hours
Service life 6,000 hours
Payload/Range 2,900kg (4,409lb) / 540km (291nm) 
   With two external tanks 1,500kg (3,306lb) / 980km (529nm)
Avionics suite
*PKV-8 Series 2 digital autopilot system
*TsNS-02 digital navigation system
*BINS-SP-1 inertial gyro reference platform
*Kontur-10Ts weather radar
   With two cabin auxiliary fuel tanks 800kg (1,763lb) / 1,420km (766nm)
Weapons PK 7.62mm machine gun. 1 rear, 2 sides.
Mission equipment
*Prima-DMV and Prima-KV transceivers
*RPA-500 direction finder
*TSL-1600 searchlight
*SLG-300 electrical rescue hoist rated at 
660lb (300kg)
* LPG-150M, rated at 331lb (150kg)
*12 stretchers in MEDEVAC configuration 
with internal aux tanks removed
*Droppable life rafts for SAR missions.
NVG flying Geophizika-NV GEO-ONV-1-01 Gen III NVGs
Protection
*6x UV-26M 32-round countermeasures 
dispensers
*Metal/ceramic armor protection for cockpit, 
cabin and all vital systems
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Fire Support Vehicle Toros 
The Toros is an Arctic adapted vehicle developed by Muromteplovoz based on the MT-LBu chassis.59  It is 
used for carrying personnel, transporting loads, infantry fire support, and escort and guard missions in Arctic 
conditions.60  In addition to deep cold, this vehicle can operate in mountainous areas up to 3,000 meters above 
sea level, and up to 4,000 meters with some modifications.61  Specifications include:
TTM 1901 Berkut Snow Mobile 
The TTM-1901 Berkut is a snowmobile with a two-
man heated cab and a rear cargo platform. It has skis in 
the front and tracks in the rear. The cab is much like an 
automobile interior with bucket seats, standard foot pedals, 
and a steering wheel instead of  handle bars. Designed to 
transport personnel and tow skiers, it is built to order by 
the Nizhny Novgorod-based “NPO Transport” company 
using Oka car bodies and Lada engines.62  The cab’s heating 
system maintains a temperature of  +18°C even if  it is 
-50°C outside. The vehicle drives on snow regardless of
its thickness at a speed of  35-40 km/h. There is a combat
station for a machine gunner.63  The Russian ministry of
defense purchased 40 of  these in November 2016.64  This
vehicle is currently in use by Russia’s Arctic brigades (80th
Independent Motor Rifle Brigade in Alakurtti and the 200th
Independent Motor Rifle Brigade in Pechenga).65  The
vehicle has also been used by the Russian border guard as
well as the Ministry Of  Emergency Situations.66
Toros Tracked Armored Vehicle 
Source: “Russia Could Order Toros Tracked Armoured Vehicle for Military Units 
Deployed in the Arctic Region 11805162,” Army Recognition, May 18, 2016, 
https://www.armyrecognition.com/weapons_defence_industry_military_
technology_uk/russia_could_order_toros_tracked_armoured_vehicle_for_
military_units_deployed_in_the_arctic_region_11805162.html
TTM-1901 Berkut   
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, “Military-Technical Forum ARMY-2016 - Static Displays Part 3: Air Defence, 
Trucks and Wheeled Armored Vehicles,”2016, https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2016-
Static-part3. CC BY-SA 4.0.
Specifications
Combat weight 15 tons Engine YaMZ-238BL-1 (310 h.p.) diesel
Length 7,210 mm Combat turret MB-2
Width 3,150 mm
Weapons
*30mm 2A42 auto cannon
*7.62 PKTM coax machinegun
*30mm AGS-17 automatic 
grenade launcher
*Six 81mm Tucha 902V smoke 
grenade launchers
Height 1.905 mm
Road Speed 60 km/h
Range 500 km
Swim speed 4-6 km
Optics
TKN-4GA-03 
combined optical/
infrared sight with 
integrated thermal 
imager
Optional weapons M113M Konkurs-M anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM)
Armor Level 3 (K) STANAG 4569
Towing capacity 6.5 tons
Arctic equipment
*Adjustable plow blade
*VSN-9DN generator
*Additional insulation
* Polar 4D-24 air heaters
Temperature 
range -50°C up to +45°C
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T-80BV Main Battle Tank
The T-80B main battle tank is a variant of  the T-80, which was 
produced only in small numbers. The T-80B is the first variant 
produced in quantity. Small scale production commenced in 
1978. The T-80BV is an improvement on the T-80B, adding 
Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armor (ERA).67  The T-80BV 
smoke grenade launchers were moved from either side of  
the main armament back to the either side of  the turret and 
positioned between the turret side and the ERA panels. On 
the turret of  the T-80BV, the panels are joined to form a 
shallow chevron shape. ERA is also fitted to the forward 
part of  the turret roof  to provide protection against attacks 
from above. The ERA provides a high degree of  protection 
against anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) which rely on a 
high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warhead to penetrate armor. 
Over the frontal arc, it does not provide any added protection against armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) 
or armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds. Some T-80BV tanks have been equipped 
with a dust flap under the glacis plate and some of  them have been equipped with single line of  ERA along the 
top of  the hull. The T-80BV engine has a gas turbine, allowing the tank to be started in one minute at -30°C, 
compared to 45 minutes with an unheated diesel engine.68 
Armored Vehicle MT-LB 
The wide track of  the MT-LB makes it one of  
the world’s best light armored vehicles for ice, 
snow, and marshes. The MT-LB is a general-
purpose carrier and prime mover developed from 
an unarmored civilian tractor. Some versions are 
used as an APC with a maximum capacity of  11 
dismounted soldiers. It is armed with two PKT 
7.62-mm machine guns. Other weapons systems 
can be mounted on the vehicle for a variety 
of  purposes. It has 
7-14mm of  armor,
has a collective NBC
protection system, and
comes with a self-
entrenching blade. The
MT-LB has a large
number of  variants.69
T-80BV at 9 May 2010 military vehicles static displays
in Luzhniki  
Source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin, “T-80BV at 9 May 2010 military vehicles static displays in Luzhniki,” 
Wikimedia Commons, May 9, 2010, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russian_T-
80BV.jpg. CC BY-SA 4.0.
MT-LB
Source: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “MT-LB Russian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC),” Worldwide 
Equipment Guide,  https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/MT-LB_Russian_Armored_Personnel_Carrier_(APC)
NAME VARIATIONS
MT-LB “Blade” Bulldozer version
MT-LBu Raised hull area for improved carrying capacity in 50+ of 60+ MT-LB variants
2S1 12mm self-propelled Howitzer
BTP-LB Technical support vehicle
MT-SON Ground surveillance radar (GSR) with the Pork Trough/SNAR-2 radar system.
RKhM Chemical reconnaissance vehicle
MT-LBVM Mounts a 12.7mm DSHK machinegun
MT-LB6MA Upgrade with 14.5mm, twin 14.5-mm DSHK machineguns with a 7.62mm machine gun
MT-LB6MB Upgraded APC with Modular Weapon Station includes the 30-mm cannon, 30-mmAGL, & 7.62-mm MG
MT-LB6MB3 FSV/APC upgrade with antiaircraft 23-mm GSh-23L twin cannons, 30-mm AGL & 7.62mm machine gun
MT-LB6MB5 APC/IFSV with Gsh-30K twin 30-mm anti-aircraft guns, 12.7-mm MG, 30-mm AGL & space for a single squad
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Key Takeaways
A conflict with Russia over the Arctic itself  is unlikely, 
but any conflict with Russia could involve Arctic 
campaigns or operations. Russia is more heavily vested 
in the Arctic than any country and certainly prioritizes 
the ability to fight there. Russia’s investment in Arctic 
development and military capability will enable Russian 
military forces to operate and sustain themselves for 
extended periods of  time, year-round, in isolated 
locations in the Arctic. Investment in maritime transit, 
primarily meant to support economic interests, also 
means Russia will be able to project and sustain power 
across Arctic waters to a significantly greater extent 
than any and all rivals. In the long run, infrastructure 
investment in overland infrastructure connecting 
Russia with the western European Arctic, in addition to 
promoting trade, will facilitate sustainment of  forward-
deployed Russian ground forces should a conflict 
occur. Russia would have an advantage within Russian 
territory and against any individual European Arctic 
country because of  force strength, prepositioning, 
purpose-designed equipment, and extended ability to 
communicate and maneuver.♦
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In October 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin co-hosted with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi a two-day Russia-Africa Economic Forum 
in the Black Sea resort town of  Sochi. Evidence 
of  African interest in greater Russian investment 
in African countries can be seen in the attendees—
over 6,000 representatives of  all 54 African nations, 
including 43 heads of  state, business and political 
leaders, and experts—who came to discuss and sign 
agreements.1  Discussions considered a 
vast array of  interests, including energy 
and infrastructure development, modern 
and high-tech mineral extraction and 
processing, agriculture, digital technologies, 
oil and gas exploration, medicine, science 
and education.2  
Russia cannot compete with the United 
States and, especially, China in economic 
terms. Because of  this, Russia is selective 
and opportunistic in its investing in places 
like Africa.3  As the United States has 
moved away from investment in Africa 
and has prioritized attention in other areas 
of  the world, Russia is making inroads 
into African countries that are hungry for 
foreign investment and security support. According 
to the Kremlin, the Sochi conference resulted in 
$12.5 billion in deals. These were, for the most 
part, memorandums of  understanding and may not 
materialize as actual investments, in the end.4  If  only 
symbolic, however, the conference does represent a 
Russia aggressively pursuing a place on the international 
stage and an Africa interested in the attention.5 
Russia is dusting off  its Cold War playbook and 
engaging with old African partners, after post-USSR 
retrenchment. Putin is positioning himself  as liberator 
and protector of  African sovereignty, an old and 
effective argument against relationships with the old 
colonialists from the West.6  In an interview with TASS, 
Putin stated that “Our country played a significant 
role in the liberation of  the continent, contributing to 
the struggle of  peoples of  Africa against colonialism, 
racism, and apartheid.”7  Konstantin Malofeev, 
billionaire Kremlin benefactor and chairman of  the 
newly-founded Moscow-based International Agency for 
Sovereign Development, said during one of  the Sochi 
conference sessions, “Regime change is promoted by 
the West to keep African countries scared and weak, so 
the West can influence them. And we in Russia know 
what we’re talking about, because we’ve come a long 
way to win our economic sovereignty.”8
The following Carnegie 
Endowment for International 
Peace table gathered from the 
Kremlin’s press service digest 
(available on kremlin.ru) for the 
period from January 2015 to 
August 2019 shows the official 
visits of  African heads of  state to 
Russia since 2015.9
Russia in Africa
By Rick Burns, OE&TA
Country President Dates
1 South Africa Jacob Zuma 2015
2 Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe 2015
3 Sudan Omar al-Bashir 2015, 2017, 2018
4 Guinea Alpha Condé 2016, 2017
5 Central African Republic Faustin-Archange Touadéra 2018
6 Rwanda Paul Kagame 2018
7 Gabon Ali Bongo Ondimba 2018
8 Senegal Macky Sall 2018
9 Zimbabwe Emmerson Mnangagwa 2019
10 Angola João Lourenço 2018, 2019
11 Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso 2019
12 Mozambique Filipe Nyusi 2019
Whether Putin is able to match results with his rhetoric 
is less important to him than the appearance of  Russian 
relevance and the dilution of  US and Western influence. 
Russia sees Africa as a means to weaken the West’s 
international dominance, attract partners in crafting a 
more advantageous multipolar world, and exploiting 
economic opportunities—particularly for Russian 
companies hit hard by international sanctions. 
Putin also sees African regimes as allies in supporting 
its interests in international organizations such as the 
United Nations; the African countries make up about 
one-quarter of  United Nations member states. Russia 
uses strategic partnerships and debt relief—Putin 
announced forgiveness of  $20 billion in African debt 
at the October 2019 Sochi Conference—as useful ways 
to encourage allies to back key votes, such as the 2014 
General Assembly resolution that criticized Russian 
annexation of  Crimea. Twenty-nine African countries 
voted or abstained from the resolution, with six not 
showing up for the vote.10  Other votes on Syria and the 
militarization of  Crimea, the Black Sea, and the Sea of  
Azov have shown African support for Russia’s agenda 
in international organizations.11
Two areas where Putin’s Russia is gaining influence and 
positioning itself  with African leaders is in military sales 
and services and nuclear energy. 
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Military Sales and Services                               
Russia is the second largest supplier of  arms in the 
world and a major supplier to African countries. 
Between 2013 and 2017, Russia supplied 39 percent 
of  the weapons sold to African countries.12  Military 
contractor Yevgeny Prigozhin and his private military 
contractor company the Wagner Group have been 
used to put down insurgencies in Central African 
Republic (CAR), which probably is motivating other 
African countries, including Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania, and Niger to explore opportunities 
for Russia’s direct assistance with their own internal 
conflicts.13 
Russia’s growing influence in the country began in 
2017, when it received an exemption to the UN arms 
embargo that restricted CAR’s ability to build and 
resource its security forces—allowing CAR to purchase 
a modest quantity of  light arms. The UN arms embargo 
dating back to 2013 required approval by the UN 
Security Council’s CAR sanctions committee, which 
included France and Russia on its fifteen-member 
committee. An uptick in violence created a dilemma, 
which France attempted to solve by offering to give 
CAR 1,400 AK47 rifles it seized in Somalia in 2016. 
Russia’s objection to that proposal led to an exemption 
for Russia to donate AK47s, sniper rifles, machineguns 
and grenade launchers in December 2017 to stanch the 
immediate crisis.14
Moscow exploited this foothold to expand its military 
and security presence there, primarily at France’s 
expense. Over the last decade and a half, Russia 
has continued to increase the number of  civilian 
and military trainers it sends to CAR. In 2018, 175 
trainers—mostly Russian military contractors—
established an expandable camp at Béréngo palace, 
which is about thirty-five miles from the capital Bangui. 
With CAR’s volatility and the government’s fragile hold 
on the country, Russia is positioning itself  as a welcome 
ally in the fight to gain government control of  the 
territory held by armed groups.15
Russia’s relatively small investment in CAR contributes 
to its larger narrative of  being a power broker on the 
world stage. Russia can lay claim to a major role in the 
peace and stability process in volatile CAR while, at the 
same time, benefiting from the sale of  arms and other 
security services. The CAR government, suspicious of  
the West, is willing to strengthen ties with Russia, whose 
less rigid stance on human rights and willingness to 
supply needed support to its military is welcomed.16 
Nuclear Energy                                                 
TEnergy sufficiency is, arguably, one of  the critical 
needs and priorities of  African countries. These 
countries face a persistent lack of  access to electricity, 
which has helped to stymie development on the 
continent. Despite progress in several countries, such as 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, and Rwanda, current 
and planned efforts at upgrading energy services will 
not outpace population growth. In order to meet 
current expectations of  the African Union’s “Agenda 
2063” vision, countries will be required to triple the 
average number of  people gaining access to electricity 
every year from around the current 20 million to over 
60 million.17 
During the Sochi Conference, Russia and Ethiopia 
signed an agreement that further cemented a 
relationship begun in 2017 to cooperate in building a 
nuclear power station in the next decade. Ethiopia’s 
Ministry of  Innovation and Russia’s State Atomic 
Energy Corporation Rosatom signed the agreement, 
which includes developing a foundation for an 
Ethiopian nuclear industry—including writing safety 
regulations, developing storage facilities for nuclear 
fuel and waste, and plans for building a 3GW nuclear 
plant. Other ambitious projects being discussed include 
reactors to create radioactive isotopes for medical, 
agriculture, and research purposes and the construction 
of  an Ethiopian Center for Nuclear Science and 
Technology.18  The agreement that Ethiopia signed with 
Rosatom is one of  several agreements signed between 
African countries and Rosatom. The largest of  these 
agreements is the $29 billion Dabaa plant in Egypt, 
with other arrangements with South Africa, Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Ghana and looser cooperation agreements 
with Sudan and the Democratic Republic of  the 
Congo.19  
Rosatom is a Moscow-headquartered international 
corporation focused on the generation of  electricity 
and meeting other subsidiary and corollary needs. The 
company offers nuclear fuel cycle, uranium mining, 
fuel and enrichment, and power generation projects, 
as well as nuclear medicine, non-nuclear equipment 
manufacturing, machine building, engineering, and 
maintenance services.20  Rosatom, founded in 2007, 
is the result of  Russian president Vladimir Putin’s 
consolidation of  the Russian nuclear industry into a 
vertically integrated state-owned company with 360 
subsidiaries. The world-wide footprint includes forty 
countries and positions it as the second largest nuclear 
power company in terms of  installed nuclear capacity 
and number of  nuclear units in operation. Its portfolio 
of  overseas projects for the next decade exceeds $133 
billion, although most of  the projects in this estimate 
are framework agreements that have not been built 
yet.21  
Critics point out that nuclear reactors may be too 
expensive for poor countries and not fit the needs of  
the poorest citizens. No nuclear projects on the African 
continent have been finished and only two contracts, 
with Egypt and Nigeria, are in place; completion of  
other nuclear projects are years into the future. The 
promise of  generous loans— Egypt has borrowed 
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85% of  the construction costs for its nuclear reactor 
from Russia—and long-term supply contracts are 
attractive incentives for Russia, but are also invitations 
for corruption and glacial improvement in delivering 
electricity to the poorest areas of  African countries. An 
industry recommendation states that no single facility 
should provide more than ten percent of  a country’s 
total power. If  a country invests in large reactors, it may 
not have the infrastructure to push power to those in 
greatest need of  electricity.22
Summary                                                          
Russia’s investment in Africa is on the rise, but it may 
be less than advertised, in the end. Russia is unable to 
effectively compete in direct competition with the West 
and China, so its investments will be opportunistic 
and focused on places where others are less focused. 
With the United States concentrated on other areas 
of  the world and viewing Africa as a lower priority, 
Russia is seeing opportunities on the continent. The 
economic benefits of  new markets and undeveloped 
African natural resources are inviting to sanctioned 
Russian companies. African countries suffering from 
internal conflicts offer new prospects for increased 
Russian arms sales and security services. African 
countries are interested in Russia’s less restrictive human 
rights and other requirements associated with trade 
and development. These relatively limited economic 
benefits, however, are side benefits to Putin’s even 
more compelling reason for investment in the African 
continent, the furtherance of  the narrative that Russia 
is a global power. To the extent possible, Putin will also 
use investments in African countries to minimize US 
and Western influence.♦ 
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Operational Environment Mapping Series
Greater Caucasus
In a previous Red 
Diamond article 
“GCKN’s Cultural 
Mapping Series” (Vol 9, 
Iss 4, Sep/Oct 2018), the 
TRADOC G-2 introduced 
a new product series intended 
to combine geospatial and socio-cultural analysis to 
enhance Operational Environment (OE) understanding, 
with the pilot project on Nigeria released in January 
of  2019 (available at https://community.apan.org/
wg/oekn/m/mediagallery/266644).  This series—
since renamed “Operational Environment Mapping 
Series” (OEMS)—continues under the direction of  
the Operational Environment and Threat Analysis 
(OE&TA) directorate with a second installment 
on the Greater Caucasus region (the Republic 
of  Georgia, and the Russian Federation’s North 
Caucasian Federal District) slated for production.
The OE&TA directorate envisions a similar product 
to the Nigeria pilot, but continues to refine and 
enhance the methods, analysis, and delivery to 
better fit the needs of  the end-user.  As in the pilot, 
the OEMS will include a short introduction to 
the Greater Caucasus OE and a number of  map 
composites generated from a pool of  geospatial layers 
that when combined help tell different stories about 
the OE.  In addition, the individual layers themselves 
will be included in the product so that the end-user 
can generate his or her own composites to help form 
a narrative that may help answer specific questions.
While standard layers 
such as physical terrain and 
infrastructure will be included as a 
foundation, the emphasis is on socio-cultural and 
related phenomena that are not as concrete as physical 
layers and in many OEs present a challenge to obtain or 
produce.  Many of  these layers are not readily available 
in a geographic information system (GIS) format and 
must be painstakingly generated from spreadsheets, 
scanned materials, or translated textual descriptions.  
The OEMS Greater Caucasus provides these layers 
while also going a step further by providing analytic 
layers produced by utilizing existing geospatial analysis 
methods or by developing new ones.  
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OEMS stand-alone layers come in six general categories:
• physical – generally available already in a GIS format, includes 
such layers as topography, land use/land cover, hydrography, 
climate, and infrastructure.  Multi-spectral imagery may also 
be included in this category.  A standard mission folder will 
include most of  these layers.
• socio-cultural – layers compiled from census data, on-
the-ground research, or interpretation of  characteristics of  
physical layers, including population density, ethnicity, and 
economic status.  A standard mission folder typically lacks 
these layers.
• events – layers compiled from official sources or media 
reporting, such as elections, demonstrations, or violence.
• perceptions – layers compiled from polls, surveys, or social 
media, such as election results, leadership approval ratings, and 
general public attitudes.
• temporal – layers depicting chronological phenomena such as 
migration or any changing conditions over time.
• analytic – variables derived through the use of  a proven 
methodology, such as hot spot analysis depicting patterns of  
violence or patterns of  movement.
This combined array of  geospatial layers form an enhanced 
mission folder, or an “OE in a Box” that will provide the end-user 
with a comprehensive picture of  the OE as well as the potential 
for generating a multitude of  composites.
While the Nigeria pilot was largely a static document, the OEMS 
Greater Caucasus seeks to provide an interactive environment, 
whereby the end-user can manipulate the OEMS data layers and 
add their own existing layers to form composites that meet their 
own specific needs.  At the same time, these external layers can be 
harnessed and vetted to feed the baseline array.
As part of  creating a realistic training environment, the OEMS 
Greater Caucasus will be able to directly inform Decisive Action 
Training Environment (DATE) Caucasus region. Not only will 
this product lead to the inclusion of  more specific and real world 
influenced conditions, it will provide geospatial representations of  
those conditions.  
The OE&TA will collaborate with other TRADOC G-2 
organizations to ensure continuity of  narrative and to identify 
further ways in which this product line can be utilized. OEMS 
Greater Caucasus will represent the second evolution of  
TRADOC G-2’s efforts to fuse socio-cultural information with 
geospatial capabilities. As part of  this evolution OE&TA will 
document both its successes and challenges with the development 
and delivery of  the product, and utilize that record to inform 
discussion among the training community and shape future 
practices.♦
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This is the first part of  a two-part series that presents Russian tactics, techniques, and procedures and tactical setting that a Battalion 
Tactical Group (батальоннуе тактическая группа - 
BTG) may employ in a maneuver defense (маневренная 
оборона). Terms used throughout the article are those 
used by Ground Forces of  the Russian Federation 
(Сухопутные войска Российской Федерации  – SV) in 
doctrine and related military articles. The Russian 
General Staff  considers the maneuver defense the 
“fundamental type of  defensive posture.”1 The SV uses 
a maneuver defense in order to progressively attack a 
penetrating aggressor force by using successive battle 
positions to inflict casualties, gain time, and preserve 
forces and means. The maneuver defense is directed 
when there are insufficient SV forces and means to set 
a strong positional defense and the SV can give ground 
until conditions are favorable to counterattack.2 
A BTG is a combined arms tactical organization based 
on a motorized (mechanized) rifle or tank battalion, 
with integrated subunits. The SV’s reorganization places 
maneuver brigades directly subordinate to an army with 
maneuver regiments subordinate to divisions. At present, 
brigades are only subordinate to an army and are not 
found under a division organization. Both brigades and 
regiments are capable of  task organizing a battalion to 
create a BTG.
BTGs maintain the highest level of  readiness in a 
brigade or regiment. Any soldier vacancies or equipment 
shortages are immediately backfilled from other units in 
the brigade.  Maintaining a BTG in this manner allows 
the SV to sustain the unit’s capability to deploy within 
2-hours of  alert.3 The allocation of  additional forces 
and means are those the higher echelon commanders 
determine are necessary to accomplish an assigned 
mission. 
Typically, a BTG operates as part of  a brigade, acting as 
the main element of  the brigade’s defense when the SV 
conducts large-scale combat operations. In this example, 
the BTG will conduct a maneuver defense forward of  
the brigade’s main defense and as it maneuvers back it 
will ultimately reoccupy a position in the defensive belt.4  
The composition of  a motorized (mechanized) or tank 
BTG will include the most modern weapons platforms 
crewed by contract (Kontraktniki) soldiers with a limited 
number of  conscripts found within the ranks. 
Russia continues modernizing the SV with both 
new equipment and manning changes. A significant 
change in the manning area is the increasing reliance 
on professional or contract soldiers to fill the ranks in 
addition to one-year conscripts. Contract soldiers agree 
to an extended period of  service that allows the SV to 
field units with higher levels of  readiness and battlefield 
skills. As more contract soldiers become available the 
number of  BTGs in a brigade will increase from the 
current 1-2 to the ultimate goal of  3 BTGs in a brigade. 
Experts remain uncertain as to the number of  BTGs a 
regiment is capable of  generating.
Assessing the capabilities and limitations of  a BTG is 
a constant comparison and contrast to determine the 
correlation of  relative combat power. Organizational 
diagrams are only a starting point in unit assessments, 
and further study must consider aspects such as the type 
and status of  weapon complexes, equipment, manning 
readiness, and available logistic support to prepare for 
and sustain tactical actions. Knowing the leadership 
experience of  commanders from senior to junior levels 
is another analytical measure of, for example, the SV 
unit’s ability to incorporate recent experiences and tactics 
employed in Syria and the Donbass.5  
At the soldier level, the combinations of  professional 
contract soldier versus conscript can be a telling indicator 
of  readiness. Open-source estimates suggest that many 
SV brigades or regiment-sized units at this time may 
only be capable of  fielding a single battalion-sized unit 
manned by contract soldiers.6  The type and number 
of  weapon complexes among units can also differ 
significantly. A motorized (mechanized) rifle brigade with 
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light armor MT-LB troop carriers presents a distinctly 
different array and combat power from a unit fielded 
with BMP-2 or BMP-3 armored fighting vehicles.7    
For the purpose of  this article’s tactical discussion, 
the BTG is a fully modernized unit with experienced 
leaders and soldiers. Sustainment is comparable to 
that expected of  a supporting effort in a brigade zone 
of  responsibility. The commanding Army allocates 
operational and strategic combat multipliers to provide 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, deception, 
prioritized long-range fires, and other support to a 
brigade’s defensive zone. These supporting forces and 
means provide area coverage in the form of  fires from 
the brigade artillery group (BrAG), division artillery 
group (DAG) or army artillery group (AAG), jamming 
and electronic attack from the electronic warfare 
company (REB) organic to the brigade structure, air 
defense coverage from the Aerospace Forces, as well 
as coordination of  intelligence from special operations 
forces (SSO) or local guerillas. This combination of  
enablers indicates that the SV tactical concepts expect 
a brigade, its units and subunits, to be capable of  
defending a larger zone of  responsibility of  up to a 
20km frontage in comparison to former Soviet units.8  
The continuing development of  BTG and brigade 
capabilities in an increasingly non-linear or fragmented 
battlefield may see the brigade’s frontage extend as far as 
50km.9 Extended coverage by reconnaissance, improved 
command and control capabilities, and increasing range 
and precision of  indirect fire complexes all contribute 
to the expansion. The SV uses the term “complexes” to 
label equipment sets and supporting systems; i.e. an air 
defense complex includes the radars, guns or missiles, 
and command and control computer networks.  
The capability to effectively control and direct both 
targeting sensors and precision fires in the strategic, 
operational, and tactical echelons is possible through 
the C2 organization known as the National Defense 
Management Center (Natsionalnomu Tsentru Upravleniya 
Oboronoy-NTsUO).10  The NTsUO functions at the SV 
strategic-operational echelons and directs fires down to 
the tactical echelon. It maintains continuous visibility of  
the battlefield using all available sensors from satellites 
down to individual soldier observers. This capability 
allows the collection, analysis, and assessment of  all 
detected battlefield actions and the resulting rapid 
adaptation to changing conditions. This unit conducts 
unified C2 using automated mobile field complexes to 
direct SV units and subunits using complexes such as the 
YeSU TZ (Yedinaya avtomatizirovannaya sistema upravleniya 
takticheskim zvenom), and Strelets, part of  the Ratnik 
soldier kit (комплекса разведки, управления и связи –КРУС 
(KRUS), Andromeda-D, or Akatsiya-M.   
The Army commander’s maneuver defense plan includes 
actions to create a tactical situation that progressively 
draws an aggressor force into committing its effort 
along a particular axis or corridor. The plan integrates a 
deliberate and calculated use of  deception (маскировка), 
radio-electronic battle (радиоэлектронная война – REB), 
and targets for long-range fires at selected times and 
locations, to defeat or destroy the aggressor force in 
support of  the higher SV commander’s plan. 
The second section of  this article presents a tactical 
vignette that describes and illustrates integrated BTG 
combat power with condition-prompted decision points 
for effective conduct of  maneuver defense tactics. Figure 
1 depicts an example task organization with additional 
forces and means as well as elements that serve to 
degrade or defeat aggressor command and control (C2) 
or higher echelon support. Note that the SP artillery 
battalion, as an attachment is directly subordinate to the 
BTG commander.11  
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Figure 1. Motorized (mechanized) Rifle BTG (example).
Source: TRADOC G-2 OE&TA. “ Motorized (mechanized) Rifle BTG (example).” TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment & Threat Analysis (OE&TA) Directorate.  2019.
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The BTG maintains continuous contact as it draws 
aggressor maneuver forces into the depth of  the 
defensive zone. To maintain contact the BTG uses 
maneuver force reconnaissance, unmanned complexes, 
both ground and air, electronic warfare complexes, and 
supporting forces and means from higher echelons. 
Elements such as Ministry of  Defense special operations 
forces (командование силами специальных операций) – 
KSSO or спецназ GRU Spetsnaz) will conduct direct 
action or reconnaissance in the depth of  the aggressors 
territory.13, 14  Observations by all SV units and subunits 
are shared through automated C2 complexes as 
described above.15    
As the aggressor maneuver units penetrate into what it 
perceives is the main defensive zone, its combat support 
and combat service support must displace and follow at 
probable distances to provide timely logistics and be able 
to react to front-line tactical contingencies. At designated 
locations and timing, the BTG uses preset fire ambushes 
to defeat or destroy aggressor critical combat power, C2, 
and following support forces. The commander’s plan 
designates ambush sites and/or fire sacs with integrated 
supporting direct fires, minefields and obstacles to slow 
the aggressor force. These recurring actions cause the 
aggressor attack to culminate before achieving its tactical 
objectives and set the conditions for its destruction 
or defeat. Key tactical maneuver defense actions are 
to cripple effective aggressor C2, deny situational 
understanding of  environmental variables, and prevent 
effective sustainment of  the attacking forces. 
The actions in a maneuver defense allow SV forces 
to withdraw unopposed or withdraw under pressure 
as directed in the brigade commander’s plan. He 
may also order strongpoints or zones of  continued 
positional defense in order to channel an aggressor 
into predesignated fire ambushes. As aggressor 
forces extend their axis of  attack into the depth of  
the maneuver defense zone, maneuver and support 
complexes are degraded, become less cohesive, and 
are more susceptible to BTG counterattack. The BTG 
counterattack can be primarily integrated fires and will 
include defensive fires and a combination of  ground and 
aerial maneuver to defeat or destroy the aggressor.
The BTG commander focuses a keen situational 
understanding of  the aggressor organization, terrain and 
weather, his own functional capabilities and limitations, 
and probable aggressor offensive actions to determine 
how and when the BTG executes its maneuver defense. 
The BTG is expected to use innovative actions and 
initiative to accomplish the commander’s plan and is 
allowed prudent latitude in the actions employed to 
accomplish the mission. SV units composed of  conscript 
soldiers continue to rely on practiced battle drills to 
Maneuver Defense Overview                              
The purpose of  a maneuver defense is to draw an 
aggressor force into the depth of  the defense where 
it is defeated or destroyed using successive kill sacs, 
ambushes, and counterattacks from the flanks. The 
SV views artillery as the principle means of  engaging 
and destroying the attacking aggressor forces. Artillery 
units and subunits will deploy forward to gain the best 
range advantage possible while retaining security and 
maneuverability.  SV defensive tactics include unit actions 
with the following general characteristics to achieve 
stability and activeness of  the maneuver defense:12 
• Maneuver of  units throughout the width and depth 
of  the security and main defensive zones.
• Maneuver by fire with concentrated fires on a high-
payoff  and high-value targets.
• Battle formations widely dispersed across the front 
and in depth to strike aggressor forces 
• Non-contiguous or non-linear front
• Deception to achieve surprise and to set anti-tank 
ambushes
• Non-templated or non-uniform formations along the 
front and in depth
• Aggressive, intense, and ferocious combat to 
overwhelm the attacking aggressor force
• Seizure of  opportunities to take advantage of  
changing situation and transition to decisive 
counterattacks
To accomplish this, subunits conducting maneuver 
defense employ integrated fires, unmanned aerial 
vehicles, electronic warfare, and integrated air defense 
as essential elements of  the defending maneuver forces. 
In the SV, units and subunits denote specific capabilities, 
basically, a unit is capable of  self-sustained actions and 
subunits require support to accomplish tasked missions. 
Maneuver units and subunits serve to draw the aggressor 
into kill sacs without becoming decisively engaged. 
The maneuver defense uses predefined successive 
engagements with indirect, electronic, and direct fires to 
defeat and destroy the aggressor. The techniques used by 
the SV include a series of  sequenced withdrawals under 
the direction of  the brigade or battalion commander. 
The BTG and brigade uses a combination of  maneuver 
and positional defensive actions to create a sequenced 
and interlinked series of  engagements through the depth 
of  the defense. 
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The BTG commander may also occupy a small 
command observation post (COP) to personally observe 
critical actions of  the defense, and direct fires and 
maneuver to achieve his maneuver defense mission.21  
The COP normally includes the BTG commander, the 
senior fire support commander or staff  coordinator in 
the BTG, a communications element, and security team.  
An automated command and control system enhances 
the commander decisionmaking process and speedy 
selection and execution of  fires and complementing 
complexes.
The main CP contains the majority of  the BTG staff  
with the battalion chief  of  staff  directing the overall 
staff  and support for the mission. If  a deception CP is to 
be employed as part of  higher headquarters information 
warfare (informatsionnaya voyna - IV) operations in the 
BTG zone, those assets would be provided by the higher 
headquarters to present a realistic multi-sensor signature 
to deceive the aggressor. 
The BTG receives logistics support from a Material 
Technical Support (MTO) battalion found in all SV 
maneuver brigades.22 The MTO commander establishes 
and controls resources and support of  the BTG based 
on the commander’s plan. The MTO command post 
conducts forward delivery to sustain the BTG for all 
classes of  supply, transportation, maintenance, medical, 
other services, and incorporates any logistics assets of  
affiliated units supporting the BTG. MTO platoons 
organic to maneuver battalions provide support and are 
also subunits of  the MTO companies subordinate to 
the MTO battalion. The MTO battalion establishes a 
forward and main CP. The forward CP locates between 
the brigades first and second echelons with the main 
CP in the rear area or off  the main aggressor avenue of  
attack.23     
Reconnaissance and Intelligence Actions 
(Pазведывание) The SV retains a simple concept and 
effective description to support decision making 
and application of  available forces and means by the 
commander. Situational awareness and understanding 
are products of  a functional system of  reconnaissance, 
intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition 
encompassed by the term, Razvedka.24, 25  Razvedka, as 
a single label, is used by the Russians, “to describe all 
actions necessary to achieve a better understanding of  
the enemy.”26 While introduced at the end of  the Soviet 
period, Razvedka continues to be expanded and refined 
as a key element of  Russia’s New Look organization. 
These capabilities are integral to effective integrated fires 
and air defense complexes as a comprehensive system 
of  systems. Reconnaissance combines with security 
functions to support the information domain and 
conduct missions. The BTG, however, will use battle 
drills to accomplish tactical actions as well as integrating 
supporting forces and means to maintain awareness and 
launch rapid strikes, at a critical and calculated point in 
time, when the aggressor force exposes a key combat 
power capability. 
Contemporary assessments recognize that emergent 
technologies and evolving integration of  capabilities 
provide the BTG commander with significant advantages 
at the tactical level.16  Capabilities at the strategic and 
operational levels inform and assist a tactical commander 
in creating the conditions for successful missions at the 
tactical level. 
At echelons above the brigade, the Army employs 
complexes to disrupt or even defeat information and 
situational awareness of  an aggressor.17 Examples 
include embedding cyber viruses in key aggressor 
infrastructure for execution at the selected critical time 
in an initial period of  warfare. Electronic warfare means 
penetrate aggressor equipment operating parameters for 
electronic attack at selected times and conditions. Global 
positioning system (GPS) frequencies and data can be 
scrambled or disrupted to provide false information 
during an aggressor’s decisionmaking cycle.18  
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), from micro-UAVs to 
larger unmanned complexes at higher altitudes, some 
used in swarm techniques—some used in discrete 
individual or small group missions—will conduct tasks 
with deception and operational synchronization to 
achieve a commander’s intent. Whatever the complexes 
and at whatever echelon of  command and control, 
logical high-payoff  and high-value targets will continue 
to be aggressor C2, communication, reconnaissance and 
surveillance, and electronic navigation complexes.19   
Given the possibility of  electronic reconnaissance 
complexes being corrupted by an aggressor, a 
component of  intelligence collection remains human 
intelligence. Observation and reporting from scouts, 
sniper teams, fellow commanders, agents, or sympathetic 
civilian or official in an area of  interest are integrated by 
the SV to provide current situational awareness.20         
Command and Control                                     
The BTG commander establishes a forward command 
post (FWD CP) with a small group of  selected staff  
members. Location of  the CP provides current or 
near-real time information, intelligence, and effective 
communications that facilitate situational awareness and 
visual understanding of  the tactical setting for command 
decisions.
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battalion such as the BTG. In a defense the forward 
detachment establishes a series of  supported positions 
astride the most likely avenue of  advance, to engage, 
delay, or destroy the attacking aggressor force.28 
The R&S assets in the BTG zone anticipate direct action 
combat, and plan for transfer of  the battle to security 
elements of  the first defensive echelon. A combat 
security outpost (боевое охранение - CSOP) conducts 
defensive actions typically within supporting direct 
fire range of  a first echelon.29  A grouping or series of  
CSOPs—formed by platoons, squads, or reinforced 
teams—provide early warning along probable aggressor 
main and secondary axes of  advance in a defensive zone. 
The CSOPs disrupt aggressor momentum and deceive 
the aggressor as to the actual main defensive array and 
kill sacs. 
The R&S functions and execution of  fires with 
maneuver can include:
• Identifying the approach and entry of  the aggressor 
into an assigned zone.
• Disrupting the momentum of  aggressor movement 
and/or maneuver.
• Defeat of  aggressor reconnaissance.
• Support counterreconnaissance tasks to destroy 
aggressor reconnaissance.
• Deceive or misdirect the aggressor’s forces as to the 
actual location of  the main body main defensive 
array.
• Act as a stay-behind capability to maintain 
reconnaissance and surveillance situational 
understanding of  follow-on forces, provide targeting 
of  critical C2 nodes and logistics, and conduct direct 
attack.
• Assists in the main body transition from defensive to 
offensive actions.   
Razvedka, in its current and future capabilities, assures 
the BTG commander that his senior leaders have used 
depth and deception to enhance tactical success once 
an aggressor enters his defensive zone of  action. Fires 
and maneuver will occur well forward of  the BTG area 
of  responsibility, integrated into a higher commander’s 
mission, and be able to respond to contingencies as the 
aggressor attempts to navigate through the security zone 
of  the BTG’s higher headquarters.    
intelligence requirements. Reconnaissance and security 
(R&S) actions are explicit tasks for all echelons of  a 
unit in order to gain, sustain, and improve situational 
awareness and understanding of  current and probable 
future operations. Similar recurring expectations are tasks 
of  area security and local security.
Typical tactical reconnaissance missions orient on 
the aggressor force to determine main avenues of  
maneuver or attack. Security considers the risks of  
tactical conditions and knowledge of  habitual aggressor 
behavior, and corresponding force protection actions to 
shield the main defense from unexpected attacks. 
The BTG employs Razvedka with task-organized and 
affiliated sensor capabilities to provide timely intelligence 
and identify specified aggressor capabilities to monitor, 
target, and strike at an advantageous time and location. 
Using the allocated combinations of  dismounted, 
mounted, manned and unmanned aircraft, unmanned 
ground platforms, and other technical sensors the SV 
works to accomplish information dominance.27  The 
configuration of  capabilities and timing of  employment 
consider at least three key aspects of  collecting 
information with cueing, mixing, and redundancy. The 
means to counter the aggressor can include direct and 
indirect fires as well as electronic warfare and deception. 
The layering of  Razvedka throughout the BTG defensive 
zone is mission-oriented by task and employs mobile, 
stationary, or a combination of  those capabilities.
As automated command and control system capabilities 
improve, the speed of  identification and prioritization 
of  targets improves timely action to engage a target with 
selected integrated fires or other capabilities. In addition 
to providing a high degree of  reliability to committing 
fires on high value targets, Razvedka and a complement 
of  information warfare (effects can enhance predictable 
and degraded impacts on the cognitive agility of  an 
aggressor. Deceiving or decreasing the skills, moral 
resolve, and ability of  an aggressor to act effectively is 
a fundamental aspect of  seizing the initiative, creating 
tactical opportunities, and applying combat power in 
an integrated and synchronized manner. The Razvedka 
system also provides subsequent data and analysis to 
estimate and/or confirm battle damage assessment on 
specific targets.
As a component of  SV tactical actions, commanders 
conduct a personal reconnaissance as part of  mission 
planning and execution to visually study aggressor 
disposition, terrain, and other environmental conditions. 
Tactical actions include observation posts (OPs) as 
a small team oriented on a given zone or location. 
The brigade will most likely also establish a forward 
detachment (Peredovoi otriad) using a reinforced maneuver 
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BTG’s units.  The brigade positions mobile air defense 
complexes including gun and low-to-medium altitude/
range missiles and other mobile surface-to-air missiles in 
the BTG defensive zone to provide layered air defense 
coverage. Air defense complexes at higher echelons 
provide additional layers of  air defense coverage to 
counter medium-to-high altitude aggressor targets. The 
combination of  artillery, rockets, and air defenses as an 
integrated fires and C2 system supports an expectation 
of  degraded or minimal aggressor aircraft influence on 
the BTG’s tactical mission.    
The SV brigade commander determines how to 
most effectively use fires to create the conditions for 
successful maneuver of  the BTG, and uses or reinforces 
terrain effects to create vulnerabilities in probable 
aggressor courses of  action. Figure 2 visualizes how a 
commander might sketch and study terrain, defensive 
options, and consider possible variations to his 
plan for the maneuver defense mission.
Integrated Fires and Air Defenses                   
The senior commander’s plan uses the integrated 
direct fires of  the BTG with indirect fires of  artillery 
groupings, REB, air defense, and engineer obstacles to 
destroy first echelon aggressor C2, artillery, tank, and 
mechanized units.30  The plan task-organizes artillery 
at higher echelons with C2 for prioritized mission 
execution. The artillery groups provide fires from 
brigade, division, and may even include support from 
combined arms army (CAA) or tank army assets. The 
BTG commander directs, in addition to artillery and 
multiple rocket launcher (MRL) artillery, antitank and 
anti-aircraft weapon complexes organic or task-organized 
to the BTG to mass fires or precision engagements in 
his defensive zone. Additional fires complexes and C2 
operate from within the zone to execute higher echelon 
fire missions and synchronize integrated fires 
within the zone and/or beyond the BTG zone.
A reconnaissance fires system (RFS), sometimes 
called a reconnaissance fires loop, is an 
operational fires executing capability that directs 
integrated fires that can lead the tactical actions 
of  the BTG. The intelligence and situational 
understanding from the Razvedka processes 
enable command decisions at higher C2 echelons 
to conduct precise point or area targeting with 
near-real time fire missions on high value 
targets.31 Selective capabilities can provide 
semi-autonomous and/or autonomous fires 
mission execution, or can be controlled in a 
standardized approval process by designated 
leaders. If  automated fire control complexes 
are disrupted by an aggressor, backup manual 
or predetermined nomogram calculations 
indicate the volume and timing of  firepower 
required to employ against selected targets.32  
Precision fires are a growing capability in the 
SV for attacking targets in dynamic tactical 
situations; however, massed artillery, gun, or 
multiple rocket fires often have debilitating 
effects beyond destruction of  a specific target.33  
Massed fires, including thermobaric munitions, 
can cause a profound paralysis or psychological 
trauma of  the aggressor leaders and soldiers 
experiencing or witnessing such an attack.  
An integrated air defense system (IADS) is a key 
component of  the integrated fires and C2 system that 
provides early warning and vectors of  approaching 
aggressor aircraft for targeting by selected air defense 
complexes. Air defense subunits include numerous low 
altitude man-portable air defense missile complexes, as 
well as the use of  other unit weaponry, in each of  the 
Figure 2. Commander’s sketch: Conceiving Razvedka, fires, and 
maneuver actions of a maneuver defense 
Source: TRADOC G-2 OE&TA. “Commander’s sketch: Conceiving  Razvedka, fires, and maneuver actions for a 
maneuver defense.” TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment & Threat Analysis (OE&TA) Directorate.  2019.
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and/or holding specific terrain to steer aggressor forces 
into subsequent fire sacs in the defensive depth of  the 
zone. Strongpoints are a significant commitment of  
resources and are usually constructed as a battle position 
that the BTG expects to retain. Defensive preparations 
support strongpoints with deliberate and hasty 
minefields as well as wire, antitank, and other physical 
obstacles. SV artillery forces use artillery-delivered 
mines to seal any breaches in laid minefields as well as 
providing timed minefields to block or trap aggressor 
units.38 Defending a strongpoint is a deliberate decision 
that forces the aggressor to commit combat power, slow 
or stop the pace or tempo of  aggressor maneuver, and/
or cause a directional change in aggressor attack efforts.    
Survivability measures for battle positions and 
strongpoints are conducted in priorities of  engineer 
effort and support that typically initiate actions in 
primary BPs in the first and second echelon of  initial 
main defensive positions, and progressively prepare other 
BPs or strongpoint defenses in depth. Engineer effort 
is also apportioned to tasks in the security zone. All 
BTG units continue to improve survivability as forms of  
cover, concealment, camouflage, and deception (C3D) 
measures.   
Natural maneuver restrictions of  terrain, and the impacts 
of  weather conditions, are reinforced in prepared 
defensive measures with general engineering effort and 
manmade obstacle complexes. These countermobility 
efforts also consider the mobility requirements of  the 
defense in order to accommodate planned mobility 
corridors for rapid defensive repositioning, or 
counterattacks and contingencies that may require rapid 
maneuver of  the BTG reserve.
Reserve                                                               
The maneuver reserve (резерв) is typically a force strong 
enough to defeat an anticipated aggressor exploiting 
force. The commander positions the reserve in an 
assembly area using camouflage, cover, concealment and 
deception to protect it from surveillance and attack. The 
BTG commander plans for and rehearses actions of  a 
reserve along avenues of  attack that may be required 
in response to emergent tactical conditions. Rapid 
maneuver may be required to occupy a line of  commitment 
to engage aggressor forces, conduct a situational defense 
focused on a designated fire sac, or counterattack (контр-
атака). A reserve typically has air defense coverage and 
mobility assets to facilitate its maneuver. 
Motorized rifle units in strongpoints or in urban terrain 
that dismount soldiers from their BTRs, BMPs or MT-
LBs may form an armored maneuver force labeled a 
bronegruppa (бронетанковая группа).39  This group may 
Tactical Maneuver and Defensive Actions      
The BTG commander uses the full depth of  his 
defensive zone in a maneuver defense to strike the 
aggressor forces at planned locations and times with 
fires and maneuver to defeat the aggressor. Once combat 
is initiated, the timing of  engagements is normally 
continuous on the aggressor combat systems but can 
be applied in a deliberate tempo to shape aggressor 
maneuver and direction for its ultimate destruction in 
zone. The type of  munition, such as cluster bomblet, 
chemical agent, or thermobaric munitions are combat 
multipliers used to disrupt, defeat, or destroy targets or 
impede trafficability of  an attacking force.34  As indirect 
and direct fires degrade the aggressor’s combat systems, 
obstacle complexes, deception, and obscurants further 
reduce the aggressor’s critical assets. 
The SV concept of  “maneuver by fire” indicates the 
commander can choose to accept a degree of  artillery 
survivability risk when identifying an aggressor high 
value target. The commander may direct indirect fire 
missions by massed artillery fires from subunits within 
effective range onto a single key target to rapidly destroy 
the target capability. The risk involves continuing to fire 
from a particular weapon system without shifting firing 
position until the fires destroy the designated target.35 
Area coverage REB complexes suppress the ability of  
aggressor counter-artillery radars to detect and proximity 
fuse munitions to strike artillery groupings during the 
maneuver defense.36    
Support from operational echelon assets extend the 
defensive depth and conduct deception actions to 
lure the aggressor force on to terrain that ensures 
commitment into an axis/corridor of  the SV brigade’s 
zone. The maneuver defense in the BTG zone presents 
a succession of  combat positions (боевую позицию), battle 
position complexes, or strongpoints (Опорный пункт) 
to channel the aggressor with disruptive or destructive 
fires and obstacles into fire sacs, and create conditions 
for BTG maneuver and continued fires effects. The 
BTG commander conducts engagements with a 
flexible repositioning of  BTG elements among battle 
positions that withdraw under pressure to subsequent 
battle positions (BPs) into the depth of  the zone. This 
maneuvering can be combined with counterattacks and 
additional fires. Tactical grouping or positioning of  
artillery considers the value of  artillery and mortar direct 
fire positions within a defense, as well as the risks and 
advantage of  firing positions well forward in a defensive 
array that are responsive and accurate with direct 
observation to adjust fires.37   
The SV plan directs the conditions for displacement of  
forces to alternate positions, delay in zone when directed, 
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Logistic sites designated for tactical reorganization 
actions perform weapon system repair or replacement, 
limited personnel replacement, and other supply and 
service functions to restore BTG combat effectiveness 
within its available logistics means. Repaired equipment 
with crew replacements returns to designated units to 
continue the defense. Logistics is a cycle of  continuous 
combat service support.
Employing Tactics in Maneuver Defense       
In part two of  this series, a battalion tactical group 
(BTG) conducts a maneuver defense to defeat an 
attack in zone by a US Armored Brigade Combat Team 
(ABCT). The BTG is a supporting effort to a motorized 
(mechanized) rifle brigade’s first echelon of  defenses and 
has been assigned a defensive zone with the frontage 
and depth to facilitate a maneuver defense. In this 
vignette, three motorized (mechanized) rifle companies, 
a tank company, and multiple support units are task-
organized under command and control of  a motorized 
(mechanized) rifle battalion headquarters.
This maneuver defense describes and illustrates the 
effective conduct of  a series of  engagements as the BTG 
withdraws into the depth of  its defensive zone. Once 
the aggressor fully commits to the canalized terrain 
corridor, the BTG stalls the attack, cripples effective C2, 
and significantly degrades effective sustainment of  the 
attacking forces. The result is that the aggressor attack 
provide the strongpoint with armored mobile fires or 
the commander may position it on a flank of  the likely 
aggressor attack as a mobile reserve.
Logistics                                                             
Logistics support in the SV is commonly referred to 
as material technical operations (MTO). The BTG 
task organization will include support from a MTO 
platoon assigned to provide the functional capabilities 
of  maintenance, transportation, medical, and general 
support and selective services.40 As part of  the New 
Generation reforms the SV maneuver brigade receives 
support from a MTO battalion that pushes support 
forward to maneuver forces based on the commander’s 
plan. Combat support and combat service support 
capabilities are provided from brigade to augment 
the BTG when additional units form the combat 
power maneuver and fires capabilities of  BTG task 
organization. The MTO battalion at brigade consists 
of  motor transport companies for general cargo, 
ammunition, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), 
a maintenance company, and other support or service 
support company or platoon units. The BTG, with 
one tank company attached, requires the maintenance, 
ammunition, and fuel augmentation to sustain subunits 
not in the motorized rifle battalion force structure. Other 
combat support forces operating with the BTG or in 
the BTG defensive zone coordinate logistics support 
depending on the command and support relationships to 
the BTG.      
The employment and positioning of  MTO assets 
are determined by the BTG senior logistics officer 
in conjunction with the BTG chief  of  staff  and in 
support of  the BTG commander’s mission and the 
brigade defensive concept. During a maneuver defense, 
designated logistic support teams operate with and near 
first echelon and second echelon units of  the BTG. 
Logistics are stockpiled or pre-positioned in echeloned 
defensive positions. Supply dumps are established 
for stay-behind forces in position or sites planned 
for repositioning as BTG fires and maneuver forces 
progressively reposition to defenses into the depth of  
the BTG defensive area.
Designated logistic support teams remain mobile to 
provide immediate resupply of  ammunition and fuel 
and other classes of  supply or services well forward in 
the defensive area. This mobility improves responsive 
relocation to designated rearm and refuel points in the 
succession of  key defensive positions or defensive arrays. 
After conducting resupply forward at special resupply 
points, a reverse flow occurs to evacuate casualties and 
equipment requiring maintenance repair. 
US Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 7-100.3, Russian 
Tactics, in Development
Mission. TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration develops, 
authors, and publishes Army Techniques Publications (ATPs) 
on Russian Tactics, North Korean Tactics, and Chinese Tactics 
IAW program directives approved by US Army Combined 
Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD). 
Intent. Each ATP enhances a doctrinal understanding and 
visualization of threat tactical capabilities and limitations 
for use as conditions in the operational and institutional US 
Army for improved readiness.
ATP Concept. Each ATP presents concepts, tactics, 
tactical models, terms, definitions, military symbols, and 
observations or lessons learned from recent and current 
military operations in complex operational environments. 
Each ATP provides a US Army authoritative description 
and fully unclassified non-prescriptive presentation of 
ways and methods that a particular threat can plan, prepare, 
and execute missions, functions, and tasks. 
Approach: The Russian Tactics ATP views Russian Ground 
Forces (SV) as a threat and potential enemy. As such, the 
view of unit and subunit actions is combat power seeking to 
negate any US or NATO overmatch or matching capabilities 
in order to neutralize and defeat those forces. If possible, 
the engagement seeks to avoid direct combat, but if 
necessary, all actions are predicated on aggressive, intense, 
and ferocious combat to overwhelm the aggressor force.
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is used either to denote neutral platforms or to 
reference all platforms, whether friendly, neutral, or 
hostile.
 ● Russian ground forces use various titles in task-
organized company, battalion, and brigade size 
units. The term detachment can be applicable to any 
of  these Russian units and subunits. In this article, 
detachment in used for a task-organized company 
with the acronym CDET. Other BTG elements, such 
as an obstacle detachment or a mobility detachment, 
are typically task-organized platoon-size elements.      
 ● TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment and 
Threat Assessment Directorate is conducting a final 
review of  TRADOC G-2 Handbook 1.10, Threat 
Tactical Actions-Drills, (2019) that provides multiple 
threat vignette narrative and illustration examples of  
threat tactical tasks and drills. Use and can be tailored 
for opposing forces (OPFOR) in readiness training 
or adapted to mission preparations against identified 
adversaries or enemies.♦
culminates before achieving its tactical objective. The SV 
commander accomplishes his mission to defeat a larger 
aggressor force within his brigade commander’s intent 
and in support of  the brigade defensive mission.
Look for “Maneuver Defense: A Tactical Fight to 
Victory.” in a future issue of  Red Diamond. 
TRADOC G-2 Notes                                                                  
 ● Maneuver Defense: Battalion Tactical Group. The 
illustrations and descriptions of  this article spotlight 
tactical actions of  mission execution but is not 
intended to be a comprehensive address of  all 
actions and forces in a maneuver defense by a BTG 
or similar task-organized unit. Operations at the 
operational level support the tactical actions of  the 
brigade and its BTGs.  
 ● UAV is the title given to platforms used by 
adversaries of  the US. When these platforms are 
used by US, allied, and friendly forces, even in 
training, they are referred to as unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS). The term “unmanned aircraft (UA)” 
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The Russian experience in the Great Patriotic War continues to cast a huge shadow over Russian military thinking, influencing everything from 
tactics to procurement decisions to national strategy 
and policy. At the same time, the contemporary Russian 
government is still trying to find its way in a post-Soviet 
world: no immediate perceived existential threat, smaller 
and wildly varying defense budgets, and no captive 
audience for foreign military sales (FMS) are proving 
a challenging series of  circumstances for the Russian 
defense industry. 
The Su-57 program represents one of  the highest-
profile confluences of  Russian military thinking so 
deeply influenced by the Second World War with the 
realities of  the 21st century defense landscape. The 
older Soviet approach to procurement – fielding large 
numbers of  reliable-though-unsophisticated systems 
over smaller numbers of  high-tech systems – clashed 
head-on with the fiscal, political, and tactical realities of  
developing a 5th-generation multirole combat aircraft. 
Shaping the Russian Way – The Eastern 
Front and the Cold War                                   
Despite the widespread destruction and 
economic setbacks of  the Russian Civil War 
and the early days of  communist rule, the 
Soviet aircraft industry was one of  the world’s 
most advanced in the 1920s and early 1930s.1  
Soviet officials saw the burgeoning world 
of  aviation competition as one of  the best 
ways to display Soviet ingenuity, technical 
advancements, and personal heroism, and 
as a result, poured money into aviation-
related causes. Soviet planes and pilots broke 
numerous records and enjoyed several highly 
successful public demonstrations, capped off  
by the world’s first transpolar flight in 1937. 
Soviet aircraft design bureaus pushed out 
several world-beating combat aircraft, led by 
the stellar Polikarpov I-16 fighter and Tupolev 
SB light bomber. While most of  the Soviet military was 
still in a state of  some disarray in the 1930s, the Soviet 
Air Services – colloquially known as the VVS – were 
among the world’s very best.2
Challenges and Changes for 
Russia in a Multi-Polar World
The SU-57
By Bradley A. Marvel, OE&TA
The specter of  war was 
looming over Europe by the 
late 1930s. Every major nation 
had begun rebuilding their militaries, set to deal with 
the new threat of  fascism and the aggressive foreign 
policies of  newly-rearmed Germany. Despite this 
volatile environment, Josef  Stalin, in one of  history’s 
most baffling decisions, ordered an unprecedented 
series of  purges that targeted practically every element 
of  Soviet society. Two of  his main targets were the Red 
Army and aircraft design bureaus. The Red Army – and 
its air force – lost many of  their experienced officers, 
and Soviet aircraft design bureaus lost many of  their 
most capable engineers. Most prominently, the brilliant 
and famed Andrei Tupolev, designer of  several leading 
Soviet aircraft, was imprisoned and charged with 
sabotage and espionage. The Soviet aircraft industry fell 
apart practically overnight, and the VVS found itself  
surpassed in capability by virtually all its competitors in 
a matter of  a few short years.3  Unfortunately for the 
Soviet Union, they found themselves embroiled in the 
largest and most destructive conflict in history before 
they were able to fully recover.
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in the 
summer of  1941, the VVS looked, on paper, as though 
it should post a significant challenge to the German 
The ANT-25 broke numerous aviation records in the 1930s, including the 
world’s first transpolar flight. Soviet aviation in this era led the world in 
many key aspects of aircraft design and operation.
Source: SDASM Archives [Public domain] https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tupolev,_ANT-25.jpg
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the VVS would eventually re-assert itself  as a fighting 
force, the multiple generations of  Soviet officers who 
served in the early days of  the Great Patriotic War – 
from field marshals to newly dressed lieutenants – had 
their perspectives on combat colored by the days when 
Soviet airspace did not belong to the Soviets. From that 
point on, air defense of  the homeland would be one of  
the Soviet Union’s – and eventually Russia’s – highest 
priorities.
The Great Patriotic War shaped Soviet military thinking 
in other ways as well. The acute need for new and 
better fighter and attack aircraft, the vast expanse of  
the Eastern Front, a huge lack of  qualified pilots and 
mechanics, and the relatively primitive capabilities of  
newly-built Soviet factories necessitated the building 
of  huge numbers of  simple, reliable, easily maintained, 
and easily operated aircraft. The nature of  combat 
on the Eastern Front – largely driven by the ferocity 
of  the ground fighting and the limitations of  Soviet 
aircraft design – centered on short-range, low-altitude 
combat, with large groups of  attack aircraft supporting 
army operations while fighters attempted to win at 
least temporary air superiority over the battlefield.7  
The Soviet aircraft industry responded brilliantly to 
the needs of  the Red Army, producing a series of  
fighters and attack aircraft that were perfectly suited to 
the needs of  the VVS. Indeed, by 1944, the frontline 
fighters of  the VVS – the Yak-3, Yak-9, and the La-5 
– were decisively superior to most of  their Luftwaffe 
competition at low altitude.8  These fighters were small, 
simple to build and robust, but were still splendid 
performers. Slowly, and at great cost, control of  the air 
was wrested from the Luftwaffe, a critical element of  of  
throwing back the German army and winning the Great 
Patriotic War. 
Luftwaffe. The VVS significantly outnumbered the 
Luftwaffe both in total aircraft and combat aircraft, 
the latter by a nearly 2:1 margin (approximately 4,000 
to 2,000).4  The Germans were fighting an offensive 
battle, and relatively few airfields from which to 
conduct their operations. Germany, however, achieved 
almost complete surprise over the VVS, destroying 
thousands of  aircraft before they could even get off  
the ground. Even when they successfully engaged the 
Luftwaffe, German pilots were better trained and more 
experienced than their Soviet counterparts, and German 
aircraft were superior virtually across the board. Some 
4,000 Soviet planes were destroyed in the first week of  
the campaign, and the VVS virtually ceased to exist as 
a fighting organization. Luftwaffe losses stood at less 
than 100 aircraft. This week of  fighting remains one 
of  the most one-sided and destructive air battles ever 
fought.5
The Soviets reeled from the German assault 
throughout the summer and fall of  1941. Luftwaffe 
attacks against Soviet ground forces and rear area 
targets were relentless and well-coordinated with 
ground assaults. Remaining VVS aircraft were either 
destroyed or forced out of  the combat area, giving 
the Luftwaffe complete command of  the air. Limited 
VVS counterattacks against German ground forces 
were suicidally ineffective.6  This experience – the 
complete loss of  control of  the air, and the inability 
to meaningfully resist – was almost plagued the Red 
Army through first couple of  years of  the war. Though 
The Bf-109 (bottom) and Ju-87 were the Luftwaffe’s frontline 
fighter and attack aircraft respectively in 1941. These types 
dominated the air war against the VVS in the early days of 
Operation Barbarossa.
Source: Billhardt / CC-BY-SA 3.0 https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Файл:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-429-0646-31,_
Messerschmitt_Me_109_und_Junkers_Ju_87.jpg
The Yak-3 was the best Soviet fighter of the war, and arguably 
the best low-altitude air superiority aircraft fielded by any 
combatant during the war. 
Source: Oren Rozen [CC BY-SA 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)]  https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CF15_Yak-3_ZK-YYY_040415_03.jpg
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The various elements of  the Soviet model were 
employed in every generation of  Soviet fighter aircraft, 
from the 1950’s through the new millennium. Simplicity 
and reliability were the most important characteristics, 
followed closely by performance in the aircraft’s 
intended role. Long range and advanced avionics were 
generally not prioritized. The primary missions of  the 
VVS were defending Soviet airspace and supporting a 
potential ground war in Eastern Europe; thus, two main 
fighter types were employed: air superiority aircraft, 
typically designed to win close-range dogfights, and 
interceptors, designed to engage Western bombers 
at high speed and long distances.15  Where possible, 
Western technology was reverse-engineered and 
integrated into new designs; a prominent example of  
this was the adaptation of  the American AIM-9 short-
range air-to-air missile into the Soviet K-13.16  Each 
new generation of  Soviet fighter was produced in large 
numbers for both VVS use and the export market, with 
massive export sales helping to fund each subsequent 
upgrade cycle. The Soviets found huge export markets 
not only in their client states, but also outside the US-
USSR axis: Middle East, Far East, and African militaries 
all lined up to buy Soviet hardware, which was generally 
cheaper and easier to maintain than their Western 
equivalents.17
This process produced some impressive results. The 
MiG-15, on showing up in the Korean theater, proved 
itself  better than any Allied fighter in existence, save 
the brand-new F-86, which was rushed to the theater 
to counter the MiG. In Vietnam, the MiG-21 asserted 
itself  as a dangerous opponent against the very 
The Soviet Model in the Jet Age                     
Despite their triumphs on the Eastern Front, by the end 
of  the Second World War, the VVS once again found 
itself  on their back foot, technologically speaking. 
Western air forces had invested heavily in jet engines 
and strategic bombers during the war, and in the early 
days of  the nuclear age, these two technologies were of  
critical importance. To help close this gap, the Soviets 
added new techniques to their capability development 
portfolio – industrial espionage and diplomacy. Soviet 
bomber technology was brought up-to-date by copying 
the American B-29 virtually rivet-for-rivet,9 while 
careful diplomacy mixed with outright industrial theft 
brought the VVS the UK’s most sophisticated jet engine 
in 1947.10
Soviet thinking throughout the Cold War was not – as is 
so often depicted in the West – obsessed with the idea 
of  conquest and implementation of  communist rule in 
Western Europe. Instead, the Soviets saw themselves as 
being surrounded by potentially hostile powers.11  The 
Soviets had no desire to repeat the horrific destruction 
of  the Great Patriotic War, and planned instead to 
resist any Western aggression outside of  Soviet borders. 
This necessitated developing a series of  buffer states in 
Eastern Europe, all nominally communist and beholden 
to Moscow in varying degrees. The Warsaw Pact, as 
this alliance came to be known, provided the final 
major element for the Soviet capability development 
model: foreign military sales. With all of  the Warsaw 
Pact nations essentially cut off  from Western military 
technology, the Soviets found willing (and sometimes 
unwilling) markets for virtually all of  their military 
hardware. In addition to funding large chunks of  
the Soviet military budget, FMS ensured a degree of  
standardization in equipment and tactics throughout the 
Warsaw Pact armies.12
The VVS envisioned the “World War III” scenario with 
the West as very similar to what they experienced in 
1941-45. Nuclear weapons would be exchanged, with 
Soviet aircraft and missiles called on to defend Soviet 
airspace against long-ranged bombers. Eventually, a 
massive ground war would take place in Eastern or 
Central Europe, a clash between two mechanized 
armies on a devastated landscape.13  Air power would 
be a key enabler for this battle, air power required air 
superiority. Airfields, however, would be among the first 
things targeted for destruction by the larger and more 
powerful Western air forces. Thus, Soviet aircraft had 
to be simple to operate, robust, easy to maintain, and 
numerous. They had to perform well, but did not need 
to be able to fly long distances, carry heavy loads, or be 
equipped with the latest in avionics.14
The MiG-15 provided a nasty surprise to UN forces in Korea. 
The design’s performance, however, was only made possible 
by a British engine design. 
Source: Tibboh [CC BY-SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)]  https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Mikoyan_Gurevich_MiG-15_UTI.jpg
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separate ways and the Russian government sought a 
new identity for itself. Years of  reform attempts failed 
or fizzled, the Russian economy tanked, and the Russian 
military industry faced collapse.18  Military spending was 
cut by over 80%; the resulting weaknesses of  the post-
Soviet Russian military were put on full display during 
operations in Chechnya and Georgia.19
It wasn’t until 2008 that a major modernization and 
reform effort finally took hold. Huge legacy formations 
were abandoned and professionalization was prioritized, 
which resulted in a mammoth drawdown of  strength. 
The old Soviet approach which emphasized mass and 
numerical superiority gave way to a much leaner and 
agile force, consisting of  better trained professional 
soldiers and better quality equipment. The new VVS 
scrapped thousands of  aging airframes and abandoned 
hundreds of  run-down bases, consolidating their 
strength in smaller units and far fewer command 
organizations. Importantly, Russian Air Defence Forces, 
a longtime branch unto themselves, were integrated into 
the new VVS.20 
The end of  the Cold War had huge effects on military 
technology development worldwide. For over a half-
century, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces were locked 
in a constant contest for technological superiority, 
backed by relatively huge defense budgets and enabled 
by a simple, single opponent operational environment. 
The post-Cold War operational environment proved 
to be far more complex. Counter-terrorism and 
counterinsurgency operations became far more 
commonplace; the threat set faced by both US and 
Russian militaries broadened significantly. Smaller force 
structures and smaller budgets placed greater strains 
on military industry, and commanders at all echelons 
struggled with far more limited training resources. 
For both NATO and Russian air forces, the idea of  a 
massive air battle over the nuclear wasteland of  WWIII 
was replaced by the reality of  small scale, precision raids 
against primitive opponents, though these missions 
competed with an ongoing need to keep pace with peer 
opponents. The pace of  aircraft development slowed 
to a crawl, and a generation of  fighter development 
essentially dissolved. Legacy Soviet aircraft were not 
only ill-adapted for the new operational environment; 
they were also very poorly maintained and dangerous 
to their crews. The enormous drawdown that began 
in 2008, however, freed up some resources to fund a 
modernization effort. The Russian aerospace industry 
had been subsisting almost entirely on exporting 
upgrade variants of  legacy fighters to the handful of  
export customers that remained – primarily India and 
China. 
advanced and expensive F-4 Phantoms of  the US Navy 
and Air Force. The MiG-29, examined after the fall of  
the Iron Curtain, was assessed as a highly capable air 
superiority fighter, possessing a handful of  capabilities 
unmatched by its contemporary Western competitors. 
Its bigger and more expensive brother, the Su-27, 
was even more capable. There were some failures as 
well: despite its impressive specifications, the MiG-25 
was an operational nightmare that never proved its 
utility, though misassesment of  the design by Western 
intelligence services was enough to set off  a minor 
panic.
In short, the approach used by the Soviet Union 
throughout the Cold War enabled them to keep pace 
with – and occasionally surpass – Western militaries 
who generally enjoyed better technology and more 
resources. 
The Post-Cold War Environment and the 
New Russian Aerospace Industry                  
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, huge 
changes followed for the Russian military. Decades of  
direct competition gave way to a new age of  limited 
cooperation with the West, largely eliminating the 
constant menace of  a huge, existential war, leading to a 
near-immediate drawdown of  military size and strength 
in both Russia and NATO. The old Soviet client states 
quickly aligned themselves with NATO and the West, 
robbing Russia of  both its longtime “buffer zone” and 
a captive market for FMS. Globally, the dissolution of  
the old US-USSR axis created a vacuum into which 
new powers could assert themselves, with a resurgent 
China leading the way. Virtually overnight, the Russian 
military was dismantled, as old Soviet states went their 
The S-400 surface-to-air missile system is one of the highest 
profile and most successful post-reform Russian defense 
programs.  
Source: Original uploader and photographer was UMNICK at ru.wikipedia [Public domain]  https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:S-400_Triumf_SAM.png
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Development of  5th-generation aircraft is an enormous 
project, comparable in many ways to the development 
of  battleship fleets or heavy armored cavalry of  
generations past. Competitive 5th-gen aircraft require, 
at a minimum, sophisticated aerodynamics and avionics, 
an advanced understanding of  low-observable (LO) 
technology, a cutting-edge jet engine design, and 
extensive over-the-air data sharing capability.  Only 
three nations have completed the development phase 
of  5th-gen fighter programs: the United States, China, 
and Russia. India – as we shall see – may soon be a 
fourth.
Fighter aircraft have gradually gotten more and more 
expensive over time. A WWII-era P-51 Mustang cost 
around $600,000 in 2019 dollars. Its successor, the 
F-86 Sabre, cost around $2.1 million. The twin engines, 
advanced avionics, and enormous size drove the cost of  
the Vietnam-era F-4 Phantom to nearly 10 times that 
Two major changes occurred in the political 
environment right about the time Russian military 
reforms were taking place. First, the Russian economy 
enjoyed a period of  impressive recovery, aided primarily 
by high oil prices and a massive expansion of  the 
Russian petrochemical industry. Second, Russian 
relations with the West – particularly the United States 
– worsened significantly.21  Tensions over missile 
defense, the Russia-Georgian War, the Ukraine, and 
the Middle East gave rise to a new Cold War dynamic. 
Both Russia and NATO began to reassess their military 
needs in light of  these new tensions, with both sides 
reconsidering the possibility of  a ground conflict 
taking place in or around Russia’s border regions. The 
long-neglected VVS and Russian aerospace industries 
suddenly found themselves not only with far more 
resources, but with a much more challenging mission 
set – one reminiscent of  that which the WWII VVS had 
faced 60 years before. 
Into the Fifth Generation – A Complex 
Technological and Political Problem             
This so-called “5th-generation” of  combat jet aircraft 
is simply the latest iteration of  combat aircraft design. 
Previous generations are broken down roughly in Table 
1.
5th-generation aircraft are defined primarily by four 
main features:
• Low observable (LO) technology for both radar 
and infrared (IR) signatures
• Advanced sensor suites highlighted by actively 
scanned radar arrays 
• Data networking and track sharing, with potential 
shared engagement capability
• Supermanuverability and great efficiency at speed
Generation Era Armament Speed Features Examples
1st WWII-era and immediate post-war Guns only Subsonic
Search-only on-board radars, 
limited range, poor reliability Me-262, P-80, MiG-9
2nd Korean War-era and early Cold War
Guns and air-to-air rockets, primitive 
air-to-air missiles Transonic 
Primitive fire control radars, 
swept wings, powered 
control surfaces
F-86, MiG-15, Hawker 
Hunter
3rd Vietnam War-era and mid Cold War
Guns, semi-active radar and 
infrared air-to-air missiles Supersonic
Multirole, fire control radars, 
afterburners F-4, MiG-21, MiG-23
4th Post-Vietnam, late Cold War
Long-range missiles, semi-active 
and active radar missiles, heavy 
missile loadouts
Supersonic 
Advanced radars, onboard 
software, powerful engines, 
multirole configurations
F-14, F-15, F-16, MiG-29, 
Su-27
4.5th Post-Cold War Guns, advanced missile technology (off-bore, active radar) Supersonic
Actively scanned radars, 
thrust vectoring, primitive 
low-observable technologies
Su-30, F/A-18E, 
Eurofighter Typhoon
Table 1. Breakdown of pre-5th generation combat jet aircraft
The F-22 was the world’s first 5th-generation fighter aircraft, 
and remains the world’s premier air superiority platform 15 
years after its introduction.   
Source: Master Sgt. Andy Dunaway [Public domain]  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:F-22_Raptor.
JPG
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The demands of  developing the Su-57 forced major 
changes to the long-time and very successful Soviet 
method of  aircraft design. It simply isn’t possible to 
build a system with 5th-gen capabilities cheaply, nor is it 
possible to make them simple or easy to maintain. This 
also meant the old Soviet approach of  mass FMS sales 
could no longer be used: a potential Su-57 customer 
would be making an enormous investment and would 
thus demand ongoing partnership and support as a part 
of  any deal. Russia couldn’t simply sell large numbers 
of  cheap, simple aircraft to a customer and then 
essentially forget about the transaction: a sale of  this 
size would more closely resemble what businesspeople 
call “relationship marketing.” At the same time, Russia 
was desperate for a partner to help offset the ruinous 
cost of  development – constant delays, technological 
unreadiness, and corruption issues were all piling up in 
the face of  the new flagship fighter. 
Russia found no interest in a simple export agreement 
among their traditional customers; costs were either 
far too high, the new fighter technology too uncertain, 
or, in the case of  China, already surpassed by domestic 
programs. Russia instead had to offer partnership 
in the program – something that had never been 
done before. The US adopted a similar approach 
with the mammoth F-35 program; offering allies and 
customers a partnership in the development process. 
This helped to dissipate the risk of  the program, aided 
interoperability, and perhaps most importantly, enabled 
a kind of  political engineering that made the program 
virtually un-killable. Though a few F-35 customers 
would reduce their purchases, none of  the 10 major 
partners withdrew or canceled their orders despite 
hideous time and cost overruns – although Canada may 
eventually withdraw, pending an ongoing competition, 
and Turkey was booted from the program following 
their purchase of  Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles.25 
Russia found the market for the Su-57 much tighter 
– nearly every country that could afford a 5th-gen 
fighter had either signed on for the F-35 or didn’t have 
requirements for a frontline fighter aircraft. The one 
exception was India: their defense budget was robust 
and growing, their air force needed modernizing, and 
they had a long and lucrative history purchasing Russian 
aircraft. Russia began viewing India as a possible savior 
for their troubled fighter, and offered an unprecedented 
partnership deal to the Indian Air Force. 26
India as a Partner: Savvy, or Gullible?            
Russia had never before developed a major weapons 
system in a partnership arrangement; the vast quantities 
of  tanks, guns, and planes they’d exported over the 
years were all simple FMS deals, mostly with their 
of  the F-86: $19 million. The F-4’s direct successor, the 
F-15 Eagle, cost twice what the Phantom did. The F-22 
– the world’s first 5th generation fighter – took the per-
airframe cost into orbit. At nearly $180 million per copy, 
the F-22 is 300 times more expensive than the P-51. If  
this trend continues, the United States Air Force of  the 
year 2120 will consist of  only one plane, which will cost 
more than the US GDP. While this is obviously unlikely 
to occur, it illustrates one of  the major problems facing 
modern aircraft designers: balancing cost and capability 
within programs that take decades to bear fruit. 
The Su-57 Takes Shape                                   
The Russian 5th-gen program that would become the 
Su-57 began at almost the same time as the American 
“Advanced Tactical Fighter” program that would 
eventually give birth to the F-22. By the late 1970s, both 
the US and USSR were considering the replacement 
for their current frontline fighters: the F-15 and F-16 
for the US, and the MiG-29 and Su-27 for the Soviets. 
Both nations identified new technologies such as LO, 
thrust vectoring as the centerpieces of  the new design, 
and both nations threw significant resources into the 
requirements development and prototyping phase of  
the new programs.22  When both were still gestational, 
however, the defense landscape – and much of  the 
rest of  the world – changed dramatically. The Soviet 
Union collapsed, the Cold War ended, and with it, much 
of  the perceived need for high performance fighter 
aircraft.23  The F-22 made it to production despite a 
long and troubled development process only to have its 
production run massively reduced; the Russian 5th-gen 
designs were all shelved. Development of  the F-22 and 
upgrades to Western 4th-generation aircraft, however, 
eventually prompted Russia to revive its interest in 
a 5th-gen fighter. Sukhoi had, by this time, largely 
supplanted Mikoyan-Gurevich as the premier Russian 
fighter manufacturer; it was they who received the 
contract to develop the PAK-FA, the predecessor to the 
Su-57.24
The first PAK FA prototype conducts a test flight. Early 
prototypes had minimal onboard systems and engines taken 
from the Su-27 family of aircraft.  
Source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin [CC BY-SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)]  https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:T-50_PAK_FA_-_MAKS-2013Firstpixflights03.jpg
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Soviet jet fighters. The new partnership dynamic, 
however, made the issues facing the PAK FA far more 
acute than those experienced by previous generations 
of  Russian and Soviet aircraft designers. India began 
publically voicing concerns about the status of  the 
program as early as 2011; by 2013, the complaints had 
become near-constant. The prototypes did not appear 
to be delivering on promised reliability, LO features, 
and safety, and India’s investment gradually became 
more and more precarious as they became increasingly 
concerned.30
Russia hadn’t faced a problem like this before. 
Their previous export agreements were essentially 
underpinned by a caveat emptor arrangement with 
their customers; customer dissatisfaction was either 
completely ignored or papered over. Now, the survival 
of  Russia’s 5th-gen program was heavily dependent on 
making the Indians happy. In an unprecedented display 
of  honesty, Russia publically admitted to the massive 
delays and cost overruns and promised to improve the 
results of  the program rapidly and cheaply.31  Unlike 
Russia’s defense industry, India’s defense ministry 
was answerable to a democratically elected body, who 
began loudly voicing their concerns about where 
these billions of  dollars had gone. India and Russia 
responded by renegotiating their partnership, with 
India lowering their investment by a billion dollars and 
buying proportionally fewer airframes –144, down from 
the original 200+. Russia was also forced to reduce 
its commitment to the PAK FA, cutting its buy from 
300+, down to around 150, and then to ~70 airframes 
between 2012 and 2016.32  This reduction caused the 
per-unit cost to skyrocket in much the same way the 
B-2’s and F-22’s cost had when their production runs 
were cut short, which caused something of  a panic in 
Russia. The PAK FA – now officially called the Su-57 
– was now no longer the cheap alternative…any nation 
that chose to invest in the Su-57 would have to shell out 
hundreds of  millions of  dollars.
The Russian response to these changes was bizarre. 
Instead of  attempting to mend fences with their Indian 
partners, they presented them with a bill – a huge bill. 
Claiming that they were “selling” valuable technology 
licenses as a part of  the partnership, Russia demanded 
a staggering $7 billion from India in order to maintain 
their stake in the Su-57/FGFA program.33  India’s 
response was predictable. They didn’t even bother to 
negotiate – they withdrew almost immediately. Just like 
that, Russia’s first major defense partnership agreement 
was dead, and the Su-57 program itself  was on life 
support. Though India still claims to have an interest 
in buying advanced Russian aircraft, the sting of  the 
billions of  dollars lost on the failed FGFA partnership, 
client states. Following the success of  the BrahMos 
cruise missile project – a joint venture between Russian 
industry and the Indian military – both sides were 
enthusiastic about an agreement for the PAK FA.27  
The initial deal, agreed to in 2007, granted India a full 
half  share of  the project in exchange for a roughly $6 
billion investment, with delivery of  over 200 aircraft 
to begin in 2017. India’s major aircraft manufacturer – 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, or HAL – would have 
full production rights once the aircraft reached maturity, 
with the Indian aircraft to be called the FGFA: Fifth 
Generation Fighter Aircraft.28  The total production run 
between the Russian and Indian air forces was estimated 
at some 500 aircraft, with traditional FMS customers 
pushing the total production past 1,000 aircraft. A 
production run of  this size rivaled that of  the F-35, and 
the total cost of  a program of  this magnitude would 
have funded virtually the entire program and made 
Sukhoi one of  the world’s largest and wealthiest defense 
firms. 
Almost immediately, cracks began appearing in the 
plan. The initial design took an extra year to complete, 
but was approved in mid-2009. The initial flight of  the 
prototype was also pushed back a full year; when the 
initial prototypes did fly, they were essentially “hollow” 
airframes that had no onboard systems aside from basic 
flight. Prototypes were plagued by engine problems, 
stability problems, and weapons integration problems, 
culminating with an airframe loss due to an engine fire 
in 2014.29  The engines were particularly problematic 
– Russian engine design had long lagged behind the 
US and UK, and the demands of  the 5th-gen aircraft 
proved too much for existing Russian technology. 
Russian designers were not strangers to engine issues 
– poor reliability and wild variance in performance 
were constant challenges going back to the very first 
A pair of early-production Su-57s in formation. Su-57 flights 
have been commonplace at airshows and defense exhibitions 
since the type began flying, ostensibly to build interest 
in the type from possible foreign customers as well as to 
demonstrate the technology to potential competitors.   
Source: Anna Zvereva from Tallinn, Estonia [CC BY-SA 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)]  
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russian_Air_Force,_052,_054,_Sukhoi_Su-57_(36975276060).jpg
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coupled with a viable domestic 5th-generation fighter 
program (the AMCA) make the prospect of  any future 
sales unlikely at best. 
The Su-57 Enters Service, Sort Of                  
The big stick of  Vladimir Putin intervened in the 
Su-57 debacle in 2016, “asking” Sukhoi to reduce 
their profit margins in order to lubricate the final 
purchases of  serial Su-57s. They agreed, and the serial 
production of  70-odd aircraft began in the summer of  
2019.34  Contracts exist for only 15 production aircraft, 
however, and the possibility exists that production may 
be terminated after this first batch is delivered. 
The Su-57 that went to production has some very 
impressive features. Full 3-dimensional thrust vectoring, 
an advanced actively scanned radar array, an advanced 
and capable suite of  missiles (set to enjoy upgrades 
of  their own in the near future) and exceptional 
maneuverability at combat speeds combine to make 
a very impressive set of  specifications. The aircraft 
appears to have significant limitations as well – engine 
troubles are not yet behind it, with initial production 
variants equipped with an “interim” engine that delivers 
neither the performance nor the reliability that was 
initially specified.35  The LO capability appears to only 
function from forward aspect angles and likely does 
not include IR signature suppression, a limitation easily 
detected by simple visual observation of  the aircraft.36  
Datalink architecture is still primitive – a complaint 
lodged by the Indians all the way back in 2012. 
These limitations, plus the limited (possibly very 
limited) production run implies that the Su-57 will 
not have anywhere near the impact on the VVS or the 
defense landscape in general that Russia envisioned 
back in 2007. Both China and India now have 
competing 5th-gen programs, with the Chinese J-20 
beating the Su-57 into squadron service by several 
years while costing tens of  millions less per airframe.  
The F-35, despite the years-long debacle that was its 
development and integration period, has commenced 
successful integration into active service. F-22s have 
been in frontline service for over a decade, and are now 
widely regarded as the gold-standard of  air superiority 
aircraft despite their very limited numbers. In short, the 
Su-57’s competition – both commercially and militarily 
– is intense, and the aircraft has yet to demonstrate any 
of  its capabilities outside of  carefully controlled test 
environments. 
Despite the collapse of  their initial agreement, Russia 
is still trying to sell the Su-57 to India. They face 
competition an Indian Air Force and political landscape 
jaded by the years-long development debacle, as well 
as a new Indian indigenous 5th-gen fighter design. 
Competitive FMS of  this type has never been a 
strength of  the Soviet/Russian defense industry, but 
the transition to competition in the modern, high-
tech, multipolar world must occur if  Russia intends to 
continue its long history of  FMS. Development of  soft 
power – salesmanship and cooperative diplomacy – 
must replace the old Soviet strongarm tactics, and high-
tech, low-density systems must replace the old Soviet 
numbers-game approach.
Su-57 in Combat – Tactical Vignette              
The capability limitations of  the Su-57 coupled with the 
small numbers of  available aircraft create a challenging 
situation for VVS tacticians. LO capability is practically 
a requirement for surviving the ultra-lethal environment 
The Chinese J-20 beat the Su-57 into service and features 
many of the same advanced technologies. It is one of the first 
times in the modern era that Chinese military technology 
equaled or surpassed that of Russia.  
Source: emperornie https://www.flickr.com/photos/77326563@N06/ [CC BY-SA 2.0 (https://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)]  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:J-20_fighter.jpg
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of  air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles that will fill 
the skies in the initial phases of  a current or future air 
war, but with only a handful of  LO aircraft available, 
Russian commanders must be creative with their use. 
The primary mission of  the Su-57 remains defending 
Russian airspace and achieving local air superiority – 
or at least parity – over tactical ground actions, much 
the same as it was for the VVS 70 years ago. Russian 
integrated air defense systems (IADS) bear a significant 
chunk of  this mission; Russian investment in IADS 
over the last 3 decades has been enormous. Ground-
based systems have limitations, however, and the VVS 
will be called upon to augment IADS capabilities. 
In this scenario, Russia finds itself  in combat against 
a modern, high-tech enemy that relies heavily on air 
power to support tactical ground operations. The 
mission of  the VVS is to deny the enemy use of  the 
air long enough for Russian Ground Forces (RGF) to 
achieve victory on the ground. Russian commanders 
assess that the enormous cost and prestige associated 
with enemy 5th-gen aircraft make them a center of  
gravity: shooting down even a small number of  these 
systems represents a major political and tactical victory 
that can be exploited through information operations. 
At the same time, the VVS recognizes that the Su-
57 is outclassed by the enemy’s more advanced and 
more mature fighters, so will seek to avoid direct 
confrontation that could lead to defeat. Instead, small 
formations of  Su-57s – likely only two aircraft per 
– target enemy strike packages, tankers, and AWACS 
aircraft using the front-aspect LO capabilities of  the 
Su-57 to avoid enemy fighters. Once the Su-57s have 
engaged and destroyed some number of  high-value 
enemy assets, the Su-57s will rapidly retreat to Russian-
controlled airspace, where a combination IADS and 
4.5th-generation aircraft pose a serious threat to 
even advanced enemy aircraft. Essentially, instead 
of  attempting to win air superiority outright, VVS 
commanders will likely employ the Su-57 as a kind 
of  aircraft sniper, asymmetrically targeting high-value 
assets, degrading enemy morale and combat capability 
while winning valuable information victories that can be 
exploited through propaganda.
Training Implications                                      
The presence of  the Su-57 – and any new follow-on 
Russian fighter aircraft – will likely never allow the 
VVS to achieve air superiority versus Western or other 
advanced air forces. The specialized capabilities of  the 
Su-57, however, pose a significant threat to any force 
that attempts to impose itself  on Russian airspace. VVS 
commanders will attempt to amplify the effects of  their 
limited fighter force by achieving high-profile victories 
whose information value outweighs their military value. 
Effectively exploiting propaganda victories against 
the high-tech, casualty-averse enemy force is designed 
to compel enemy commanders into curtailing or 
withdrawing their air component, leaving enemy ground 
forces without much-needed air support.♦
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By William Hardy, OE&TA
Go Fish                                                            
In 1939, the Director of  Naval Intelligence Admiral John Henry Godfrey of  the Royal Navy issued a document that is now known as the Trout Memo.i   
In it, he likens military deception to the sport of  trout 
fishing (i.e., fly fishing). 
“The trout fisher casts patiently all day. He frequently changes his 
venue and his lures. If  he has frightened a fish he may give the water 
a rest for half  an hour, but his main endeavor, viz. to attract fish by 
something he sends out from his boat, is incessant.”
Though simple, this metaphor could not be more apt 
in its illustration of  the inherent patience, ingenuity, 
and an enduring focus on a primary objective that are 
necessary requirements for successful information and 
influence operations.
Eight decades later, the patience and enduring focus 
described in the Trout Memo can be seen in recent 
Russian disinformation campaigns and their efforts to 
meddle in the domestic affairs of  other nations. The 
Russian interference in the run-up, during, and after the 
2016 US Presidential Election has become, perhaps, 
the most infamous and now widely investigated 
contemporary example of  recent Russian deception 
and disinformation campaigns. This article pulls from 
the findings in the US Senate’s Select Committee on 
Intelligence (US SSCI) Report on Russian Active 
Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election Volume 2: Russia’s Use of  Social Media with 
Additional Views, among other references. The intent 
of  this piece is foster critical discussion concerning 
whether the US Army’s training community can inform 
and develop an  Operational Environment (OE) with 
enough depth and complexity to replicate how Russia 
has utilized information operations, disinformation, and 
deception.
Consistent Patterns of  Activity                       
While the report contains many details that demand 
attention, one of  the key findings is the assertion 
that while the Russians may be using new tools to 
Replicating Russian Disinformation 
& Deception in Training
Operational Environment Considerations
i. While the Trout Memo was issued under Admiral Godfrey’s name, there is speculation that it was authored by his assistant, Lieutenant Commander Ian Fleming, who later went on to Author the James 
Bond novels.
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conduct information operations, the underlying 
principles driving their efforts are the result of  decades 
of  application, study, and continued refinement of  
disinformation practices used inside of  Russia, within 
its zone of  periphery, and beyond. In some instances 
disinformation can be used for immediate purposes, as 
seen in the intentional spreading of  claims of  alleged 
atrocities committed by Georgians during the 2008 
Russo-Georgian War to gain international legitimacy 
for their actions. While in others instances, Russian 
efforts might be better understood as being long term 
investments, which though initially small, have the 
potential to grow exponentially in the future.1  While 
these principles are not new, Russia’s military has 
embraced technological advances in order to amplify 
its efforts, creating an advantage in an otherwise 
asymmetric competition. As a testament to the 
underlying principles guiding the evolution of  Russian 
efforts, they have stayed relevant and “even with the rise 
of  new technologies, the underlying truth about such 
operations hasn’t changed […] they [their methods] are 
less a way to conjure up something out of  nothing than 
to stir a pot that is already bubbling.”2  In other words, 
the Russians are simply adapting and evolving proven 
methods rather than creating something new.
The US SSCI report makes it abundantly clear that 
the Russian military has seized upon the idea that 
“the manipulation of  the information sphere is a 
very effective tool” for achieving desired outcomes 
and often times is a more economical alternative or 
augmentation to conventional operations.3  
Overwhelming the Audience
As part of  their efforts to manipulate the information 
environment, the Russians seek create a high volume 
of  messages originating from multiple channels (e.g., 
online information sources, social media platforms). By 
creating content that delivers their messages through 
“text, video, audio, and still imagery,” the Russians 
are flood the targeted audience with disinformation.4  
The ubiquity of  information and communications 
technology around the globe has dramatically increased 
both the number of  people that can be exposed to 
a narrative and the number of  messages about that 
narrative that can be delivered.5 
Russian disinformation campaigns are also aided by the 
speed at which they are able to create and distribute 
content. The SSCI states that the Russians strive to 
develop, adapt, and distribute false narratives online 
at a pace that exceeds the truth.6  The Russians intent 
is to force other actors to simultaneously disprove 
false narratives while they seek to support their own 
narrative. If  the Russian disinformation is able to 
engage an audience first, then it will be more difficult 
for good-faith actors prove that the Russian narrative is 
false.7 
Outsourcing and Automating
In order to generate as much content as possible, as 
quickly as possible, the Russians have outsourced their 
efforts in several ways. First, they have recognized the 
unique ability of  “internet trolls” to hijack an online 
forum by injecting polarizing and radical views, then 
stifle all debate through aggressive harassment of  any 
individuals who challenge their narrative.8  The Russian 
internet troll is able to succeed if  they can successfully 
insert a disingenuous narrative into a conversation, if  
they can force the voices of  competing narratives to 
disengage from the conversation or from the online 
platform entirely.9  The other way that the Russians are 
able to quickly generate and spread disinformation is 
through the use of  automated accounts and Bots. 
Automated accounts and Bots are able to exploit 
existing mechanisms in social media platforms to attract 
attention, engage with an audience, and then create 
a network of  like-minded users and Bots to amplify 
and reinforce disinformation. Figure 1 illustrates how 
an interaction between a human user and a bot can 
lead to the human user’s account being flooded with 
disinformation.
Mutually Reinforcing Efforts
The Russian Government then reinforces the 
disinformation introduced by covert bots and trolls, 
through overt media platforms that are known to 
“Nothing has changed [since the Soviet era], 
Russia is doing everything it can today to 
embarrass the US.”
— Sergey Tretyakov 
Former Russian Intelligence Official 
One way of looking at the impact of these 
activities… is to think of drops of water falling on 
a stone: five minutes, ten minutes, fifteen minutes, 
one hour, one day, nothing happens, but five 
years, ten years, fifteen years – you’ve worn a hole 
in the stone. 
                     — Dennis Kux
Former Head of the US Active 
Measures Working Group, 1984
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be either funded by, or influenced by the Russian 
Government itself.  By reinforcing disinformation 
found on social media platforms with disinformation 
being propagated by seemingly legitimate news sources, 
the Russians are able to rapidly spread disinformation 
through as though it were a complex contagion, 
through which multiple exposures from multiple 
sources increases the probability that a piece message 
will spread.10  
The Russians do not stop with the introduction of  
disinformation and the silencing competing narratives.  
They also seek to manipulate real people and events 
within the targeted audience to internalize the message, 
and begin disseminating it themselves.  The Russians 
seek to amplify their message through naïve but “useful 
idiots,” to legitimize their message through ideologically 
sympathetic “fellow travelers,” and to influence events 
through “agent provocateurs” who are either paid for, 
coerced, of  manipulated by the Russian government 
or its proxies.11  The Russians use online phenomena 
known as echo chambers and filter bubbles to trap their 
targeted audience in an information environment that 
is devoid of  alternative views and discussion.ii  By 
exploiting the tendency of  
individuals to have a bias 
toward new information that 
confirms their previously 
held beliefs, the Russians 
are able to create a layer of  
dissonance between their 
targeted audience and the 
real world.
Malleable Objectives 
& Ideologies                         
Though many of  the actions 
associated with recent 
Russian disinformation 
campaigns are directly 
focused on swaying 
sentiment among a 
target audience, the SSCI 
also highlights that the 
Russians have identified 
the underpinnings of  a 
healthy democracy as an 
indirect objective. The 
Russian government has 
long sought to undermine 
the perceived threat 
from western democratic 
institutions. Therefore, in 
shifting the political discussion and sentiment within 
a democratic population, they are indirectly seeking 
to force democratic governments to undermine their 
foundational principles through overbearing reactions 
that encroach upon civil liberties.12  
By focusing their objectives at an extremely macro 
level, the Russian disinformation operations are able 
to have a fluid ideology of  dissonance that guides 
their manipulations. In spite of  the ideologically fluid 
nature of  both previous and ongoing overt and covert 
actions, Russian state media has been able to promote 
and maintain distinct narratives in coordination with 
media proxies without undermining their own efforts.13  
Precarious actions that risk information fratricide are 
left to non-attributable sources.
In the case of  interference in the US election, the 
objectives were to fracture democratic discourse and 
undermine democratic principles, “Russia’s information 
operatives are unencumbered and can support any and 
all perspectives.”14  This enables Russian disinformation 
to seize upon single events that occur in a complex 
and fast paced environment, and to target all sides of  
Figure 1. A simplified illustration of how malicious bots might interact with and eventually 
inundate a human user’s information environment through social media.
ii. Echo chambers occur when an individual finds themselves in an online network that continuously reinforces narratives and ideas; Filter bubbles occur when an individual either intentionally or 
unintentionally narrows the scope of content they interact with (i.e., avoid discourse and alternative perspectives).
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the conversation, targeting and exploiting existing 
fissures within the population (e.g., economic 
inequalities and demographic pressures).15  
By focusing on existing fissures, the Russians are able 
to avoid needing to introduce a novel narrative into 
the target population. The exploitation of  existing 
fissures requires that malign operations are based upon 
an intricate understanding of  socially divisive fault 
lines within the population, and driving targeted and 
timely “wedges” designed to limit discourse.16  These 
wedges consist of  false narratives, half-truths, and 
outright fictions designed to resonate with and exploit 
confirmation biases among the target population. 
They are also designed to challenge the credibility 
of  competing sources of  information by presenting 
alternative truths and overwhelming the audience 
because there are too many versions of  events, and 
they’ll never know the truth. As discussed earlier, the 
speed at which the Russian disinformation is created, 
adapted, and disseminated allows them to utilize a 
quantity over quality approach, creating a large number 
of  varying messages and only honing in once a specific 
message gains traction among the audience.
Replicating Depth & Complexity                   
The SSCI report focuses on Russian activity to 
influence a US population, however it also mentions 
that the Russians are conducting the same type of  
disinformation campaigns all around the world. In 
addition to their efforts to sway international opinions 
during the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, the Russians 
were also able to successfully weaponized information 
using information and communications technology 
in concert with conventional operations, creating 
confusion as “Georgian officers struggled to send 
orders to troops, and bewildered citizens had no way to 
find out what was happening.”17  Given their success at 
frustrating the Georgians, it is likely the US Army will 
observe, engage with, and be affected by similar Russian 
disinformation efforts regardless of  where its Soldiers 
are operating. In order for Russian disinformation 
operations to succeed in the real world, the campaigns 
must be tied to existing grievances among the 
population, appear to share the perspectives of  the 
aggrieved populations, and capable of  pushing targeted 
populations beyond their tipping point, often using 
emotional appeals, to designed to either stoke tensions 
or force disengagement.
So the question is, what does this all mean for the 
US Army training community? In order to prepare 
the total force to deter, fight, and win against Russian 
disinformation campaigns, the training community 
has an opportunity to orient toward the challenge 
of  creating a training environment that encapsulates 
the detailed conditions and characteristics required 
to enable Soldiers and leaders to develop and perfect 
their skills with regard information environment. 
The training OE should contain enough depth and 
complexity to replicate the real world OE characteristics 
that are utilized and exploited during Russian 
disinformation campaigns. 
The current training OE meant to inform this process 
is arguably data rich, replete with enough raw data to 
support the replication of  the aforementioned Russian 
patterns of  activity associated information warfare. But 
that data rich training OE may actually be information 
poor due to a lack of  organization, structure, 
and contextualizing narrative associated with the 
available data. All of  which is required to inform how 
information is used to target a population.
This increased depth and complexity would enable the 
development and executing of  increasingly realistic 
scenarios that challenge and test the analytic posture, 
decision-making, and reactions of  training participants. 
In line with the ideas discussed throughout the 2016 
White Paper written by USACAC on Enhancing 
Realistic Training, increasingly realistic OE conditions 
in training will help the Army develop a force capable 
of  not only deterring, fighting, and winning against 
adversaries that seek to spread disinformation and use 
hybrid warfare, it will also enable Soldiers and Leaders 
to hone their ability to predict and preempt these 
type of  threats and potentially shape the information 
environment in our favor ahead of  potential adversary 
operations.  
“But the Russians, you know, can’t basically exploit 
cleavages if there are not cleavages. The Russian 
can’t exploit corruption if there’s not corruption. 
They can’t exploit alternative narratives if those 
alternative narratives are not out there and getting 
credence. What the Russians do is they exploit things 
that already exist.” 
— Dr. Fiona Hill, 
Former National Security Council Russia Analyst
“In order to win in the complex world, we must 
enhance realistic training so that we train not 
only technical and tactical proficiency but also 
provide a training environment that has a robust 
representation of the complex interaction of the 
OE variables and poses physical, mental and 
ethical challenges to the training audience.”
— Enhancing Realistic Training White Paper, 
US Army Combined Arms Center, 2016
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In order to realize this complexity and better prepare 
the US Soldier to compete against adversaries like 
Russia, the training community may need to reflect on 
its current practices, from a critical perspective, in order 
to further enhance how it replicates the OE. In order 
to initiate this critical reflection, this article finishes with 
several yes/no questions, each of  which may represent 
an opportunity to improve upon some of  Army’s 
training community’s current practices.♦
1. Vera Zakem, “How Russia’s Disinformation Campaign Could Extend its Tentacles,” National 
Public Radio (NPR), January 6, 2017.; Lionel Beehner et al., “Analyzing the Russian Way of 
War: Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia,” The Modern War Institute at West Point, 
(March 20, 2018): 48, 59-68.; Mikhailov, Kirill. “Top 10 Russian Lies about the Georgia War.” 
Euromaidan Press, August 16, 2015.; Steve Abrams,  “Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active 
Measures in Putin’s Russia,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 1, Partnership for 
Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, (2016): 10-11.  
2. Evan Osnos, David Remnick, and Joshua Yaffa, “Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War,” The 
New Yorker, Annals of Diplomacy, March 6, 2017. 
3. United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (US SSCI), “Report on Russian Active 
Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US Election, Vol. 2: Russia’s Use of Social 
Media with Additional Views,” US Government Publishing Office, Washington DC. (October 8, 
2019): 13.
4. US SSCI, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election, Vol. 2, 16.
5. Lord Michael Jopling, “Countering Russia’s Hybrid Threats: An Update.” Special Report by the 
Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, (October 1, 
2018): 7.
6. US SSCI, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election, Vol. 2, 17-18.
7. United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Minority Staff Report, “Putin’s 
Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for US National 
Security.” US Government Publishing Office (Washington DC. 10 January, 2018): 40. 
8. US SSCI, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election, Vol. 2, 19.
9. US SSCI, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election, Vol. 2, 19.
10. Bjarke Mønsted, Piotr Sapieżyński, Emilio Ferrara, and Sune Lehmann. “Evidence of complex 
contagion of information in social media: An experiment using Twitter bots.” PloS one 12, no. 
9, 2017. 
11. US SSCI, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election, Vol. 2, 20.
12. US SSCI, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election, Vol. 2, 22.
13. Lord Michael Jopling, “Countering Russia’s Hybrid Threats: An Update.” Special Report by the 
Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, (October 1, 
2018): 7.
14. US SSCI, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election, Vol. 2, 22.
15. US SSCI, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election, Vol. 2, 21.
16. US SSCI, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US 
Election, Vol. 2, 21.
17. Osnos, Remnick, and Yaffa, “Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War.”; Beehner et al., “Analyzing 
the Russian Way of War, 59.
Red Diamond 43 Oct-Dec 2019
By MAJ Megan Williams, OE&TA
For more than a decade, the United States was embroiled in two exhaustive global conflicts.  The US was preoccupied with these commitments, 
becoming financially, physically, and emotionally 
drained.  During that time, the concept of  war and 
conflict shifted, but the US still emphasizes preparation 
for conventional warfare.  In the current operational 
environment, global players prefer to compete below 
armed conflict, as deterrence is more challenging.  By 
avoiding direct conflict and complicating the distinction 
between war and peace, these states have expanded the 
battlefield in time, domains, and geography.1  Near-peer 
threats, including Russia, have been able to understand, 
plan, and adjust to this new dynamic, because it is to 
their advantage to avoid direct conflict with America.  
Now, the US is attempting to intellectually define and 
understand the broader context of  competition warfare, 
edging past the binary concept of  only war or peace. 
Without these conceptual limitations, Russia has been 
able to pivot and diversify elements of  national power 
to effectively influence or subvert the US government 
in active competition. No stranger to hybrid warfare, 
Russia has matured combinations of  systems and 
concepts and is leveraging crime as a disruptive tactic 
during this competition, continuing to propagate 
ambiguity.2  The United States must act now to identify 
and mitigate this threat.  
Politics by Other Means                                 
Contemporary Russia is in a transition period, as 
the country moves to align its internal concept of  
positional power against how the external world views 
it.3  Russia’s foreign policy is attributed to the Primakov 
Doctrine, which is centrally concerned with ending the 
Western-dominated world order.4  In this doctrine, a 
unipolar, American-dominated world is unacceptable to 
Russia.  Since Russia cannot achieve world domination 
through either military means or span of  control, their 
secondary objective is to achieve regional hegemony.5   
Regional dominance in Eurasia would entail weakening 
neighboring states or continuing to degrade Western 
and NATO alliances.  
Russia justifies this subversion and the subsequent 
aggression by maintaining a compelling victim narrative 
of  Russia’s subjection to political, cultural, and 
territorial injustices from the West.6  Gaining recent 
regional experience in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia 
is currently developing momentum in creating and 
manipulating friction.  Russia is allowing conflict to 
simmer without boiling over into overt hostilities and 
open warfare against the US, where armed conflict 
would be to Russia’s disadvantage.  
Russia is able to set conditions and leverage control 
beyond military power by utilizing non-traditional 
means to indirectly gain an advantage.  By inserting 
state influence, overtly or covertly, Russia can create 
enough “strategic ambiguity” to distract their targets 
and weaken them.7  The past two decades of  President 
Vladimir Putin’s leadership indicate his preferred 
method is a blend of  hard and soft power.8  Russian 
military leadership identifies and publicly proclaims that 
“nonmilitary means of  achieving political and strategic 
goals has grown…and exceeded the power of  force of  
weapons in their effectiveness.”9  However, as in both 
Georgia and the Ukraine, military force remains an 
option.
Russia is “strong on ambitions but weak on resources,” 
thus, hybrid warfare is both a risk management 
technique and an economy of  force effort.10  Hybrid 
warfare, or maintaining competition with the United 
States below armed conflict, is not a new concept 
under the Primakov Doctrine.  By employing other 
instruments of  state power beyond just military efforts, 
Russia can leverage an “operational approach based 
on localized and temporal dominance at the expense 
of  persistent dominance.”11  Russia has realized that 
the ability to instigate problems without the trouble or 
commitment of  mobilizing the military can disrupt civil 
society enough that it creates dissonance and ultimately 
a vacuum that Russia may be able to effectively fill.  
Russia does not and will not hesitate to incorporate 
a suite of  options designed to target populations, 
including information warfare and propaganda.12  
These options allow degrees of  separation between 
Russian Crime:
The Simmering Threat
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the Russian government and the targets, because their 
actions are less attributable to either the government or 
military.  Russia’s dominance aligns with the strategy of  
“addition by subtraction,” meaning that Russia grows 
stronger when its neighbors grow weaker.13  Russia 
does not have to engage in open warfare to be gaining 
an advantage. Ultimately, Russia moves closer to their 
doctrinal goal and is able to achieve it with an economy 
of  effort.
Russian Crime                                                 
Organized crime has long enjoyed a parasitic 
relationship with the Russian state, as Russia has a 
history of  crime, corruption, and the culture that 
supports crime.  “Corruption can be considered an 
incubator for the growth of  organized crime, violence, 
and terrorism,” and Russia has been a breeding ground 
for all three.14  In a post-Soviet world, Russian organized 
crime has “complex relationships with the private 
market” because it has been able to not only co-exist, 
but also grow and flourish under the state.15  
When Putin took office in 2000, he imposed a social 
alternative to criminals to be de facto coopted into 
the state, “so long as they understood that the state 
was the biggest gang in town and they did nothing 
to directly challenge it.”16  This unique symbiosis 
allows the government to participate in the criminal 
underworld and regulate its power. As long as organized 
crime did not threaten the state, the state would allow 
its existence.  Russia leverages organized from for the 
government’s behalf  for resources, operational capacity, 
and intelligence efforts.17  Effectively, the state can 
leverage crime to their advantage by having an implicit 
agreement about the strategic stakeholder relationship 
with these criminals.  
War by Other Means                                       
As a result, criminal organizations can act as aberrant 
proxies for the state by engaging in specific criminal 
activities sanctioned by the Russian government because 
it provides cover for the state’s nefarious actions and 
a cost effective way to achieve their goals and increase 
the collaboration between these two entities. Thus, new 
techniques, like cybercrime and social media attacks, are 
less attributable to Russian innovation and disguisable 
as a part of  inevitable modernization in a global world.
Criminals, like terrorists, are beneficiaries of  
globalization and digitization and connectivity have 
expanded their reach.18  For example, Moscow can 
recruit cybercriminals to use for their purposes, 
when they can provide ‘surge capacity’ for official 
state operations, such as attacks on Estonia in 2007 
and Georgia in 2008.  The government establishes 
enduring relationships so the criminal elements are 
available when needed for an asymmetric means to 
affect a national or international target.  It is also easier 
for the government to outsource hacker operations 
to mercenaries than to build the capacity within their 
intelligence services.19  The US defense community 
is building capacity within the cyber domain, but the 
technological terrain of  cyber-attacks strongly benefits 
the offensive.20 
Russia can mobilize criminal actors against the United 
States or against NATO; either way, it weakens the 
alliance and benefits Russia in two ways.  First, it 
provides a distraction and attrition of  state resources 
for the US to deal with crime, even if  the US is not 
aware that it is being targeted by a state actor.  Under 
the assumption that crime is a domestic issue, it takes 
attention away from military and defense issues, 
and requires the US to develop new capabilities and 
strategies.  
Additionally, the complexity of  crime is now heavily 
networked and interconnected.  Criminals are now 
able to be so networked and interconnected that they 
can essentially outsource criminal behavior through a 
network of  allies and contacts, causing destabilization 
to countries and states when the criminal instigators are 
not physically present.21  These two levels of  separation 
(first, Russia from the Russian criminals and second, 
Russian criminals from a global crime syndicate) 
provide even more benefits for the state to continue 
operating in this way.  
Recommendations                                          
Offensive criminal activity in Russia is sanctioned by 
and leveraged by the state. While it is not difficult 
to understand the interconnected nature of  this 
problem, it is challenging to understand how to defeat 
or dismantle it.  Based on the growing complexity 
of  this problem, the longer the United States takes 
to understand and address it, the more sophisticated 
state-sponsored crime grows.  The US must take two 
immediate steps, cognitively and behaviorally.  First, the 
US should quickly abandon any conceptual limitations 
about hybrid warfare.  In the current hyper-connected 
world, we should cast off  any previous assumptions 
about what warfare is and understand that near-peer 
threats will continue to exploit the ambiguity of  
competition with the US, precisely because it will be 
more challenging for us to determine an appropriate 
response.
Russia, as our adversary, is unapologetically willing to 
make attacks in any forms and on any scale, even if  it 
is something that Americans would not be willing to 
do. We cannot let our ethical restrictions about how 
Americans would engage in competition limit our 
detection of  how adversaries engage us.  Criminal 
intelligence must be understood as part of  the common 
operating picture, because it produces indicators of  
vulnerability and disruption.  The presence of  crime 
indicates that an area or population is susceptible to 
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manipulation and damage by an unlawful criminal 
entity, causing instability in ways that America would 
not reciprocate with.
Secondly, the US must create identification strategies 
and means to address the crime threat in the context 
of  foreign intervention.  These threats are not just the 
realm of  law enforcement.22  Identifying the Russian 
threat is not enough if  it does not produce effective 
action.  We need particularly sophisticated awareness 
and tracking to identify and combat these crime 
networks and trace them back to their origins.  Law 
enforcement coordination and cooperation between 
local and federal entities has been an area of  emphasis 
since 2001, but in the context of  preventing terrorist 
attacks on US soil.  However, since threat adversaries 
in the operational environment are also willing to 
engage in crime as part of  competition, this networked 
coordination must continue to evolve and expand.  
Existing institutions, primarily joint task forces, 
between local and federal authorities must grow and 
restructure to effectively communicate requirements 
with the field.  Locally, law enforcement must be able 
to identify patterns and vulnerabilities.  The federal 
law enforcement network must be able to effectively 
communicate with local sources to identify larger 
correlations, transmitting those developments within 
the larger federal government to incorporate that 
knowledge into instruments of  national power, with 
responses being diplomatic, informational, military, or 
economic, or any combination.
Pragmatically, information fusion between local and 
federal authorities is not without challenges already, 
especially considering the volume of  information 
potentially pertaining to terrorism.  Both local and 
federal law enforcement must be aware of  the Russian 
strategy, because the goal is not a violent attack, like 
in terrorism, but to be disrupting and damaging to 
the American population and economy.  “When it 
comes to homeland security, local police play the most 
fundamental and largest role,”23 and to be able to have 
the most comprehensive protection, there must be a 
national understanding that homeland security includes 
both crime and terrorism. 
Identification will strengthen a hybrid requirement in 
our country: to marry law enforcement with intelligence 
and determine how these threat actors will be dealt 
with.  The police will want to prosecute the criminals 
while the intelligence will want to monitor or exploit 
them.24  The US will need to develop a collaborative 
mechanism of  both active and passive measures to 
prevent Russia from using criminal activity to disrupt, 
degrade, or destroy our capabilities.  The current stove 
piped bureaucratic process creates friction that slows 
down (or completely prevents) this fusion. 
As the US gains a more comprehensive understanding, 
the government has the difficult and tenuous challenge 
of  how to address Russian crime.  The United States 
faces a distinct paradox of  how to respond.  For the US 
to address the crimes, and identify Russia as the culprit, 
will justify Russian claims that the US is targeting them.  
To ignore the threat will allow the simmering problem 
to boil and grow, gaining complexity and sophistication, 
and the US will get burned without seeing it coming.♦
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principles for deception operations.3  Chinese military 
theory on the other hand, recognizes all combat as a 
form of  deception with unconventional techniques, 
indifference to rules and norms, ambiguous conflicts, 
and temporal superiority as guidelines for implementing 
deception.4  These concepts are set in opposition to US 
joint doctrine which describes deception principles in 
terms of  focus, objective, centralized planning, security, 
timing, and integration. While the labels and priorities 
differ the one unifying aspect of  deception operations 
is the synchronization and coordination required for 
both the deception plan and the broader operational 
mission. 
Deception Applications                                           
Emerging technologies such as AI enabled “deep 
fakes”, advanced natural language processing, and 
so called precision propaganda are making it easier 
to manipulate information and human reasoning 
through the use and exploitation of  existing user data. 
The ability to create tailored themes and messages 
will be enhanced by leveraging the threat’s in depth 
understanding of  the operational variables of  area of  
operations. With automated tools like advanced content 
distribution networks, it is foreseeable that a level of  
precision could be produced through the application of  
current analytical and coercive computer applications. 
US joint doctrine describes military deception as deliberate actions to mislead adversary decision makers, and information operations 
are employed to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp 
the decision-making of  the adversary. It follows 
that both deception and information operations are 
mutually supportive activities that place a high value 
on understanding the level of  reliance and ultimately 
breaking up command and control (C2) information 
systems and processes.
The reliance on digital information systems for combat 
operations is a concern for US joint forces and threat 
actors as well. Recognizing the considerable value of  the 
information and technology to the C2 process threat 
actors will prioritize operations to degrade friendly 
communications and sensors while protecting their 
own systems and infrastructure.1  Deception techniques 
like disinformation, misinformation, feints and ruses 
are among the most useful tools when attempting to 
confuse the friendly commanders’ understanding and 
ultimately affect their decisionmaking process.
The “profound position” information holds in the 
threat’s assessment of  joint operations will require 
friendly forces to double their efforts to protect and 
control the information environment foreseeable future 
combat situations.2  The disruption and manipulation 
of  information through deceptive techniques will 
continue to be a central component for threat actors 
seeking to influence actions and events across the 
spectrum of  combat. From decoys and camouflage, 
to electronic attacks, and manufactured civil unrest, 
the information environment affects practically all 
operational domains and is evolving into a potentially 
decisive component of  modern warfare. 
Deception in the Operational Environment     
The threat’s use of  deception techniques to deny, 
degrade, and disrupt the flow of  information is applied 
as a cohesive plan with adherence to known rules for 
implementation. Russian forces emphasize activity, 
plausibility, variety and continuity as foundational 
By Jerry England, OE&TA
Deception and 
Information Warfare
“How do you make a cat eat a hot pepper?  
You can stuff the pepper down the cat’s 
throat (the most difficult), you can put 
the pepper in cheese and make the cat 
swallow it, or you can grind the pepper 
up and spread it on the cat’s back. The 
latter method makes the cat lick itself and 
receive the satisfaction of cleaning up the 
hot pepper.”
— Major General Li Bingyan, 2004
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threat will appear larger where it is small and smaller 
where it is large, thus confusing the friendly commander 
and the staff. Successful execution of  the EW 
deception operation can be measured by the amount 
friendly forces committed to defending against the false 
attack.5  Unconventional tools including cyberattacks, 
disinformation, political interference, and illicit finance 
sequenced to bring about the threat’s deception plan, 
the more varied and persistent the indicators the more 
likely the threat’s efforts will be successful. By carefully 
using deception techniques and avoiding a windfall 
of  indicators that defeats the ruse threat actors can 
manipulate possibly misdirect friendly forces into a self-
defeating situation or at least cause enough confusion to 
delay their plan.
The use of  technical means is not the only way 
the threat will attempt to use deception to gain an 
advantage. Basic false flag techniques within the variety 
of  combat and non-combative actors on the battlefield 
increase cultural standoff  at the tactical level and exploit 
the friendly force’s unfamiliarity with the region. For 
example, non-government or charitable organizations 
with allegiances to a threat actor can engage in 
subversive activities while at the same time operating 
under the guise of  humanitarianism. The threat will 
also seek to infiltrate allied forces and if  given the 
opportunity use violence, graft, and non-compliance in 
an attempt to disrupt friendly and allied forces relations. 
Deception Operations in the Cyberspace            
Cyberattack tools like the deceptive technologies 
mentioned above are designed to mislead through 
manipulation and distortion of  trusted systems in 
order to induce a reaction that makes friendly forces 
more vulnerable to the effects of  threat weapons.  
Similarly cyberattacks that use social engineering, 
misinformation, and obfuscation techniques can achieve 
similar results and create windows of  opportunity 
for the use of  digital weapons that degrade friendly 
warfighting systems and or important friendly 
infrastructure.
Generally, most cyber activity employs deception in one 
form or another. One of  the most basic methods for 
The ability to influence local rivalries through 
manipulative social media posts could create significant 
unrest and help the threat defeat friendly forces through 
the increase in violence and unrest.
High tech electronic warfare (EW) platforms and 
deception tools such as digital radio jammers and 
multi-spectral decoys can potentially degrade the 
effectiveness of  modern collection assets, disrupt the 
transfer of  intelligence data to decisionmakers, and 
produce false analytical conclusions. Operating across 
multiple domains, deception elements can create or 
deny detection signatures and possibly defeat advanced 
systems that rely on converting signatures to digital 
information for use in C2 systems. 
Successful employment of  deception activities can 
force friendly forces to over commit or under commit 
combat power against an unknown verified enemy 
situation. Increasing ambiguity and confusion through 
sensor false positives is one way deception activities can 
delay the decision making process and increase threat 
actor’s operational flexibility. As an example a defensive 
belt of  decoys may stall the friendly advance long 
enough to call in a damaging artillery strike. As long as 
the deception continues the adversary has the ability to 
exercise a range of  operational alternatives. 
Another example could be a deception effort that 
targets the friendly commander’s cognitive biases or 
false assumptions. This approach exploits the rule that 
it is better to reassure someone who believes wrongly 
rather than it is to convince them of  something that 
is not true. For example, by presenting false signatures 
that match well known doctrinal templates the 
adversary can lay an ambush at for an attacking force at 
the time and place of  its choosing. 
Other technical means designed for the cognitive aspect 
of  the information environment can influence friendly 
forces perception of  the battlefield through false news 
stories, disinformation, and deceptive communications 
from compromised frequencies and civilian phones. 
Successful deception operations in the perception 
management or cognitive layer can be used as a way to 
confirm a friendly commander’s biases toward a certain 
enemy course of  action and lead them to possibly 
expedite the decisionmaking process against a false set 
of  conditions. By misrepresenting the situation based 
on the commander’s preconceived notions the threat 
will have achieved the goal of  causing the friendly 
forces to self  dis-organize and or dis-orient by changing 
the tempo of  the battle. 
By adding thorough electronic, acoustic, and thermal 
means to the signatures of  multimodal decoys the 
“The goal of Reflexive Control is to 
prompt the enemy to make a decision 
unfavourable to himself. Naturally, one 
must have an idea about how he thinks.”
— Colonel S. Leonenko, 1995
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digital weapons once used can potentially be used 
against their creator. The risk—sometimes known 
as the “monkey’s paw”—relates to the unintended 
consequences of  issuing a successful attack in 
cyberspace only to have in backfire in a modified form.
Psychological Deception                                                                 
Threat actors looking to affect the morale of  Ukrainian 
troops had taken to sending threatening false text 
messages regarding their chances of  survivability 
to the frontlines of  the conflict in eastern Ukraine.8  
Messaging that promotes a false narrative that 
highlights the brutality and the illegitimacy of  friendly 
operations can degrade morale and affect the discipline 
of  friendly troops if  counter arguments fail to take 
root.  Other activities aimed at the civilian population 
may also contribute to discontent and mistrust of  
friendly forces concerted through social media, attacks 
on infrastructure, and the takeover of  media outlets 
by threat actors.9 The perception that the legitimate 
government is not in control and cannot help the 
population is a misinformation technique that deceives 
the target audience into believing they must either leave 
or choose a side and fight. 
Psychological warfare and the battle for ideas will target 
the friendly commander’s misperceptions, cognitive 
biases, or their ignorance of  battlefield events and 
actions. These personality traits if  revealed can emerge 
as vulnerabilities that can be exploited for the threat’s 
purpose. Deception efforts and manipulation of  data 
flows contribute to the fog of  war and create windows 
of  opportunity for threat actors to gain control of  the 
information environment while denying it to friendly 
forces. The conflation of  events and the misdirection 
of  accusations of  responsibility can compel the 
friendly commander to miscalculate battlefield 
conditions, such as their ability to estimate outcome 
probabilities, evaluate the situation, and establish cause 
and effect. Recent offensive operations in the Ukraine, 
the Georgian republic, and in counter insurgency 
operations in Syria have shown the effectiveness of  so 
called “reflexive control” operations.10  In each conflict 
the use of  surprise, information denial, disinformation, 
and deception were used to misrepresent the true intent 
of  the threat’s operations and set conditions for a 
military victory while remaining below the threshold of  
a traditional military response from western nations. 
Agility and Counter Deception                               
The use of  advanced C2 systems that combine multiple 
information inputs into a unified operating picture 
are part of  the research and development efforts of  
threat actors wanting to leapfrog older legacy systems 
attacking an information system is known as a “Trojan 
horse” arguably the most famous deception operation 
in history. But instead of  a large mobile structure full 
of  Greek warriors, malicious software (malware) is 
delivered to a targeted computer system after the user 
opens a seemingly innocuous attachment. The Trojan 
horse software releases its payload and attacks the target 
systems either by stealing sensitive data, controlling the 
target computer system, and or launching a debilitating 
attack.
Other forms of  cyber deception can come in the form 
of  a compromised computer systems known as “bots” 
and their malicious networks known as “botnets.” 
Botnets can be used for a range of  purposes, from 
sending unwanted emails (spam), to creating more bots 
(zombies), to mining crypto currencies for nefarious 
purposes.  The key element is that the bots are trusted 
by the target systems and are able to breach them by 
posing as legitimate hosts. 
The widespread use of  networked technologies and 
common software suites for warfighting is part of  the 
reason that hackers could potentially affect multiple 
friendly C2 systems. Many attacks that seem to be a 
routine nuisance can contain dangerous payloads of  
malware that attackers use to penetrate friendly systems 
of  systems. The convergence of  military automated 
systems with commercial and civilian software and 
hardware as well as the increasing interaction with 
unknown third party contractors can increase the 
potential for a network attack. For example, day to day 
interactions such as participating on social media or 
online shopping can open defense systems to potential 
attacks.  
Threat actors that have an understanding of  friendly 
forces information systems, hierarchical structures and 
operational processes, can use cyberattacks to breach 
networks and alter interconnected logistics, resupply, 
and personnel systems.6  Reports dating back to 2008 
show how threat actors from Iran had intercepted 
satellite video from unmanned aerial systems using 
commercial software, thus compromising the integrity 
of  the information the ground commander uses.7 
The threat routinely uses its knowledge of  processes 
to locate vulnerabilities and compromise friendly 
operations, but the activities are not always information 
or networked based; in some cases the individual 
Soldier is a target. 
The low risk high payoff  nature of  cyber operations 
will make them more and more common as warfighting 
processes move further into the digital age. The flipside 
of  these types of  operations however are a risk that 
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unmanned systems, intelligence analytics, and improved 
command and control capabilities.14    
Implications for Training                                    
The integration by threat actors of  multi-domain 
deception activities should lead US forces to ensure 
they are prepared to meet the challenges of  modern 
warfare. This includes technical solutions as well 
as organizational solutions. Having the training to 
deal with preventing, countering, and in some cases 
recovering from threat information warfare will require 
a cross functional approach. The ability to protect 
and possibly attack in the information environment 
will involve the use of  advanced communications and 
electronic warfare systems. The ability to recognize 
threat deception techniques will mean improved 
sensors with increased sensitivity and communications 
capability. The need for more information to be 
collected, assessed, and disseminated at combat speed is 
a necessity for conflicts of  the foreseeable future. 
The solutions will not all be technical, however, as 
the need to deal with local populations and their 
interpretation of  events will require cultural and 
regional experts who can establish the friendly force 
as legitimate stakeholders in the contested areas. An 
expansion of  support operations to include not just 
the friendly forces but elements of  the local population 
as well will require expertise from military members 
not just in their respective fields but also in the art of  
civil military relations with a foreign entity. Maintaining 
situational awareness through technical means as 
well as through networks of  non-government and 
international organizations can assist the friendly force 
in better understanding the nature of  the conflict and 
reduce the risk of  being deceived in the information 
environment.♦
and win in the information enabled battlefield. Military 
communications satellites such as the Chinese Fenghuo 
series are providing unified communications using 
domestically produced technology to Chinese army 
units in the field.11  Developing position navigation 
and timing systems such as the Chinese Beidou and 
Russian GLONASS are likely compatible with US 
GPS as well as their own national standard.12  While 
the threat technology has historically lagged behind 
advanced militaries, their reliance on human solutions 
for situation awareness has in some ways closed 
the gap. However, technological initiatives and the 
increased availability of  information communication 
technology appears to be improving threat systems 
C2 capabilities. Irregular forces armed with mobile 
access to operationally significant opensource data can 
improve the threat’s situational awareness and improve 
interoperability with regular forces. Friendly forces 
that include deception as part of  their operational 
strategy will have to contend with threat actors who 
are achieving parity with regard to network enabled 
warfare. Systems such as the Russian YeSU battlefield 
management system provide situational awareness of  
both friendly and enemy forces through a combination 
of  multiband wireless inputs from reconnaissance to 
fire support systems.13  The ability to provide real-time 
status reports will allow threat force commanders to not 
only gain valuable feedback on their deception efforts 
but also react decisively when faced with a potential 
deceptive situation. Improved C2 will improve the 
threat force’s ability to react and realign their forces to 
exploit the situation. 
The integration of  machine learning and big data 
will aid the threat in controlling the information 
environment at machine speed and create overmatch 
for a range of  processes such as piloting swarms of  
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Reflecting their realpolitik view of  the world, Kremlin officials often quote Tsar Alexander III who remarked that “Russia has just two 
allies, the armed forces and the navy.”1  Russian leaders 
today would also count their neighbor Belarus among 
their close allies. However, due to a difference in views 
as to the proximity of  this alliance, the strength of  
the Russian-Belarus relationship has recently come 
under strain. This brief  paper will provide a thumbnail 
sketch of  the Belarus-Russia relationship, a few of  the 
current contentious issues, and possible tools which the 
Kremlin might employ to ensure that Belarus remains 
aligned with Russia. 
While it has enjoyed independence since 1991, for many 
Russians, Belarus (like Ukraine) is not a truly sovereign 
state. These Russians would agree with President Putin 
who has repeatedly asserted that Russians, Belarusians 
and Ukrainians are “one people,” and that the borders 
between these countries are merely administrative.2  
And although the term has become offensive to those 
living in Ukraine and Belarus, mentally speaking, many 
Russians still regard these countries as part of  “Little 
Russia,” (Малая Россия, Malaya Rossiya). The deep 
belief  that these countries “belong” to Russia forms the 
basis of  Kremlin policies toward Ukraine and Belarus, 
(and the source for many of  the problems). 
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Movement Along the 
Belarusian Front
By Ray Finch, Foreign Military Studies Office
Ray Finch provides insight on Russia’s relationship with Belarus, as well as a potential future that would change 
Russia’s dynamic with NATO in Movement Along the Belarusian Front.  The Belarus economy is dependent on Russia 
and Belarus President Lukashenko has walked a tightrope to maintain Belarussian autonomy.  Putin exploits this 
dependency, as well as aspects of a 1999 agreement to form a union state, which has never been fully implemented 
due to Lukashenko’s deft maneuvering.  If Putin arranges Lukashenko’s departure from office and creates the union 
state, then he would be able to continue as leader of a newly expanded Russia, instead of leaving office when term 
limits require in 2024.  This would effectively create a shared border between Russia and NATO members Poland and 
Lithuania.  While Russian troops are often stationed in Belarus, exercise there (i.e., Zapad (see the November 2017 
issue of OEWatch at community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/)), and often transit through Belarus and the Suwalki 
Gap to and from Russian Kaliningrad, under a union state Russian forces across all domains could be stationed 
permanently on NATO’s border.  This could place the Suwalki Gap in jeopardy of a fait-accompli takeover similar to 
Crimea.  
However, union between Russia and Belarus could face the broader problem of opposition by the Belorussian 
population, who mostly resent Putin’s repeated reference to Russians and Belarusians as “one people.”  While 
this attitude will likely not escalate to open revolt, it could threaten internal stability, which is one of the consistent 
objectives across Russian strategy. (see Katri Pynnöniemi’s review of Russian strategy documents in The Russian 
National Security Strategy: shaping perceptions and coordinating actions in this issue).  Further, Belarus’s weak 
economy, burdened by heavy social subsidies, would be a drag on the already strained Russian economy.  Regardless, 
Putin will maneuver to retain power in some manner and to keep Belarus within the Russian sphere of influence.
Similar to Ukraine, Russian historians have argued 
over the notion of  a distinct Belarusian national 
identity. For the past 500 years, Belarus national 
character was weakened by their much larger Russian 
neighbor. The horrors of  the 20th Century (WW I, 
Civil War, collectivization, WW II) further diminished 
a separate Belarusian ethnos and language. The Belarus 
proclamation of  independence in 1991 had as much to 
do with weakening the already decrepit power of  the 
centralized Soviet bureaucracy than with proclaiming a 
separate Belarusian identity.  
Like the former republics of  the USSR, the first few 
years of  independence for Belarus were economically 
extremely painful. By promising a return to some of  
the social and economic security provided under the 
Soviet model, in 1994, the former collective farm 
director, Alexander Lukashenko was able to beat 
challengers to become the second president of  an 
independent Belarus. Since then, Lukashenko has 
worked to consolidate his control over the country, 
dismantling the weak democratic structures which 
appeared after the collapse of  the Soviet Union. For 
the past 25 years, by leveraging generous subsidies 
from Russia, Lukashenko has been able to maintain a 
USSR-lite economy and social model in Belarus, where 
workers are provided with decent wages and benefits, in 
exchange for their political passivity. 
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To compensate for the Russian economic largesse, 
Kremlin leaders (Yeltsin, Putin, Medvedev and again 
Putin) have demanded certain concessions from 
Belarus. In 1999, the two countries agreed to form a 
Union State whereby Belarus would be merged into 
the Russian political, economic and security systems. 
While there has been plenty of  discussion over the past 
twenty years as to how this Union State would operate, 
its actual implementation has been delayed—mostly by 
the clever maneuvering of  President Lukashenko, who 
has grown increasingly reluctant to cede elements of  
Belarus sovereignty. 
Lukashenko’s desire to remain independent of  Kremlin 
influence became more pronounced after Russia 
annexed Crimea and became militarily involved in 
the Donbas in early 2014. For the second time within 
a decade (Georgia, 2008) the Kremlin reminded 
Russia’s neighbors of  its great power pretensions. 
However, being economically dependent upon Russia 
has reduced Lukashenko’s maneuver room. While 
he has resisted pressures to either recognize Russia’s 
ownership of  Crimea or to allow Russia to open a new 
airbase in Belarus, Kremlin domestic politics may soon 
force Lukashenko to show greater enthusiasm toward 
establishing a Union State with Russia.  
The transfer of  political power within Russia has often 
been fraught with tension, and already today, Kremlin 
officials are planning for who will lead the country 
when Vladimir Putin’s current term as president ends 
in May 2024. One possible option revolves around 
a scheme to allow Putin to remain at the Kremlin 
helm as leader of  this new Union State with Belarus. 
Presumably, this new “state” would require a new 
constitution, and thus Vladimir Putin would be 
permitted to run for the highest office. While such a 
proposal would be amenable to a large percentage of  
Russians, it is not so popular among the Belarusians, 
particularly the elite.3
The two presidents have met nearly 20 times over the 
past 15 years (twice in December 2019) to discuss 
specific details of  how this new Union State will 
operate. While no final decisions have yet to be made, 
after their 7 December 2019 meeting in Sochi, one 
Kremlin insider suggested that Lukashenko was offered 
the role of  head of  the Union Parliament. According 
to the source, Lukashenko apparently turned down this 
offer and is still trying to both to preserve his role as 
the Belarusian leader and the country’s independence.4 
Belarusian presidential elections are scheduled for 
August 2020, and while today Lukashenko is almost 
guaranteed to win against a non-existent opposition, 
much could change over the next eight months. 
For instance, should Lukashenko prove less than 
enthusiastic in actually forming the new Union State 
with Russia, the Kremlin could apply significant 
economic and information pressure to either ensure his 
compliance or make his re-election difficult. 
Russian domestic politics, however, is not the only 
driver behind this renewed interest in forming a Union 
State with Belarus. From a military perspective, a mere 
glance at a map of  Russia and Eastern Europe makes 
it readily apparent why the current Kremlin leadership 
is adamant that Belarus remains within its sphere of  
influence. While European countries may look at raw 
military power as quaint and outdated, memories of  
a Western threat have been scarred upon the Russian 
DNA. Kremlin military leaders value having a strong 
buffer on their Western border. Since the Baltic 
countries have already joined NATO, and with today’s 
Ukraine moving in a pro-Western direction, Russia can 
simply not allow the strategically important Belarus to 
follow suit. 
Making specific predictions regarding the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy remains a losing proposition. 
Nevertheless, since regime preservation continues as 
the primary strategic objective, and because Vladimir 
Putin’s presence has become so essential in defining and 
managing this regime, the likelihood that the Kremlin 
will prolong Putin’s rule with the creation of  a Union 
State with Belarus could be a smart bet.♦ 
About the Author:
Ray Finch is a Eurasian Military Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies 
Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Finch spent 20 years in the 
US Army and has spent the past 20 working in business, academia, 
and as a contractor for the US government. 
Vladimir Putin met with President of the Republic of 
Belarus Alexander Lukashenko in Moscow, 29 Dec. 2018 
Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59618  CCA 4.0 Intl
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Security strategies: anticipating a new cycle 
of  revisions                                                       
Since 2014, Russia has renewed all its key documents on security and military affairs. The list is impressive. The drafting of  the military 
doctrine started in 2013 and the new doctrine was 
approved in December 2014. It registered a heightened 
perception of  threats towards Russia and emphasized 
the importance of  informational and other non-military 
measures. A year later, the National Security Strategy1 
outlined a vision of  Russia’s role in the world, strategic 
interests, and means to achieve them. After these 
main strategic planning documents were out, specific 
thematic strategies and concept papers have followed 
suit. In 2015, the new Maritime Doctrine replaced the 
2001 version. The new versions of  the Foreign Policy 
Doctrine and the Information Security Doctrine were 
approved in 2016. After a short pause, the Energy 
Security Doctrine was approved in May 2019, followed 
by the Strategy on Artificial Intelligence in October 
2019. 
A new cycle of  revisions has already started. The first 
in line is the National Security Strategy. A new version 
is expected to be published in 2020.2 The Russian 
Security Council is also drafting a master plan for the 
development of  national power agencies, including 
the armed forces, other security force structures 
and the military-industrial complex.3 The fate of  the 
Military Doctrine is still undecided, at least according 
to secretary of  the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev.4  
However, it is unlikely that this new round will bring 
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The Russian National 
Security Strategy:
shaping perceptions and coordinating actions
By Katri Pynnöniemi, Assistant Professor, University of Helsinki and the National Defence University
Dr. Katri Pynnöniemi’s review of Russian strategy documents in The Russian National Security 
Strategy: shaping perceptions and coordinating actions is revealing.  Russian national strategy is 
consistent across multiple organs of the Russian government and focused on several main themes.  Dr. 
Pynnöniemi rarely mentions Putin, but his hand is evident in the presence of the same themes that he 
has stressed publically for years.  The strategy documents show Russia competing globally for “power 
and prestige” and locally for national sovereignty. Russia is painted as on the defensive against 
the West, which continues its Cold War policy of containment and is the instigator of all instability 
areas of Russian influence.  These documents largely apply both internationally and domestically, as 
maintaining stability is a key theme.  This justifies Russian actions as self-defense against Western-
instigated aggression. The documents stress the multi-domain aspects of competition with the West, 
reaffirming the US Army’s emphasis on Multi-Domain Operations.  Overall, the insights into Russian 
strategic thinking in relation to the West provides a view to how Russia will pursue its interests and 
therefore what the Army may face within the Russian sphere of influence and why.
paradigmatic changes to Russia’s military and foreign 
policy. 
Strategic narratives about Russia’s role in 
the contemporary conflicts                                                     
As I’ve argued earlier, the current version of  the 
National Security Strategy “sees the world through 
the prism of  strategic stability, whereby the military 
component of  national security is emphasized 
and Russia’s position in the world depends on the 
‘correlation of  forces’ – the country’s ability to use the 
full spectrum of  means in the competition for power 
and prestige”5. The general contours of  the strategy 
are unlikely to change. In its current form, the text 
adheres to the core narratives with which Russia seeks 
to maintain room for maneuver in the future conflicts. 
The strategy creates an image of  Russia as a target 
of  containment. This image can be traced to the so 
called besieged fortress narrative where Russia, especially 
the Russian political decision-making system, is seen as 
a target of  malign outside interference. The National 
Security Strategy and later public commentary presents 
Western governments as responsible for aggravating 
the security situation in the world, and especially in the 
regions adjacent to Russia. The regional conflicts in the 
Commonwealth of  Independent States (CIS) area are 
portrayed as tools to contain Russia, as these conflicts 
undermine Russia’s privileged interests in the region.  
The military doctrine increased the stakes by arguing 
that “military threats and dangers have shifted to the 
information space and to Russia’s domestic sphere”.6 
Red Diamond 53 Oct-Dec 2019
The political leadership has referred to this assessment 
before and after the doctrine was approved. For 
example, in July 22, 2014 meeting with the members of  
the Russian Security Council, President Putin argued 
that: 
Attempts are clearly being made to destabilize the 
social and economic situation, to weaken Russia in one 
way or another or to strike at our weaker spots, and 
they will continue primarily to make us more agreeable 
in resolving international issues. So-called international 
competition mechanisms are being used as well (this 
applies to both politics and the economy); for this 
purpose the special services’ capabilities are used, 
along with modern information and communication 
technologies and dependent, puppet non-governmental 
organizations – so-called soft force mechanisms. 
This, obviously, is how some countries understand 
democracy.7
Another main narrative inherent in the strategy 
originates in the Soviet era ‘myth of  Soviet/Russian 
aggression’. It represents the West as an active force 
undermining the world order and strategic stability 
and subsequently, creates an image of  Russia as 
passive observer of  the conflict.8 This narrative is 
used to represent Russia’s actions as defensive, aimed 
at countering the malign Western plots against Russia. 
Actually, this view runs through all of  the main strategy 
documents. (see Table 1.) Perhaps in the clearest form it 
appears in the National Security Strategy. It states that: 
Interrelated political, military, military-technical, 
diplomatic, economic, informational, and other 
measures are being developed and implemented in 
order to ensure strategic deterrence and the prevention 
of  armed conflicts. These measures are intended to 
prevent the use of  armed force against Russia, and to 
protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.9
Interpretation: institutionalized power 
vested in the strategy?                                                  
The previous section focused on the ways in which 
the strategies function as a resource for strategic 
communication and deception. It suggests that the 
strategy documents aim to shape general understanding 
of  contemporary conflicts and Russia’s role in them. 
However, the security strategies clearly have other 
functions as well. For example, the National Security 
Strategy forms “the basis for shaping and implementing 
state policy in the sphere of  safeguarding the Russian 
Federation’s national security”. More concretely, the 
strategy is intended to consolidate the policies and 
actions of  different state agencies and civil society 
actors in an effort to create “favourable internal and 
external conditions for the realization of  the Russian 
Federation’s national interests and strategic national 
priorities.”10 This is, in essence, a key paragraph in 
the strategy, for it expresses both the function of  
the strategy (as a guideline for policy-making), and 
the direction of  the policy (the creation of  favorable 
internal and external conditions).
The extent to which different stakeholders can 
influence strategic planning process in Russia is difficult 
to assess. The role of  informal networks in the Russian 
political system is considerable, and therefore, official 
administrative position does not necessarily translate 
into political influence. However, it is safe to assume 
that the Kremlin sets the overall strategic priorities for 
military and foreign policies. Thereby, a radical shift 
in the security priorities would require a paradigmatic 
change in the composition of  power in the Kremlin. 
From the key agencies involved, the General Staff  of  
Russian Armed Forces is responsible for the revisions 
made to the military doctrine. The role of  the Security 
Council is also important. It is formally the key entity 
responsible for drafting the main security related 
strategy documents.11 The council has several working 
groups that reflect Russia’s main areas of  interest: 
global problems and international security, problems 
in the CIS-countries, military-industry and technology 
development, economic and social security, military 
security and the information security.12 
A comparison of  the key strategies shows that all of  
them define contemporary conflicts and the threat 
environment in a similar way (Table 1). Even if  
individual strategies may emphasize different aspects of  
the threat environment, there is a consolidated vision 
of  Russia’s strategic priorities. However, in conclusion 
it is important to emphasize that the National Security 
Strategy and other documents do not provide a 
blueprint to predict Russia’s future actions. Rather, 
their detailed analysis may contribute to the better 
understanding of  the logic upon which Russia operates 
in competition and conflict.♦
1. Russian National Security Strategy. Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Feder-
ation, 31 December, 2015, No. 683, <www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document133/>, accessed 
May 5, 2018.
2. Patrushev, Nikolai. ‘Bezopasnosti Rossii v sovremennoi mire’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta 11 November, 
2019.
3. President of Russia. ‘Vladimir Putin chaired a Security Council Meeting in the Kremlin’, 22 July 
2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46305>, accessed 15 November 2019; Mis-
livskaya, Galina. ‘Patrushev rasskazal o hode podgotovki kontsepstsii razvitiya Vooruzhennyh 
cil’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta 22 November 2019.
4. Mislivskaya, Galina. ‘Patrushev rasskazal o hode podgotovki kontsepstsii razvitiya Vooruzhennyh 
cil’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta 22 November 2019.
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Kallio, Katri Pynnöniemi (eds.): The Security Strategies of the US, China, Russia and the EU: 
Living in different worlds, FIIA Report 56, June 2018, p 41: https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/
the-security-strategies-of-the-us-china-russia-and-the-eu; Pynnöniemi, Katri. ‘Russia’s National 
Security Strategy: Analysis of Conceptual Evolution’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 
31:2, 2018, 240-256.
6. Russian Military Doctrine. Presidential Edict N2976N (Article 11), Approved 25 December 2014, 
<www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/>, accessed May 5, 2018.
7. President of Russia. ‘Vladimir Putin chaired a Security Council Meeting in the Kremlin’, 22 July 
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Description Military doctrine (2014) National Security Strategy (2015) Foreign Policy Doctrine (2016)
Contemporary 
conflicts
Integrated use of military force, political, 
economic, informational and other non-
military measures, implemented together with 
the widespread use of the protest potential of 
the population and special operation forces 
(15a)
An entire spectrum of political, financial-
economic, and informational instruments 
have been set in motion in the struggle 
for influence in the international arena. 
Increasingly active use is being made of 
special services' potential. (13)
Alongside military might, other important factors 
allowing States to influence international politics 
are taking centre stage, including economic, legal, 
technological and IT capabilities. Using these 
capabilities to pursue geopolitical interests is 
detrimental to efforts to find ways to settle disputes 
and resolve the existing international issues by 
peaceful means on the basis of the norms of 
international law. (8)
Sources of conflict
World development is presently characterized 
by increasing global competition, tensions 
in the various areas of interstate and 
interregional interaction, rivalry of values and 
development models, instability of economic 
and political development processes at 
the global and regional levels against the 
background of a general complication of 
international relations. A gradual redistribution 
of influence in favor of the new centres of 
economic growth and political attraction. (9)
We are seeing an exacerbation of 
contradictions linked to the unevenness of 
world development, the deepening of the 
gap between countries' levels of prosperity, 
the struggle for resources, access to 
markets, and control over transportation 
arteries. The competition between states 
is increasingly encompassing social 
development values and models and 
human, scientific, and technological 
potentials. (13)
Tensions are rising due to disparities in global 
development, the widening of prosperity gap 
between States and growing competition for 
resources, access to markets and control over 
transport arteries. This competition involves 
not only human, research and technological 
capabilities, but has been increasingly gaining 
a civilizational dimension in the form of rivalry of 
value orientations. Against this backdrop, attempts 
to impose values on others can stoke xenophobia, 
intolerance and conflict in international affairs, 
leading ultimately to chaos and an uncontrolled 
situation in international relations. (5)
Active defence
The military policy of the Russian Federation 
is aimed at deterring (сдерживание) and 
preventing military conflicts, improving 
military organization, forms and methods of 
using the Armed Forces, other troops and 
entities, increasing mobilization readiness 
in order to ensure the defence and security 
of the Russian Federation, as well as the 
interests of its allies. (18)
Interrelated political, military, military-
technical, diplomatic, economic, 
informational, and other measures are 
being developed and implemented in 
order to ensure strategic deterrence and 
the prevention of armed conflicts. These 
measures are intended to prevent the 
use of armed force against Russia, and 
to protect its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
Strategic deterrence and the prevention of 
armed conflicts are achieved by maintaining 
the capacity for nuclear deterrence at a 
sufficient level, and the Russian Federation 
Armed Forces, other troops, and military 
formations and entities at the requisite level 
of combat readiness. (36)
As a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council and a participant in a number of 
influential international organizations, regional 
frameworks, inter-State dialogue and cooperation 
mechanisms, the Russian Federation contributes 
to the development of a positive, well-balanced 
and unifying international agenda by relying on 
substantial resources in all areas of human activity 
and pursuing a foreign policy that actively seeks 
to develop relations with the leading States, 
international organizations and associations in 
various parts of the world. (20)
NATO
Main external military dangers: building up 
NATO’s power potential and endowing it with 
global functions implemented in violation 
of international law, bringing the military 
infrastructure of NATO countries closer to the 
borders of the Russian Federation, including 
by further expanding the bloc. (12a)
Activities of the Russian Federation to contain 
and prevent military conflicts: maintaining 
an equal dialogue in the field of European 
security with the European Union and NATO. 
(21h)
The buildup of the military potential of the 
NATO and the endowment of it with global 
functions pursued in violation of the norms 
of international law, the galvanization of 
the bloc countries' military activity, the 
further expansion of the alliance, and the 
location of its military infrastructure closer 
to Russian borders are creating a threat to 
national security. (15)
The Russian Federation is prepared for the 
development of relations with NATO based 
on equality for the purpose of strengthening 
general security in the Euro-Atlantic region. 
The depth and content of such relations 
will be determined by the readiness of the 
alliance to take account of the interests of 
the Russian Federation when conducting 
military-political planning, and to respect the 
provisions of international law. (107)
The Russian Federation maintains its negative 
perspective towards NATO’s expansion, the 
Alliance’s military infrastructure approaching 
Russian borders, and its growing military activity 
in regions neighbouring Russia, viewing them as 
a violation of the principle of equal and indivisible 
security and leading to the deepening of old 
dividing lines in Europe and to the emergence of 
new ones. (70)
Russia will build its relations with NATO, taking 
into account the degree to which the Alliance 
is ready to engage in equitable partnership, 
strictly adhere to the norms and principles of 
international law, take real steps towards a 
common state of peace, security and stability in 
the Euro-Atlantic region based on the principles 
of mutual trust, transparency and predictability, to 
ensure the compliance by all its members with the 
commitment undertaken within the Russia-NATO 
Council (…) (70)
Katri and Andras Racz (eds) Fog of Falsehood. Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict 
in Ukraine, Report No. 45, Helsinki: The FIIA, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, p79-91: 
http://www.fiia.fi/fi/publication/588/ fog_of_falsehood/, accessed 24 May 2018.
9. Russian National Security Strategy. Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federa-
tion, 31 December, 2015, No. 683, Article 36 [emphasis added], <www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/
document133/>, accessed May 5, 2018.
10. Russian National Security Strategy. Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federa-
tion, 31 December, 2015, No. 683, Article 4, <www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document133/>, 
accessed May 5, 2018.
11. Patrushev, Nikolai. ‘Bezopasnosti Rossii v sovremennoi mire’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta 11 November, 
2019; Egorov, Ivan (2019) ‘Sovbez prostital ygrozy’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta 17 April 2019.
12. Interfax. ‘Strategiyu natsbezopasnosti Rossii izmenyat v 2020 godu’, 17 July 2019, <https://www.
interfax.ru/russia/669430>, accessed 12 December 2019
Table 1. Comparison of the main strategic documents. The figure in the end of each paragraph refers to the Article in the document.
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Okkupert (Occupied) is a Norwegian 
television series 
set in the near 
future exploring 
how a Russian 
occupation of  
Norway might 
unfold. It was 
created by Erik 
Skjoldbjærg, 
Karianne Lund, 
and Jo Nesbø 
and produced 
by TV2 Norge, 
Viaplay, and 
Yellow Bird. The 
show’s dialogue is in 
Norwegian, English, 
and Russian. The first 
two seasons were filmed at 
multiple locations in Norway  
and were the most expensive 
Norwegian television series 
seasons ever filmed. The third and final season 
was filmed in Lithuania.  
Central characters include Jesper Berg (Henrik 
Mestad), Prime Minister of  Norway, Hans Djupvik 
(Eldar Skar), a Norwegian Police Security Services 
Officer assigned to the Prime Minister and later 
internal security, Hilde Djupvik (Selome Emnetu), a 
criminal judge, Bente Norum (Ane Dahl Torp), wife of  
investigative journalist who opens a restaurant catering 
to Russians, Irina Sidorova (Ingeborga Dapkunaite), the 
Russian Ambassador to Norway, and Anita Rygh (Janne 
Heltberg), the Prime Minister’s chief  political advisor.
The story is set in a notional near future in which the 
US has left NATO and climate change is having an 
exacerbating effect upon Norway. After Norwegian 
scientists develop a clean energy source using thorium, 
an environmentalist party is elected into power, vowing 
to divest Norway completely from fossil fuels and 
stop all oil mining and production in Norway. Soon 
after, Russian forces seize Norwegian oil facilities. 
At the same time, Prime Minister Jesper Berg is 
briefly kidnapped. He is soon freed, but during his 
capture he learns that neither the 
EU nor NATO are coming to 
Norway’s assistance. The story 
is spread over an extended 
time period. Each episode 
takes place in a subsequent 
month, representing the 
culmination of  several 
weeks’ worth of  activity. 
As the series progresses, 
the Russian presence 
in Norway gradually 
grows in response to 
varied events that take 
place throughout Norway.  
Prime Minister Berg and his 
advisor Ms Rygh endeavor to 
persuade Russia to withdraw, 
desperately but fruitlessly 
seeking any form of  international 
assistance while trying to balance 
the urgency of  Russian departure with 
preventing the loss of  life. The result is an 
administration that increasingly becomes a 
puppet state of  Russia. Meanwhile, anti-Russian 
sentiment grows and eventually blossoms into a 
full-blown insurgency that involves Norwegians 
from all walks of  life, including disaffected private 
citizens as well as government insiders. By the end 
of  the second season, the political plot has become 
intricately complex, drawing in multiple international 
actors and governments. 
As the plot develops, so do the principal characters. 
Berg transitions from a timid environmentalist to a 
shrewd resistance leader. Rygh grows from advisor 
to political figure herself. Hans Djupvik begins as a 
security guard and becomes the most powerful security 
official in the country. Hilde Djupvik begins as a minor 
court judge gradually becomes a fierce champion of  
justice. Norum grows from a struggling small business 
owner to insider with the Russian occupiers. Sidorova 
begins as a powerful if  arrogant diplomat but grows 
in cynicism and insecurity. There are no real good 
guys or bad guys, except perhaps Norway itself. As the 
characters interact, they all transition from protagonist 
to antagonist in one way or another, each trying to 
do what he or she perceives as the right thing in their 
respective situations. 
Okkupert  (2015)TV SHOW REVIEW
By Kevin M. Freese, OE&TA
(4.5/5)
The timing of  and scope of  Okkupert eerily resembles 
events that unfolded in Ukraine in 2014. However, the 
show was more prophetic than deliberately analogous. 
According to show creator Erik Skjoldbjærg, filming 
of  the show began the day Russia invaded Crimea. The 
story itself  was inspired by other international events, 
notably the US-led invasion of  Iraq in 2003.  The story 
was originally conceived by writer Jo Nesbø in 2008, 
with other writers contributing over the years. 
Okkupert is definitely a political show, not an action 
show. Most tactical actions are either inferred 
or depicted as quick, rapid events. However, the 
military and security theme predominates. The show 
very astutely presents the role of  the military as an 
instrument of  national power, cleverly employed 
alongside the other instruments. The scenario itself  is 
a well-crafted example of  conflict in an age of  multi-
domain operations. It depicts Russia competing for 
control of  energy production resources, relying upon 
special operations rather than conventional forces, 
timing actions to support diplomatic and economic 
efforts, all supported by robust information operations. 
In doing so, Okkupert manages to portray Norwegian 
concerns about the potential existential threat posed by 
Russia while maintaining realism in how such a threat 
might unfold. If  anything, it does too good a job; the 
depiction of  Russia, combined with the coincidental 
timing, hit enough of  a nerve to generate condemnation 
from the Russian government as Cold War reminiscent 
propaganda.  
Okkupert has a lot to offer for the US Army training 
community, particularly in terms of  scenario 
development. It shows how a near-peer competitor 
could pose a threat to a US ally through coordinated 
integration of  all elements of  national power, while 
managing to keep the conflict below the threshold of  
armed conflict. The portrayal of  Russian activity is 
consistent with Russian strategic doctrine and recent, 
real-world examples. It is a decidedly Norwegian 
perspective on how things could happen, and how 
Norway should be paid attention, both as a NATO 
partner and a Russian neighbor. Whether season three 
will be as good remains to be seen, but if  it even comes 
close to being as insightful as the first two seasons, it 
should also be a great success.♦
1. IMDB, Okkupert (2015), https://www.imdb.com/title/
tt4192998/. 
2. Aukse Kancereviciute, “Norwegian TV Series Occupied Films 
in Lithuania,” Film New Europe, May 7, 2019, https://www.
filmneweurope.com/news/lithuania-news/item/118016-nor-
wegian-tv-series-occupied-films-in-lithuania. 
3. Ari Shapiro, “Political Thriller Series ‘Occupied’ Parallels 
Russia’s Actions in Ukraine,” NPR All Things Considered, 
April 14, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/04/14/474265717/
political-thriller-series-occupied-parallels-russias-ac-
tions-in-ukraine.  
4. “Jacob Brown, “Homeland Withdrawal? This Series from 
Norway is Your New Favorite Geopolitical Thriller,” Vogue, 
January 29, 2016,  https://www.vogue.com/article/net-
flix-occupied-erik-skjoldbjaerg-homeland. 
5. David Crouch, “TV Drama Depicting Russian Invasion 
Premieres in Norway,” Guardian, October 2, 2015, https://
www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2015/oct/02/tv-dra-
ma-russian-invasion-occupied-premiere-norway.  
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T-14 Armata Russian Main Battle Tank
Tanks and AT Vehicles > Tanks > Main Battle Tank > T-14 Armata Russian Main Battle Tank
Tiers:
1
2
3
4
WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT 
GUIDE (WEG) SHOWCASE
Alternative Designation: T-14 Armata
Date of  Introduction: 2015
Proliferation: The Russian Army initially planned to acquire 2,300 T-14s 
between 2015 and 2025.
Crew: 3 ea
Passenger Capacity: NA
Maximum Effective Range: 8,000 m
Meteorological Mast: Yes
Satellite Communications: Yes
Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS): Yes
The T-14 MBT can be a significant capability to Russia’s tank fleet once a 
substantial number of  T-14s appear in operational units. Although varied 
ways exist to classify tanks by characteristics of  weight, roles, or main 
armament, current tank design descriptions sometimes blur terms, such 
as main battle tank versus medium tank. Overall size of  a tank appears 
less important than developments to optimize technological advantages in 
automotive performance, weapon system lethality, and vehicle and crew 
survivability within a general category of  main battle tank. The Armata 
chassis now presents the ability to apply major improvements to Russia’s 
tank fleet that were previously constrained by the chassis and turret 
dimensions of  the basic T-72 MBT design and those of  its predecessors. 
Some of  the most significant changes in the T-14 design, besides its visual 
dimensions, are―
• Unmanned turret with a 125mm main gun and autoloader of  main 
gun ammunition from a cassette within the turret base, and a remotely-
controlled weapon station (RCWS) on top of  the turret that mounts 
one medium 7.62mm machine gun (there is no machine gun mounted 
coaxially to the main gun);
• Crew compartment capsule separated and protected from the turret and 
main gun ammunition to enhance crew survivability if  turret area stored 
ammunition experiences a catastrophic explosion;
• Vehicle survivability armor appliques and active protection systems 
that improve the probability to defeat main gun, missile, large rocket-
propelled grenade, and mine threats; and 
• Improved automotive engineering, crew situational awareness systems, 
weapon system effectiveness, and digital command and fire control 
systems.
The larger dimensions of  the T-14 allow for future design modifications 
as Russian requirements evolve and technology advances. Although some 
designers suggest a fully-robotic Armata vehicle could be considered in 
the future, or that a larger cannon or gun could be mounted to the Armata 
MBT, neither robotics nor a larger main weapon appear to be in the 
current program. Other capability claims have yet to be fully substantiated, 
such as radically-reduced emission signatures to diminish or negate 
infrared or thermal detection.
Source: The information provided above is from the January 2017 
article titled “T-14 Gun-Missile Tank for the Russian Federation,” by 
Jon H. Moilanen published in the TRADOC G-2 Red Diamond Threats 
Newsletter, Volume 8, Issue 01, January 2017.
Length: 8.7 m
Width: 3.5 m
Height: 3.3 m
Weight, Combat: 55 tons (sources range from 48 tons to 65 tons)
Ground Pressure: INA kg/m
Engine Name: ChTZ 12N360 (A-85-3A)
Engine Type: Diesel
Engine Power: 1,500-2,000 hp
Power / Weight: 31 hp/t
Transmission: 12-speed automatic
Cruising Range: 500 km
Speed, Maximum Road: 80-90 km/h
Speed, Average Cross: INA
Speed Maximum Swim: Not Amphibious
Gradient: 60 %
Side Slope: 40 %
Vertical Step: 0.8 m
Trench: 2.8 m
Fording without Preparation: 1.2 m
Fording with Preparation: INA
Data-link and Radio Communications Antennae: Yes
Primary Tactical Radio: R-168 Akveduk
Note: It is anticipated that the T-14 Armata will have a modern suite of  
digital and FM communication capabilities.
Note: The T-14 is equipped with a unmanned Turret mounting a 125mm 
2A82-1M smoothbore gun fed by an automatic loader. The turret 
carries a total of  45 rounds of  ammunition, including ready-to-use 
ammunition.
System
Name: 2A82-1M (later versions may have the 2A83, 152mm cannon)
Type: Smoothbore Cannon
Caliber: 125 mm
Length: 7 m
Weight: 2,675 kg
Loader Type: Automatic Loader
Autoloader Basic Load: 32 ready-to-use rounds
Range Finder Type: Laser
Maximum Range: 8,000 m
Max Rate of  Fire: 10-12 rds/min
Sustain Rate of  Fire: INA
Red Diamond 58 Oct-Dec 2019
Ammunition (Option 1)
Ammunition (Option 2)
Ammunition (Option 3)
Ammunition (Option 4)
Ammunition
System
System
Ammunition
Name: 3VBM3/3BM9/10
Type: APFSDS
Caliber: 125 mm
Muzzle Velocity: 1,800 m/s
Basic Load: 45 rounds, 32 rounds in the autoloader
Effective Range: 3 km
Armor Penetration: 140 mm
Name: 9M119 Svir, 9M119M Refleks
Type: Laser beam ATGM
In Service: 1980 to present
Manufacturer: Degtyarev Plant
Mass: 17.2 kg
Diameter: 125 mm
Warhead Type: Tandem hollow-charge
Warhead Weight: 4.5 kg
Basic Load: 45 rounds, 32 rounds in the autoloader
Operational Range: 5,000 m
Guidance: Laser beam riding
Name: 3VBK7/3BK12
Type: HEAT-FS
Caliber: 125 mm
Muzzle Velocity: 950 m/s
Effective Firing Range: 4,000 m
Shell Weight: 29 kg
Projectile Weight: 19 kg
Basic Load: 45 rounds, 32 rounds in the autoloader
Charge Weight: 5 kg
Penetration: 220 mm
Name: 3VOF22/3OF19
Type: HE-Frag-FS
Round Weight: 33 kg
Muzzle Velocity: 850 m/s
Projectile Weight: 23 kg
Basic Load: 45 rounds, 32 rounds in the autoloader
Charge Weight: 3.4 kg
Note #1: The T-14 is equipped with a Remotely-Controled Weapon 
Station (RCWS)
Type: Armor Piercing
Caliber: 12.7 mm
Cartridge: 12.7×108mm
Muzzle Velocity: 860 m/s
Basic Load: 300 ea
Effective Range: 2,000 m
Maximum Effective Range vs Aircraft: 1,000 m
Maximum Effective Range vs Armor: 800 m
Maximum Effective Range vs Ground Targets: 2,000 m
Maximum Range: 7,850 m
Name: Kord 12.7mm Machine Gun
Type: 12.7mm
In Service: 1998-Present
Manufacturer: V.A. Degtyarev Plant
Variants: 6P50-1, 6P50-2, 6P50-3, 6P49
Length: 1,980 mm
Weight: 25.5 kg
Action: Gas-operated, rotating bolt
Rate of  Fire: 650-750 rds/min
Effective Firing Range: 2,000 m
Feed System: 50-round linked belt
Sights: Iron Sights
Name: 7.62mm PK (Kalashnikov’s) Machine
Type: 7.62mm Machine Gun
Caliber: 7.62 mm
In Service: 1961-Present
Length: 1,203 mm
Barrel length: 605 mm
Weight: 9 kg
Max Rate of  Fire: 800 rds/min
Sustain Rate of  Fire: 250 rds/min
Action: Gas-operated, open bolt
Maximum Firing Range: 3,000 m
Effective Firing Range: 1,000 m
Feed System: Non-disintegrating metal 50 round belts in 100, 200, 
and 250 round boxes
Sights: Tangent iron sights (default); Optical, Night-vision, Thermal 
and Radar sights
Type: Ball
Caliber: 7.62 mm
Cartridge: 7.62×54mmR
Muzzle Velocity: 825 m/s
Basic Load: 1,000 rds/min
Effective Range: 1,500 m
Armor Penetration: INA
Maximum Firing Range: 4,000 m
Name: Kalina System
Computerized FCS: Yes
Thermal Sight Tank Commander: Yes
Thermal Sight Gunner: Yes
Main Gun Stabilization: Yes
Battle Field Management System: Yes
Laser Rangefinder: Yes
Cameras: Several cameras provide for a 360 degree visual coverage
Automatic Target Tracker: Yes
Hull Armor: 44S-sv-Sh: effective to 900mm vs Sabot and 1400mm vs 
HEAT.
Turret Armor: Lightly armored; relies on APS.
Applique Armor: Capable
Explosive Reactive Armor: Malachit dual ERA (4th Gen) can reduce 
penetration of  APFSDS and HEAT rounds by 50%.
Active Protection System: Yes, Afghanit (similar to Israeli “Trophy”); 
NII Stali Upper Hemisphere Protection Complex; AESA radar slaved 
to the AA machine gun.
Mine Clearing: Yes, the T-14 has a active mine countermeasure system.
Self-Entrenching Blade: Yes
NBC Protection: Yes
Smoke Equipment: Yes
IR Signature: Can warn of  electro-optical and infrared interrogation.
Note: There are reports that the T-14 will be equipped with STANAG 
4569 Level 5 protection.
T-16 Armata BREM: Armored recovery version with the T-14 chassis. 
The standard turret of  the T-14 is removed and replaced by a small, 
remotely operated, weapon station armed with a Kord 12.7mm caliber 
heavy machine gun. A crane is mounted on the right side on the top of  
the hull which is protected at the front with slat armor.
Note #1: The T-14 is equipped with a Remotely-Controled Weapon 
Station (RCWS)
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1 Pandur I Austrian 6x6 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Austrailia P
2 Pandur I-AM Austrian 6x6 Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Austrailia P
3 Pandur II Austrian 8x8 Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Austrailia P
4 Pak-IBMS (Rehbar) Pakistani Integrated Battlefield Management System Belarus P
5 Optima-3 Belarusian GNSS Distributed Jamming Complex Belarus P
6 EE-9 Cascavel Mark 4 Brazilian Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle Brazil P
7 EE-9U Cascavel MX-8 Brazilian Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle Brazil P
8 GC-45 Canadian 155mm Towed Gun-Howitzer Canada P
9 DF-3 Chinese Surface to Surface Medium Range Ballistic Missile China P
10 VN-11 Chinese Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) China P
11 VN-1 (ZBD-09) Chinese 8x8 Armor Personnel Carrier (APC) China P
12 Z-8 (Zhishengji-8) Chinese Multi-Role Helicopter China P
13 Z-19 (WZ-19) Chinese Reconnaissance/Attack Helicopter China P
14 Z-9 Harbin (WZ-9) Chinese Medium Multi-Role Helicopter China P
15 YW-531H (Type 85) Chinese Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) China P
16 YW-534 (Type 89) Chinese Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) China P
17 DF-11 Chinese Surface to Surface Short Range Ballistic Missile China P
18 DF-15 Chinese Surface to Surface Short Range Ballistic Missile China P
19 Type 63A (ZTZ-63A) Chinese Amphibious Light Tank China P
20 HQ-7B (FM-90) Chinese 6x6 Short-Range Air Defense Missile System China P
21 LD 2000 (LuDun-2000) Chinese 8x8 Mobile Air Defense Gun Missile System China P
22 LUYANG III Chinese Class DDG China P
23 BM-1 Russian (Type 85, Chinese) 107mm Single Launch Surface to Surface Rocket System China P
24 AH-1/AH-1A Chinese 155mm Towed Artillery China P
25 AH-2 Chinese 155mm Towed Artillery China P
26 Type 15 Chinese Main Battle Tank (MBT) China P
27 GSL-130 Chinese Tracked Comprehensive Mine Clearing Vehicle (TCMCV) China P
28 GCZ-110 Chinese Tracked Multi-Purpose Engineer Vehicle (TMPEV) China P
29 GCZ-112 Chinese Tracked Multi-Purpose Engineer Vehicle (TMPEV) China P
30 Z-9 Harbin (WZ-9) Chinese Medium Multi-Role Helicopter China 
31 HQ-7 (FM-80) Chinese Short-Range Air Defense Missile System China P
32 Type 63 Chinese 107mm Multiple Rocket Launcher China P
33 SA 321 Super Frelon (Super Hornet) French Multi-Role Helicopter France P
34 AS532 Cougar (H215M) French Multipurpose Helicopter France P
35 EC725 Caracal (H225M Super Cougar) French long-Range Tactical Transport Helicopter France P
36 SA-341/342 Gazelle French Light Utility Helicopter France P
37 SA-342L Gazelle French Light Attack Helicopter France P
38 VAB French 4x4 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) France P
39 VAB French 4x4 Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) France P
40 SA-341/342 Gazelle French Light Helicopter France P
41 Gepard German 35mm Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun German P
42 Leopard 2 German Main Battle Tank German P
43 Armbrust German 67mm Shoulder Fired Disposible Anti-Tank Missile Launcher German P
44 Polyphem German and French Multi-Role Short Range Cruise Missile Germany P
45 BO-105 German Light Utility Helicopter Germany P
46 EULe German Ground Based SIGINT Light Electronic Support System Germany P
47 Leopard 2A German Main Battle Tank Germany P
48 RESOLVE British Tactical Electronic Warfare Manpack System Great Britain P
49 FV101 Scorpion British Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle Great Britain P
50 FV101 Scorpion 90 British Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle Great Britain P
51 FV102 Striker British Anti-Tank Missile Carrier Great Britain P
52 FV103 Spartan British Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Great Britain P
53 FV104 Samaritan British Armored Ambulance Great Britain P
54 FV105 Sultan British Command and Control Vehicle Great Britain P
55 FV106 Samson British Armored Recovery Vehicle Great Britain P
56 FV107 Scimitar British Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle Great Britain P
57 Shorland S55 British Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Great Britain P
58 FV101 Scorpion 90 British Amphibious Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle Great Britain P
59 Panther V (BCC 67/VRQ 327) British Portable VHF Frequency Hopping Secure EPM Radio Great Britain P
60 Panther V (BCC 67/VRQ 327) British Vehicle-Mounted VHF Frequency Hopping Secure EPM Radio Great Britain P
61 Meerkat-SA British Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) System Great Britain P
62 FEG AK-63/AMM Hungarian 7.62mm Assault Rifle Hungary P
63 BrahMos Indian / Russian Multi-Role Short Range Cruise Missile India P
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64 BrahMos II Indian / Russian Multi-Role Short Range Cruise Missile India P
65 Tondar-69 Iranian Surface to Surface Short Range Ballistic Missile Iran P
66 Shahab-3A Iranian Medium Surface to Surface Medium Range Ballistic Missile Iran P
67 Shahab-3B Iranian Medium Surface to Surface Medium Range Ballistic Missile Iran P
68 2S1 (Gvozdika) Iranian 122mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) Iran P
69 Raad-2 (Thunder 2) Iranian 155mm Self-Propelled Artillery Iran P
70 Raad-2M Iranian 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) Iran P
71 Karrar Iranian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Iran P
72 Chieftain MK 3 Iranian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Iran P
73 Zulfiqar-1 Iranian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Iran P
74 Zulfiqar-2 Iranian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Iran P
75 Zulfiqar-3 Iranian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Iran P
76 M110 Iranian 203mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) Iran P
77 M107 Iranian 175mm Self-Propelled Gun (SPG) Iran P
78 BMP-1 Iranian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Iran P
79 BMP-2 Iranian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Iran P
80 SA-5 Gammon (S-200 Vega) Iranian Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Iran P
81 SA-20C (S-300PMU-2) Iranian Long Range Air Defense Missile System Iran P
82 Ra'ad (Thunder) Iranian Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Iran P
83 Khordad-3 Iranian Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Iran P
84 9K330 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet) Iranian Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Iran P
85 Fateh-110 Iranian Surface-to-Surface Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) Iran P
86 CSA-41 (FM-80) Iranian Short-Range Air Defense Missile System Iran P
87 Naze'at 10-H Iranian Long-Range Artillery Rocket Iran P
88 Naze'at 6-H Iranian Long-Range Artillery Rocket Iran P
89 9K35M Strela-10M (SA-13 Gopher) Iranian Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Iran P
90 Fadjr-5 Iranian 333 mm Long-Range Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Iran P
91 Fadjr-3 Iranian 240 mm Intermediate-Range Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Iran P
92 BM-21 Grad Iranian 122mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) Iran P
93 M115 Iranian 203mm Towed Howitzer Iran P
94 Hadid HM20 Iranian 122mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) Iran P
95 GHN-45 Iranian 155mm Towed Gun-Howitzer Iran P
96 M-46 Iranian 130mm Towed Gun Iran P
97 D-20 Iranian 152mm Towed Gun-Howitzer Iran P
98 M114A1 Iranian 155mm Towed Howitzer Iran P
99 D-30 Iranian 122mm Towed Gun Howitzer Iran P
100 Type 63 Iranian 107mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) Iran P
101 Oerlikon GDF-001 Iranian 35mm Towed Anti-Aircraft Gun Iran P
102 Toophan (BGM-71A TOW) Iranian Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Iran P
103 EE-9 Cascavel Mark 3 Iranian Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle Iran P
104 Sayyad Iranian Multi-Purpose Armored Vehicle Iran P
105 FV101-EX Scorpion Iranian Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle Iran P
106 M113A1-EX Iranian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Iran P
107 BTR-50-EX Iranian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Iran P
108 BTR-60-EX Iranian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Iran P
109 Panha 2091 (Toufan I) Iranian Attack Helicopter Iran P
110 Shahed-129 Iranian Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) Iran P
111 Mohajer-1 Iranian Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Iran P
112 Mohajer-2 Iranian Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Iran P
113 Mohajer-2N Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Iran P
114 Mohajer-3 (Dorna) Iranian Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Iran P
115 Mohajer-4 (Hodhod) Iranian Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Iran P
116 Mohajer-6 Iranian ISTAR Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Iran P
117 Ababil-2 Iranian Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Iran P
118 AT-5 Towsan Iranian Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Iran P
119 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) Iranian Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Iran P
120 RPG-29-EX (Vampir) Iranian 105mm Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) Launcher Iran P
121 Fateh-110 Iranian Surface to Surface Short Range Ballistic Missile Iran P
122 Sayyad Iranian Multi-Purpose Armored Vehicle Iran P
123 SA-5 Gammon (S-200 Vega) Iranian Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Iran P
124 9K330 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet) Iranian Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Iran P
125 CSA-41 (FM-80) Iranian Short-Range Air Defense Missile System Iran P
126 Zulfiqar 3 Iranian Main Battle Tank Iran P
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127 BTR-50 (Export) Iranian Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Iran P
128 Sayyad-1 (SA-2 Guideline) Iranian Strategic Surface-to-Air (SAM) System Iran P
129 MP-DF 100 Israeli Manpack DF/COMINT System Israel P
130 IAI Searcher Mk II Israeli Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Israel P
131 IAI Searcher Mk I Israeli Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Israel P
132 IAI Searcher Mk III Israeli Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Israel P
133 VTT-323 Korean 107mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) North Korea P
134 VTT-323 (M1973) North Korean Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) North Korea P
135 NoDong-1 Noth Korean Surface to Surface Medium Range Ballistic Missile North Korea P
136 R-330Zh Zhitel, Russian Cellular Jamming and Direction Finding System Russia P
137 Tipchak, Russian UAV Russia P
138 T-14 Armata Russian Main Battle Tank Russia P
139 S-500 Russian Air Defense Artillery System Russia P
140 BMPT, Terminator Russian Armored Fighting Vehicle Russia P
141 Nerehta Russian Armed Unmanned Ground Vehicle (AUGV) Russia P
142 Kurganets-25 Russian Tracked Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
143 Kurganets-25 Russian Tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
144 K-17 Bumerang Russian 8x8 Wheeled Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
145 K-16 Bumerang Russian 8x8 Wheeled Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
146 RS-28 Sarmat Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Russia P
147 3M22 Russian Cruise Missile Russia P
148 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (Dagger) Russian Cruise Missile Russia P
149 9M730 Burevestnik (Storm Petrel) Russian Nuclear Powered Cruise Missile Russia P
150 Poseidon Russian Underwater Unmanned Vehicle Russia P
151 Peresvet Russian Air and Missile Defense Laser Russia P
152 SSC-8 (9M728) Russian Ground Launched Cruise Missile Russia P
153 Kh-101 / Kh-102 Russian Air Launched Cruise Missile Russia P
154 SS-N-27 Sizzler Russian Multi-Purpose Cruise Missile Russia P
155 SS-N-26 Strobile Russian Anti-Ship Short Range Cruise Missile Russia P
156 SS-N-30A Kalibr Russian Multi-Role Long Range Cruise Missile Russia P
157 Kh-55 Russian Multi-Role Long Range Cruise Missile Russia P
158 9M14 Malyutka Russian MCLOS Wire-Guided Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Russia P
159 BMP-1 Russian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
160 BMP-1P Russian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
161 9K111 Fagot Russian SACLOS Wire-Guided Anti-Tank Missile (ATGM) Russia P
162 BMP-1D Russian Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
163 BMP-2 Russian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
164 BMP-2M Berezhok Russian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
165 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) Russian Man-Portable Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Russia P
166 BMP-2K Russian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
167 BMP-3 Russian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
168 9K116-1 Bastion (AT-10) Russian Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Russia P
169 BMP-3M Russian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
170 BMP-3K Russian Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
171 GAZ-2330 Tigr Russian Light Utility Vehicle Russia P
172 PKP Pecheneg Russian 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Gun Russia P
173 GAZ-2975 Tigr Russian Light Utility Vehicle Russia P
174 2S7 Pion Russian 203mm Self-Propelled Gun (SPG) Russia P
175 T-72A Russian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Russia P
176 T-72B Russian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Russia P
177 T-72AK Russian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Russia P
178 T-72BM Russian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Russia P
179 T-72B3 Russian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Russia P
180 2S34 Hosta/Chosta Russian 120mm Self-Propelled Mortar (SPM) Russia P
181 BMD-4 Russian Airborne Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Russia P
182 ZSU-23-4 Shilka Russian 23-mm Self-Propelled Gun (SPG) Russia P
183 9K720 Iskander (SS-26 Stone) Russian Ballistic Missile and Cruise Missile Launcher Russia P
184 OTR-21 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) Russian Tactical Ballistic Missile System Russia P
185  S-400 Triumph (SA-21 Growler) Russian Long-Range Surface-to-air Missile System Russia P
186 S-300PMU-1 (SA-20 Gargoyle) Russian Long Range Surface-to-air Missile System Russia P
187 9K317M Buk-M3 (SA-X-27) Russian Medium-Range Air Defense Missile System Russia P
188 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly) Russian Medium-Range Air Defense Missile System Russia P
189 BM-30 Smerch Russian 300mm Multiple Launch Rocket System Russia P
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190 Tor (SA-15) Russian Short-Range Air Defense System Russia P
191 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher) Russian Short-Range Air Defense Missile System Russia P
192 BM-27 Uragan Russian 220mm Multiple Launch Rocket System Russia P
193 9A52-4 Tornado Russian Multiple Launch Rocket System Russia P
194 BM-21 Grad Russian 122mm Multiple Launch Rocket System Russia P
195 TOS-1 Buratino Russian 220mm Heavy Flamethrower System Russia P
196 TOS-1A Solntsepek Russian 220mm Heavy Flamethrower System Russia P
197 Uragan-1M (Hurricane-1M) Russian 220mm/300mm Multiple Launch Rocket System Russia P
198 2A65 Msta-B Russian 152mm Towed Gun Howitzer Russia P
199 D-30 Russian 122mm Towed Gun Howitzer Russia P
200 2B16 Nona-K Russian 120mm Towed Combination Gun Russia P
201 BTR-80 Russian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
202 KPV-14.5 Russian Heavy Machine Gun Russia P
203 BTR-80A Russian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
204 BTR-82 Russian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
205 RPM-2 Russian CBRN Reconnaissance Vehicle Russia P
206 RKhM-6 Povozka Russian CBRN Reconnaissance Vehicle Russia P
207 RKhM-4 Russian CBRN Reconnaissance Vehicle Russia P
208 BTR-60 Russian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
209 BRDM-2 Russian Amphibious Scout Car Russia P
210 BTR-60-R-145BM Russian Command Post and Communication Center Vehicle Russia P
211 Ural-4320 Russian General Utility Truck Russia P
212 Ural-43206 Russian 4x4 General Utility Truck Russia P
213 BMR-3M Russian Mine Clearing Vehicle Russia P
214 GMZ-3 Russian Tracked Minelaying Vehicle Russia P
215 IMR-2 Russian Combat Engineering Vehicle Russia P
216 1L269  Krasukha-2 Russian Broadband Multifunctional Jamming Station Russia P
217 1RL257 Krasukha-4 Russian Broadband Multifunctional Jamming Station Russia P
218 Moskva-1 (1L265) Russian Electronic Warfare Vehicle Russia P
219 Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind Russian Attack Helicopter Russia P
220 S-5M (ARS-57) Russian 55mm Rocket Russia P
221 UB-32 Russian 57mm Reusable, 32-salvo Rocket Pod Russia P
222 Mil Mi-28 Havoc Russian Attack Helicopter Russia P
223 Mil Mi-8 Hip Russian Medium Transport Helicopter Russia P
224 Eleron-3 Russian Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Russia P
225 Forposts Russian Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Russia P
226 Orlan-10 Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Russia P
227 T-72S (Shilden) Russian Main Battle Tank (MBT) Russia P
228 S-75 (SA-2 Guideline) Russian Strategic SAM System Russia P
229 SA-5 Gammon (S-200 Volga) Russian Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Russia P
230 MIM-23B Shahin Iranian Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Russia P
231 SA-20 Gargoyle (S-300PMU-1) Russian Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Russia P
232 MAZ-537 Russian 8x8 Special Wheeled Chassis Russia P
233 SA-20B Favorit (S-300PMU-2) Russian Long Range Air Defense Missile System Russia P
234 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet) Russian Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Russia P
235 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) Russian Short-Range Air Defense Gun/Missile System Russia P
236 Scud-C Russian Surface to Surface Short Range Ballistic Missile Russia P
237 SA-13 Gopher (9K35 Strela-10) Russian Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Russia P
238 M115 Russian  203mm Towed Howitzer Russia P
239 M-46 Russian 130mm Towed Gun Russia P
240 D-20 Russian 152mm Towed Gun-Howitzer Russia P
241 BTR-50 Russian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
242 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) Russian Man-Portable Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Russia P
243 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) Russian Man Portable Surface-to-Air Missile (MANPAD) Russia P
244 9K388 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch) Russian Man-Portable Air-Defense Missile System (MANPADS) Russia P
245 9K38 Igla (SA18 Grouse) Russian Man-Portable Air-Defense Missile System (MANPADS) Russia P
246 Misagh-2 Russian Man Portable Air-Defense Missile System (MANPADS) Russia P
247 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) Russian Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Russia P
248 RPG-29 (Vampir) Russian 105-mm Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) Launcher Russia P
249 Mil Mi-28 (Havoc) Russian Attack Helicopter Russia P
250 Ka-50 Black Shark (Hokum A) Russian Attack Helicopter Russia P
251 Ka-52 Alligator  (Hokum B) Russian Attack Helicopter Russia P
252 Mil Mi-28 (Havoc) Russian Attack Helicopter Russia P
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253 Mil Mi-2 Hoplite Russian Transport Helicopter Russia P
254 Mil Mi-8T (Hip-C) Russian Medium Transport Helicopter Russia P
255 Mil Mi-17 (Hip H) Russian Medium Transport Helicopter Russia P
256 Ka-27 Helix Russian Anti-Submarine Helicopter Russia P
257 Mil Mi-6 (Hook) Russian Heavy Transport Helicopter Russia P
258 Mil Mi-26 (Halo) Russian Heavy Transport Helicopter Russia P
259 Mil Mi-26T2 Russian Heavy Transport Helicopter Russia P
260 BTR-70 Russian Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
261 BTR-152 Russian Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
262 SG-43 Goryunov Russian 7.62mm Medium Machine Gun Russia P
263 BTR-T Russian Heavy Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
264 9K113 Konkurs ( AT-5 Spandrel) Russian Ant-Tank Guided Missile Russia P
265 BTR-87 Russian 8x8 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
266 BTR-90 (GAZ-5923) Russian 8x8 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
267 ASG-17 Plamya Russian 30mm Automatic Grenade Launcher Russia P
268 BTR-D Russian Airborne Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
269 BTR-ZD Russian Airborne 23mm Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun Russia P
270 BTR-80 Russian 8x8 Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
271 BTR-82A Russian 8x8 Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
272 BTR-50 Russian Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
273 BTR-40 Russian 4x4 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
274 BRM-1K Russian Amphibious Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) Russia P
275 BRM-1 Russia Amphibious Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) Russia P
276 9M337 Sosna-R (SA-24) Russian Short-Range Air Defense Missile System Russia P
277 BRM-3K Rys Russian Amphibious Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) Russia P
278 R-149BMR Russian 8x8 Amphibious Armored Command and Signal Vehicle Russia P
279 Andromeda-D Russian Automated Command and Control (C2) System Russia P
280 R-168-0,1U(M)E Russian VHF Handheld Radio Station Russia P
281 R-168-5UN(1)E Russian VHF Manpack-Vehicular Radio Station Russia P
282 R-168-100U-2 Russian Mobile VHF Radio Station Russia P
283 R-168-100KA Russian Vehicle Mounted HF Radio Station Russia P
284 R-438M Belozer Russian Mobile Satellite Communication Station Russia P
285 KamAZ-5350 Russian 6x6 General Utility Truck Russia P
286 R-149AKSh-1 Russian 6x6 Command and Signal Vehicle Russia P
287 R-1685KVE Russian Vehicle-Mounted HF Radio Set Russia P
288 R-163-50K Russian Mobile HR Telephone and Telegraph Radio Russia P
289 R-149MA3 Russian 8x8 Amphibious Command and Signal Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Russia P
290 Akatsiya-M ASU Russian Automated Command and Control System Russia P
291 URAL-375D Russian 6X6 General Utility Truck Russia P
292 9S52 Polyana-D4 ASU Russian Air Defense Command and Control System Russia P
293 Kvant 1L222 Avtobaza Russian 6x6 Electronic Support (ES) Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) System Russia P
294 1V152 FIST Kapustnik-B Russian 8x8 Amphibious Command and Forward Observer Vehicle Russia P
295 1V152 FDC Kapustnik-B Russian 8x8 Amphibious Command and Fire Control Vehicle Russia P
296 KamAZ-6350 Russian 8x8 Heavy Utility Truck Russia P
297 1L269 Krasukha-2 Russian 8x8 Mobile Electronic Warfare System Russia P
298 BAZ-6909 Russian 8x8 Special Wheeled Chassis Russia P
299 1L269 Krasukha-4 Russian 8x8 Mobile Electronic Warfare System Russia P
300 Borisoglebsk-2 Russian Multi-Functional Electronic Warfare (EW) Weapon System Russia P
301 GAZ Tigr-M Russian 4x4 Multipurpose Armored Vehicle Russia P
302 Kord 6P50 Russian 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun Russia P
303 Leer 2 Russian 4x4 Mobile Electronic Warfare (EW) Vehicle Russia P
304 2A45 Sprut-A Russian 125mm Towed Anti-Tank Gun Russia P
305 2A45M Sprut-B Russian 125mm Self-Propelled Towed Gun Russia P
306 R-142 NSA Russian 6x6 Command and Control Vehicle Russia P
307 Rtut-BM 1L262E (Mercury) Russian Mobile Electronic Defense Station Russia P
308 Groza R-934UM2 Russian 6x6 HF/VHF Electronic Warfare (EW) System Russia P
309 PSNR-8 Kredo-M1 Russian Portable Ground Surveillance Radar System Russia P
310 P-40 (Long Track) Russian Mobile 3-D UHF Radar System Russia P
311 Kasta 2E2 Russian 6x6 Low-Altitude All-Around 3-D Surveillance Radar System Russia P
312 Kasta 2E1 Russian 6x6 Low-Altitude All-Around 3-D Surveillance Radar System Russia P
313 BRDM-1 Russian 4x4 Amphibious Armored Scout Car Russia P
314 ZPU-4 Russian 14.5-mm Towed Anti-Aircraft Gun Russia P
315 ZU-23-2 Russian 23-mm Towed Anti-Aircraft Gun Russia P
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316 M-1939 (61-K) Russian 37mm Towed Anti-Aircraft Gun Russia P
317 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) Russian Man-Portable Infrared Homing Surface-to-Air Missile Russia P
318 S-300P (SA-10 Grumble) Russian 8x8 Long Range Surface-to-Air Missile System Russia P
319 OTR-21 Tochka (Scarab-B) Russian Surface to Surface Close Range Ballistic Missile Russia P
320 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly) Russian Medium Range Air Defense Missile System Russia P
321 Buk-M3 (SA-X-27) Russian Medium Range Air Defense Missile System Russia P
322 Iskander Russian Surface to Surface Short Range Ballistic Missile Russia P
323 Scud-C Russian Surface to Surface Short Range Ballistic Missile Russia P
324 MAZ-7910 Russian 8x8 Air Defense Missile System Carrier Russia P
325 30N6 Flap Lid Russian Ground-Based Target Acquisition and Tracking Radar Russia P
326 76N6 Clam Shell Russian Low Altitude Acquisition Radar Russia P
327 64N6 Big Bird Russian Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar Russia P
328 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin) Russian 4x4 Infrared Guided Surface-to-Air Missile System Russia P
329 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet) Russian Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Russia P
330 30N6E2 (Tombstone) Russian 3-D Long-Range Surveillance Radar Russia P
331 96L6E (Cheese Board) Russian Early-Warning and Acquisition Radar Russia P
332 MAZ-543 Russian 8x8 Special Wheeled Chassis Russia P
333 MT-T Russian Heavy Tracked Cargo Carrier Russia P
334 S-300V (SA-12s Gladiator) Russian Long-Range Air Defense Missile System Russia P
335 S-300V (SA-12b Giant) Russian Long-Range Air Defense Missile System Russia P
336 9S15 Billboard (9S15M Obzor 3) Russian 3D Surveillance Radar System Russia P
337 9S19 High Screen (9S19M Imbir) Russian Long-Range Sector Surveillance Radar System Russia P
338 9S32 Grill Pan Russian Fire Control Radar System Russia P
339 ZSU-57-2 (Ob'yekt 500) Russian 57mm Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun Russia P
340 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef) Russian Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System Russia P
341 AK-12 Russian 5.45 x 39mm Assault Rifle Russia P
342 BM-27 Uragan Russian 220mm MLRS Russia P
343 2S6M1 Tunguska Russian 30mm SP AA Gun & Missile System Russia P
344 RKhM-2 Russian CBRN Recon Vehicle Russia P
345 ZSU-57-2 Russian Self Propelled Air Defense Artillery Gun Russia P
346 IMR-2M Russian Obstacle Clearing Vehicle Russia P
347 9P162 KORNET LR Russian ATGM Launcher Vehicle Russia P
348 9A51 Prima Russian 122mm MLRS Russia P
349 QBZ-95 Chinese 8x42mm Bullpup Assault Rifle Russia P
350 PMP Russian Heavy Folding Pontoon Bridge Russia P
351 AK-47 Russian 7.62x39mm Assault Rifle Russia P
352 T-80B Russian Main Battle Tank Russia P
353 2B11 Russian 120-mm Towed Mortar Russia P
354 BOV M11 Serbian 4x4 Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle Serbia P
355 BOV-M Slovenian 4x4 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Slovenia P
356 BOV-1/POLO M-83 Slovenia 4x4 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Slovenia P
357 BOV-3 Slovenian 20mm Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Vehicle Slovenia P
358 URO VAMTAC ST5 BN3 Spanish 4x4 High-Mobility Tactical Vehicle Spain P
359 URO VAMTAC Spanish 4x4 High-Mobility Tactical Vehicle Spain P
360 EIMOS-81 Spanish 81mm Self-Propelled Integrated Mortar System Spain P
361 EIMOS-60 Spanish 60mm Self-Propelled Integrated Mortar System Spain P
362 AT-4 Swedish 84mm Single-Use Anti-Tank Recoilless Rifle Sweden P
363 Giraffe 50AT Swedish Air Defense Radar System Sweden P
364 Pz 87 (Panzer 87) Swiss Main Battle Tank Switerland P
365 Oerlikon GDF Switzerland 35mm Towed Anti-Aircraft Gun Switterland P
366 HC-2423 Swiss Secure GSM Telephone Switzerland P
367 Oerlikon GDF Swiss 35mm Towed Anti-Aircraft Gun with Skyguard Radar Switzerland P
368  DFINT-3T2 Turkish Transportable Direction Finding (DF) System Turkey P
369 Cobra Turkish 4x4 Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Turkey P
370 Cobra II Turkish 4x4 Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Turkey P
371 DFINT-3T2 Turkish Transportable Direction Finding (DF) System Turkey P
372 BMP-3 UAE Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) UAE P
373 Kolchuga-M Ukrainian Electronic Warfare (EW) Support System Ukrainian P
374 Warrior United Kingdom Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) United Kingdom P
375 VROD/VMAX American Versatile Radio Observation and Direction System USA P
376 M2 Browning American .50 Caliber Heavy Machine Gun USA P
377 M110 American 203mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) USA P
378 M110A1 American 203mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) USA P
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379 M110A2 American 203mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) USA P
380 M107 American 175mm Self-Propelled Gun (SPG) USA P
381 MIM-23A Hawk American Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System USA P
382 MIM-23B I-Hawk American Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System USA P
383 M114 American 155mm Towed Howitzer USA P
384 BGM-71A TOW American Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) USA P
385 M113 American Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) USA P
386 M113A1 American Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) USA P
387 M113A3 American Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) USA P
388 M113A2 American Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) USA P
389 AH-1W SuperCobra American Attack Helicopter USA P
390 AH-1J SeaCobra American Attack Helicopter USA P
391 AH-1F Cobra American Attack Helicopter USA P
392 MD 500 Defender American Light Multi-Role Helicopter USA P
393 MD 530F Cayuse Warrior American Scout Attack Helicopter USA P
394 M113A2 American Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) USA P
395 AH-1W Super Cobra American Attack Helicopter USA P
396 Arpia Venezuela Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Venezuela P
397 Zastava M84 Yugoslavian 7.62mm General-Purpose Machine Gun Yugoslavia P
CORRECTION NOTICE
Correction: It has come to the attention of  the TRADOC G-2 OE & Threat Analysis 
Directorate that a January 2017 Red Diamond Threats Newsletter article titled, “T-14 Gun-
Missile Tank for the Russian Federation” by Jon H. Moilanen list the secondary weapon system 
of  the T-14 Armata as a 7.62mm Machine Gun. In fact, the secondary armament of  the T-14 
Armata includes the Kord 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun and the 7.62mm PKMT (Kalashnikov) 
General Purpose Machine Gun. Both machine guns are remotely-controlled and mounted on top 
of  the unmanned turret. 
The Red Diamond Threats Newsletter January, 2017 article, “T-14 Gun-Missile Tank for the 
Russian Federation” by Jon H. Moilanen can be located at the following website:
https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/ace-threats-integration/m/documents/210978
The Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) “The T-4 Armata Main Battle Tank” profile can be 
viewed at the following website:
https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/T-14_Armata_Russian_Main_Battle_Tank

